Questionnaire for
the Draft Framework Guideline on Harmonised transmission tariff structures¹

Please provide the Agency with your full contact details, allowing us to revert to you with specific questions concerning your answers.

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Please indicate, if your company/organisation is:

- a. European association
- b. National association
- c. TSO
- d. Shipper or energy trading entity
- e. End-user
- f. Other (e.g. Power Exchanges, Storage Operator etc.), namely:……

Please provide, if relevant, reasoned indication if you wish to consider (part of) your response as confidential².

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¹ Further also referred to as “FG”. The resulting Network code on Harmonised transmission tariff structures is further also referred to as “NC”.

² The Agency shall carefully consider all responses received (whether confidential or not) subject to the provision that anonymous responses or responses from respondents who do not want their identity to be made
When writing your responses could you include how your arguments contribute to the objectives set out in section 1.2 of the draft Framework Guideline. For definitions please consult section 1.3 of the draft FG.

1. General provisions. Scope, application, definitions and implementation (Chapter 1 of the draft Framework Guideline)

1.1. Please explain whether any of aspects of the application of the draft FG (NC) to existing contracts would cause disproportionate effects on gas business in relation to 3rd Package objectives? Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples (if required, under confidentiality).

1.2. Please explain if any further definitions should be added for clarity of the FG (NC)?

In our opinion the definitions are correctly described in the Framework Guidelines.

Regarding to the general objectives of gas transmission tariff structure, we think it would be important to add the security of supply, an issue of utmost relevance in EU.

1.3. Please suggest the top-5 core indicators\(^3\) for monitoring the future EU-wide implementation of the future tariff FG (NC)? ACER and ENTSO-G both have legal obligations to monitor NC public will generally not be taken into consideration. The Agency will make public the number of responses received to formal consultations, the names of the respondents, and all non-confidential responses. Respondents may request that information or data in their responses is treated as confidential. The Agency will assess, in co-ordination with the respondents requesting confidentiality, which information or data shall not be made public and may request from the respondents an explanation of their confidentiality interests and a non-confidential version of their response for publication. The Agency will evaluate confidential responses as transparently as possible without undermining the respondents’ confidentiality interests.

\(^3\) An example of a core indicator could be e.g. the relative size of (positive or negative) Regulatory account in comparison to overall Tariff revenues, indicating under- or over recovery of the tariff regime in a specific entry- and exit zone.
implementation (in accordance with Article 9 (1) and Article 8(8) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 respectively).

2. Cost allocation and determination of the reference price (Chapter 2 of the draft Framework Guideline)

2.1. Transparency provisions

2.1.1 Do you agree with the level of harmonization proposed for the transparency in relation to tarification methodologies?\(^4\)

Yes, we agree with ACER proposal.

2.1.2 Would you support additional requirement(s) to ensure “reasonable and sufficiently” detailed tariff information?\(^5\) For example, one could consider including a provision such as: “the transmission system operators or relevant national authorities shall provide additional information if a significant tariff fluctuation is expected on a specific or on all entry- and exit points”.

Yes, we agree.

2.2 Cost allocation and reference price setting methodology, general questions.

\(^4\) Article 18(2) of Regulation 715/2009 states that: “In order to ensure transparent [...] tariffs [...], transmission system operators or relevant national authorities shall publish reasonably and sufficiently detailed information on tariff derivation, methodology and structure”. The proposed text in the draft FG seeks to ensure such reasonable and sufficient detailed information.

\(^5\) Article 18(2) of Regulation 715/2009 states that: “In order to ensure transparent [...] tariffs [...], transmission system operators or relevant national authorities shall publish reasonably and sufficiently detailed information on tariff derivation, methodology and structure”.
2.2.1 Do you agree with proposed level of harmonization for the reference price setting methodology, aiming for same methodology for all types of network users per one entry-exit zone?

Yes, we generally agree with the proposed level of harmonization for price setting methodology. Nevertheless we think that it would be important to clearly envisage in the FG specific cases in which it would be acceptable for NRAs to deviate from the general rules (e.g. use of distance criterion, 50-50 split between entry/exit points).

In particular we think that the FG should expressly allow exceptions to general rules where such exception aims to preserve/increase the security of supply of the Member States (provided, of course, that it has no detrimental effect on cross-border trade).

We understand the importance of promoting cross-border trade, but we also think that security of supply is of utmost relevance in Europe, given its high dependence on import; therefore each regulatory measure should try to avoid any possible negative impacts on security of supply.

In the answer 2.3.3 we provide an example of the possible negative impacts of some tariffs rules on the security of the system and how some deviation from the general rule could help.

2.3 Cost allocation and the Reference price setting methodology, detailed questions.

2.3.1 Do you agree with proposed option for setting reference prices for entry capacity i.e. to have methodology based on major cost driver (e.g. distance) unless use of equal tariffs can be justified?

Yes, in general terms we agree with a methodology based on major cost drivers (such as distance) for setting tariffs (provided that deviations are allowed in specific cases, in particular with reference to security of supply issues, as further detailed below).

2.3.2 Do you agree with proposed option for setting Reference prices for exit capacity i.e. to have methodology based on major cost driver (e.g. distance) unless use of equal tariffs can be justified?
Yes, we agree (with possibility of deviations, as reported in previous answers).

2.3.3. Do you agree with the cost allocation principle that revenue from entry points should equal 50% of revenue from all entry and exit points?

Yes, in general we agree with the 50-50 split between entry/exit points as a way to assure non discriminatory cost allocation for IPs between Member States.

As for entry/exit tariffs, though, we think that the FG should envisage that NRAs should have the possibility to deviate from this general rule in some specific cases, in particular with reference to security of supply.

We think, for instance, that in some cases it could be justified to attribute higher quotas of revenues to domestic exit points, in order to make domestic customers pay for the security of supply that otherwise would be paid by importers/exporters.

We try to explain this issue in a specific case.

Italy is a net importing country (with only a few transit towards other MS, so far) and imports gas from the North (mainly Russia) and from the South (Algeria, Libya).

Entry tariffs are very much differentiated; in particular they are higher for import coming from the South and lower for import coming from the North. This situation is primarily due to the application of a distance-based approach – given Italy’s geography and provided that Italian consumption is concentrated in the Northern area of the country. Moreover entry tariffs differentiation is magnified by the national regulation that limits the variability of domestic exit tariffs (the difference between adjacent exit points’ tariffs must be lower than a certain percentage of their average). Therefore, a very high share of the variability of transport tariffs is attributed to entry points: entry tariffs from the South are up to 7 times the entry tariffs from the North (the situation even worsened under the current regulatory period, as the increase of entry tariffs from South was higher than average due to some changes, among which stricter limits to the variability of exit tariffs).

In particular, an operator will pay around 7 M€ per each bcm of gas imported from the South but only 1-2 M€ (depending on the entry point) if importing from the North.
This is a very relevant difference (7 M€ are around 2-3% of the commodity cost of 1 bcm of gas; 1-2 M€ are less than 1%) and is it such to reduce the incentives to import from the South.

Indeed gas (commodity) pricing is independent from transport entry tariffs as gas producers do not take into account the Italian transport tariffs – nor their changes – when setting the prices of their contracts. In such a situation, importers from the South are clearly discriminated compared to importers from the North, due to the higher transport tariffs they pay. In general, when competing for the same Italian consumers, importers from the South don’t manage to recover all the tariffs costs from final customers.

For instance for final protected customers (households and small enterprises) the Regulator sets a reference price that, for entry points, is calculated as a weighted average of all entry tariffs; with this reference price operators receive around 4 M€/bcm of imported gas. It is clear that the importers from the South incur in losses (-3 M€/bcm in this example) while importers from the North gain (+2-3 M€/bcm). Similar figures are valid for other customers.

In a certain way it can be said that in this situation importers from the South are paying for the security of the system, provided that a diversification of the import sources is essential to guarantee supply during gas crisis (we saw it several times in last years, when Algerian import in Italy was fundamental as Russian gas exports decreased).

This is a situation in which we think it would be appropriate to deviate from the general rule. For instance the share of revenues coming from domestic exit points could be increased (in Italy we currently have a 50-50 split); in this way, higher costs for security of supply would be allocated to final customers, that are the ones who benefit from the diversification of the sources. We would like to stress that in this way the cross border trade would not be hampered (conversely it should be facilitated as entry/exit tariffs at IPs would be lower).

Alternatively, it would be also possible to reduce variability of entry tariffs using an “equalisation approach” (although in this case distortions for cross-border trade could arise).
2.3.4. Do you agree with application of the proposed options for setting reference prices to all entry and exit points (without any separate mechanism for the domestic points, whilst ensuring no discrimination between domestic and cross-border network usage)?

Yes, in general we think that it is reasonable to calculate also the exit domestic points with the same methodology used for entry/exit at IPs. As explained in the example reported in the previous answer, we think for instance that “equalization criterion” for exit domestic points could lead to potential distortions (e.g. higher variability of entry tariffs with potential negative impacts on security of supply). Anyway, also in this case we think that deviation from general rules are to be accepted when fundamental principles like security of supply are in danger.

2.4 Pricing of entry- and exit capacity on the transmission network to and from gas storage facilities (see also questions under ‘9’ Locational signals).

2.4.1. Do you agree with proposed option to base tariffs for entry and exit capacity on the transmission network to and from gas storage facilities at an adequate discount to other entry and exit points on the TSO?
In general terms we do not agree, see answer 2.4.2.

2.4.2. Do you agree with harmonization of such a discount across all storage points in the EU?
We do not agree. We think that decisions on storage tariffs are to be taken at national level only.
Indeed storage facilities have different characteristics and purposes (e.g. seasonal, fast churn, system support) and so will provide different levels of benefit, if any, to the system. Further, to avoid discriminations, at national level it would be equally appropriate to assess the benefits of other entry points (such as LNG) and exit points (such as power stations) that can provide similar services as storage facilities.

2.4.3. If you prefer harmonization for an ‘adequate’ discount, which level of such a discount applied to firm capacity level do you advocate?

a. 0, because....
b. 0-30%, because......;
c. 30-50%, because......
d. 50-80%, because...
e. 80-100%, because....
f. No opinion or other suggestions, because....

Please give reasons for your answer, including how you would suggest to calculate the discount, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples, e.g. based on current practice in EU known to you. Would you propose alternative measures as to those proposed?

2.4.4. What are your views on harmonization of tariff measures, leading to harmonization of transmission tariff levels across all storage points in the EU (instead of harmonizing a discount across all storage points in the EU)?

Please reason your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Please consider question 2.4.2, where we also asked about your ideas on benchmarking of absolute entry-exit tariff levels for gas storage sites.

3. Revenue recovery (Chapter 3 of the draft Framework Guideline)


Introduction.

Revenue recovery (chapter 3), Reserve price for firm standard capacity products (chapter 4.1) and Payable price (chapter 7) cannot be considered separately. The main interaction is that a regime where auctions are used will have a greater level of uncertainty in revenues collected from auctions.

The use of specified in FG chapters 3, 4 and 7 policy options need to work together to meet the objectives of the FG whilst ensuring the TSO recovers their allowed revenues. There is a possibility that is in practice there might be under- or over recoveries, especially as a consequence of policy options regarding short term reserve prices and payable price. Therefore there will need to be a Regulatory Account to ensure the TSOs recover their allowed revenues.

3.1.1. Do you agree that the current draft FG proposals on Reserve prices for short term products, on revenue recovery and on payable price are consistent together?

a. Yes, because......;

b. No, because......;

c. No opinion, because......
Please give a brief explanation for your answer, including the beneficial and detrimental interactions you see. Would you propose alternative combinations, and if so please reason why?

3.1.2. Are the current draft FG proposals on Reserve prices for short term products, on revenue recovery and on payable price properly addressing the ambition for the pricing of transmission capacity to strike the right balance between facilitating short-term gas trading on one hand and providing long-term signals for covering costs and promoting efficient investments on the other?
   a. Yes, because......;
   b. No, because......
   c. No opinion, because......;

Please give a brief explanation for your answer, including the beneficial and detrimental interactions you see.

3.2 Regulatory account

3.2.1 Do you agree with the principle to set reference prices to minimise the difference between allowed and collected revenues?

   Yes, we agree with ACER proposal.

3.2.2 Do you agree with proposed level of harmonization of using the regulatory account?

   a. Yes, because......;
   b. No, because......
   c. No opinion, because....

   Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Would you propose an alternative option to that proposed?

3.2.3 Do you agree that NRAs should determine or approve how often and how fast the regulatory account has to be reconciled on a national level, whilst preserving balance between timely cost recovery and sudden adjustments to tariffs?

   Yes, we agree with ACER proposal.
3.2.4 What is your view on including the option to use the Regulatory Account (including the potential over-recoveries from auction premium) to contribute to solving congestion? How could this be done, especially in view of principles of non-discrimination and cost-reflectivity? Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples.

3.3. Reconciliation of Regulatory accounts.

3.3.1. Which option for the reconciliation of regulatory accounts do you prefer?

a. Option 1; because....

b. Option 2; because....If preferred, what percentage of revenues should be recovered through capacity charges and why?

c. No opinion, because.....

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Would you propose an alternative option to that proposed?

3.3.2. In line with the interdependency discussion above in question 3.1, what are your views on recovering revenues by means of a separate charge set at the start of the gas year with the aim of minimising the amount that goes into the regulatory account? This charge could be based either on gas flows (commodity) or capacity bookings (capacity). Then the regulatory account would be reconciled through the reserve or reference price. See chapter 3 of the draft FG.

3.3.3. Do you agree with application of the option on reconciling regulatory account to all entry and exit points (both domestic and cross-border)?

a. Yes, because......;

b. No, because......

c. No opinion, because....:

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Would you propose an alternative option to that proposed?

3.3.4. Do you agree that the regulatory account should be recovered by splitting the total under- or over-recovery across all entry and exit points in the same proportion as set out in the cost allocation methodology? For example if the cost allocation methodology is a
50:50 split then 50% of all under- or over- recovery will be from the entry points and 50%
from the exit points.

a. Yes, because......;

b. No, because.......  
c. No opinion, because....

In your explanations please include any quantitative evidence, tables and examples, where
appropriate. Would you propose alternative application as to that proposed? Please explain (if
relevant) the alternative proposals and reasons why.

4. Reserve prices (Chapter 4 of the Framework Guideline)

NB: when answering, please specify if your answer differs for daily, monthly and/or quarterly products.

4.1 General.

4.1.1 Do you consider it sufficient to have rules on firm, interruptible and non-physical backhaul
capacity products or are you aware of other capacity products that should be addressed in the
FG?

Yes, we agree with ACER proposal.

4.2 Reserve prices (firm)

4.2.1 Do you agree with proposed level of harmonization?

Yes, we agree with ACER proposal.

4.2.2 Do you agree with proposed option for the Reserve price for short-term products
including the possibility that the national regulatory authority may decide to allow for
higher short-term prices that may apply (via multiplier higher than one, but not higher
than 1.5) if there is risk of significant under-recovery of allowed revenues?

We do not agree with the proposed option for Reserve price for short term products. As already
stated in the answer to the previous ACER consultation document on harmonisation of transport
tariffs, we think that reserve price for firm short-term capacity service, such as for long-term
price, shall reflect both system transmission services costs and different risk profiles associated
with the duration of the contracts. For this reason, short-term tariffs must be higher than tariffs.
for long term capacity service. We also think that in this way we could protect long term contracts too, that will still be fundamental in the coming years for guaranteeing security of supply at reasonable prices (as it is a way to buy large quantities at stable prices from the oligopoly of gas producers - that will be still dominant also in the next future - limiting therefore their market power).

4.2.3 Do you agree with application of the proposal on short-term Reserve prices to entry and exit points where the Network Code on CAM applies, i.e. interconnection points only?

Yes.

4.2.4. What criteria would you propose to set the Reserve price for short-term products that will be higher than the price of an annual product, to interconnection points?

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Please include in your answer your views on use of seasonal factors.

4.2.5. Would you agree with using Seasonality (or other criteria, which you may suggest) of the systems as criteria to set the Reserve price for short-term products that will be higher than the price of an annual product, to interconnection points?

Yes.

4.3 Reserve prices (interruptible)

4.3.1 Do you agree with proposed option to set Interruptible Reserve prices at a discount to firm capacity where the discount is based on the likelihood of interruption, and to recalculate once a year?

Yes, Enel agrees.
4.3.2 If you prefer a fixed discount, which level of such a discount applied to firm capacity level do you advocate?

a. 0, because....; whereas risk of interruption is.....;
b. 0-30%, because......; whereas risk of interruption is.....;
c. 30-50%, because......; whereas risk of interruption is.....;
d. 50-80%, because...; whereas risk of interruption is.....;
e. 80-100%, because....; whereas risk of interruption is.....;
f. ......% (customized value, as above values are chosen arbitrary to allow for a global grouping of answers), because....; whereas risk of interruption is.....; and risk of interruption is calculated as follows:....

Please give reasons for your answer, including how you would calculate the discount, risk of interruption and link the discount to risk of interruption, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Would you propose alternative measures as to those proposed?

4.3.3 Do you agree with application of the proposed option to entry and exit points where the Network Code on CAM applies, i.e. interconnection points only?

Yes, we agree.

4.4. Reserve price (backhaul)

4.4.1 Do you agree with proposed level of harmonization?

Yes.

4.4.2 Do you agree with proposed option to set backhaul prices at a discount to firm capacity level so that Reserve prices reflect the level of actual marginal costs (= IT and administrative costs)?

Yes, Enel agrees.
4.4.3 Do you agree with application of the proposed option on backhaul capacity pricing to entry and exit points where the Network Code on CAM applies i.e. interconnection points only?

Yes, we agree.

5. Virtual IPs
Do you support the proposed option for Reserve price in Virtual IPs as EU-wide standard? Please reason your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples on balance between cost-reflectivity and cross border trade stimulation.

Yes. Obviously the reserve price for virtual interconnection points has somehow to be established based on a combination of the reserve prices that previously applied when individual entry or exit points were in place. Requiring the TNC to elaborate further on this would be helpful. But how much added clarity or guidance can be given prior to deciding on whether to go ahead and implement a virtual interconnection point is not entirely clear.

6. Bundled capacity products
6.1 Reserve price (Bundled)

6.1.1 Do you agree with proposed level of harmonization?
   a. Yes, because......
   b. No, because......
   c. No opinion, because.....

   Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Would you propose an alternative option to that proposed?

6.1.2. Do you agree with the proposed option that the sum of Reserve prices for unbundled capacity is used as bundled Reserve price?

Yes, we agree.

6.1.3 Do you agree with application of specified the proposal to entry and exit points where the Network Code on CAM applies i.e. interconnection points only?
Yes, Enel agrees.

6.2. Do you support the proposed option for Reserve price (if unbundled) as the EU-wide standard? Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples on balance between cost-reflectivity and cross border trade stimulation. We encourage you to specify if you support the Unbundled Reserve price being higher to support bundling of products.

a. Yes, because......;
b. No, because......
c. No opinion, because.....

Would you propose alternative measures to those proposed?

6.3 The Network Code on Tariffs shall specify that the revenues from Reserve price of bundled capacity products shall be attributed to the TSOs proportionally to the Reserve prices of their respective capacities in the Bundled Capacity. The revenues from the auction premium from bundled capacity above the Reserve price shall be split according to agreement between the relevant national regulatory authorities. Furthermore, the Network Code on Tariffs shall in the case that no agreement is concluded before the auction, specify that the revenues from the auction premium shall be split equally between the TSOs.

6.3.1 Do you agree with proposed level of harmonization in that approach above?

a. Yes, because......;
b. No, because......
c. No opinion, because.....

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Would you propose an alternative option to that proposed?

6.3.2 Do you agree with proposed option for splitting auction revenues from bundled products to the relevant TSOs?

a. Yes, because......;
b. No, because......
c. No opinion, because.....

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Would you propose an alternative option to that proposed?

6.3.3 Do you agree with application of the proposal to entry and exit points where the Network Code on CAM applies i.e. interconnection points only?

a. Yes, because...
b. No, because...
c. No opinion, because.....

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Would you propose an alternative option to that proposed?

7. Payable price

7.1.1 Do you agree with proposed level of harmonization?

Yes, Enel agrees.

7.1.2 Do you agree with the proposed option to set payable price equal to the current Reserve price for year in which capacity is used plus any premium?

Yes, we agree.

7.1.3 Do you agree with the application of specified options regarding payable price to entry and exit points where the Network Code on CAM applies i.e. interconnection points only?

Yes, we agree.

8. Incremental capacity (no explicit chapter in draft FG, implications at least to chapters 2/3 foreseen).

In EC letter ACER is invited to consider in the Impact Assessment if tarification principles should be developed in the Framework Guideline for Incremental Capacity.
Incremental capacity is defined as capacity that is provided (by investment) on top of capacity at an existing IP, after a ‘market test’ has been met. The market test sets out what the criteria are for providing incremental capacity. The key issue from ‘incremental capacity’ for tariffication is that incremental capacity can expose consumers to costs incurred by TSOs which may be problematic if incremental capacity costs are not fully recovered by users triggering the capacity provision as a result of the market test.

Therefore it is very important how economic test(s) (principles) are constructed at country- or even broader EU level, to get a balance between timely increases in capacity, efficient increases in capacity and under-recovery of revenues.

We note that in CEER-roundtable 2012 discussions on Incremental capacity experts have noted that harmonization of the specific parameters in the market test might not be needed, but rather a consistent approach to the principle of having a market test to trigger Incremental capacity may be needed at the EU level.

8.1. Please provide evidence of concrete problems with the current arrangements for incremental capacities, whereas these problems affect tariff structures in EU. Any quantitative evidence, tables and examples (if necessary, subject to confidentiality) are welcomed.

8.2. Please therefore consider if harmonization, or partial harmonization of any parameters in the “market test” is appropriate within Tariffication principles at EU-level?

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Please e.g. specifically address if FG/NC should set minimum and maximum thresholds for such a “market test”, whilst NRAs would set actual thresholds at national level. Please also address how such thresholds for a “market test” should take account of positive externalities (such as Security of Supply), as well as of the

6 Please consider the ongoing consultation on Incremental capacity issues by CEER, available via http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER CONSULT/OPEN%20PUBLIC%20CONSULTATIONS/Investment%20Procedures%20for%20Gas%20Infrastructure. Please also note that ACER will work with CEER during 2012 to further analyze the issues in this area.
risk that incremental capacity can expose consumers to costs incurred by TSOs which may be problematic if incremental capacity costs are not fully recovered by users triggering the capacity provision as a result of the market test.

8.3. Are there any other elements required in the Network Code on transmission tariff structures, to accommodate incremental capacity offer (e.g. influence on regulatory accounts, regulatory periods length, requirement for a fixed for period of years tariffs).

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples\(^7\).

9. **Usage of locational signals** *(no explicit chapter in FG, implications at least to chapters 2/3/4 foreseen)*.

Locational signals are considered to contribute to shippers using the system in a way which minimises future costs. Locational signals can be defined as specific tariff measures for specific entry or exit points in the system.

In EC letter ACER is invited to consider in IA if locational signals should be developed in the Network Code on transmission tariff structures. For example to address decisions on locating gas-fired power plants and/or gas storages and/or LNG terminals.

9.1 Please provide evidence of concrete problems with the current arrangements for locational signals. Any quantitative evidence, tables and examples (if necessary, subject to confidentiality) are welcomed.

\(^7\) Please specify per below options, if your answer differs, if the approach to Incremental capacity identification (and, where applicable, allocation) would be based on 1 of the following options:

- Open Seasons (according to 2007 GGPOS),
- Coordinated Open Seasons (in light of the experience gained in the years since 2007)
- Identification via TYNDP, GRIPs and/or national TYNDPs,
- Regular integrated capacity auction for incremental and existing capacity,
- Incremental capacity auction if demand is identified in a regular process, and
- One time integrated auctions.
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9.2. Are there any other elements required in the Network Code on transmission tariff structures to accommodate locational signals?

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples.

9.3. Please consider whether the chapter on ‘Reference price’ should have more options added in regard to use of locational signals. Please consider specifically how tariff structures can be used to signal investment for e.g. gas-fired power plants, storages, LNG terminals, etc.

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples.

9.4 Shorthaul as a form of ‘locational signal’ in e/e systems.

Recent THINK-study, commissioned by European Commission, recommended ‘some harmonization in natural gas transmission tarification to ensure that the breakdown of costs among grid users and among entry- and exit points respects the principle of cost-reflectiveness as much as possible. Adequate discounts on short-haul transports should be encouraged”.

Entry-exit systems require users who want to take gas onto the system and deliver it to others in the system to buy entry capacity (to allow them to flow gas from the entry point to the virtual hub) and exit capacity (to allow them to flow gas from the virtual hub to the exit point). If users want to flow significant volumes of gas from an entry point to a nearby exit point they may consider building their own pipeline between the two points if that is cheaper for the user than paying for entry and exit capacity plus any additional revenue recovery charges (as their own pipeline would also be subject to less onerous tariff regulation in general). Building additional pipelines when there is capacity available on the system may not be the most efficient way to develop the network. Whilst it must be considered that permitting construction of such a pipeline might not be a realistic option in all EU Member-States. E.g. in GB a user could decide to locate a CCGT (= Combined Cycle Gas Turbine power plant) 1 km from a large entry point and decide to build their own pipeline from the large entry point to their CCGT. This is an example of how such a concern arises in practice, stemming mainly from inefficiency of constructing an additional pipeline.

9.4.1. Should the FG have a tariff structure in place to avoid the incentive for inefficient building of pipelines (to avoid the entry-exit system charges) described above?

a. Yes, because.....
b. No, because.....
c. No opinion, because.....

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples.

9.4.2. How could this tariff structure be designed?

Please propose wording for a policy option (if needed).

9.4.3. Should there, in order to address risk of cross-subsidies and discrimination - be a limitation on the capacities that can be “shorthaul capacities”? Based on expert advice on current EU-practices, following options are proposed:

a. Maximum 50 km (only distances of maximum 50 km can be considered as shorthaul capacities)
b. Max 20% of the average gas travelling distance in the E/E system
c. Max 10% of the total capacities of a E/E system can be considered as “shorthaul”
d. Other, namely:........

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Please specifically address who should pay the difference between the shorthaul tariff and the overall tariffs.

9.5 Specific treatment of LNG (if any) considered, in view of considering specific storage treatment (see questions under 2.4).

LNG competes with the natural gas from other sources, like national production points or other entry points. It could therefore be argued that any discount on the entry and exit tariffs at points where CAP applies could produce a cross-subsidy, reducing cost reflectivity of system as a whole, and resulting in a discriminatory effect on the cross-border trade between LNG- and IP entry users. In addition, storage – contrary to LNG - is mostly considered as part of the system, as it uses gas, which has already ‘paid e/e fees’. Namely, gas injected into underground storages have flowed across the system, which means it
has been charged entry/exit fees, this is not the case for LNG which is stored after it has been unloaded from LNG-ship cargoes, before any entry fee on the transmission system is charged.

On other hand, it could be argued that LNG and Storage are both valuable flexibility tools in some EU gas market systems (especially in systems where LNG is due to geology & geographical situation potentially the only source of flexible gas) for shippers that should be stimulated, and similar to storage special treatment could be envisaged (contrary to gas production entry points, which with very few exceptions in EU, deliver much less flexibility in comparison to LNG). It must be also considered that – with similar logic – special treatments might be required by any end-user with flexibility for the system (e.g. power plants). In any case, justification is sought, as any special treatment must be reasoned and justified for a category of e/e points, to ensure non-discrimination.

9.5.1. Do you think that tariffs for entry and exit capacity from the LNG terminal could incorporate a discount relative to other entry and exit tariffs on the TSO, similar to the proposed option for underground gas storage?

a. Yes, because...
b. No, because....
c. No opinion, because....

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Please specifically address who should pay the difference between such a special tariff and the overall tariffs.

10. Effects Entry-Exit Zone mergers & Virtual IPs (no explicit chapter in FG, implications at least to chapters 2/3 foreseen).

In the CAM network code (art 5.1(10)) Virtual Interconnection points are addressed (see draft FG, chapter 5).

In EC letter ACER is invited to consider in IA if the effects of entry-exit zone mergers should be developed in the Network Code on transmission tariff structures. This could address, for instance, the topics of tariff alignment and the disappearance of interconnection points, and the corresponding cross-border tariffs, due to the zone merger’.

Both topics affect the setting of reserve prices at IPs and, more importantly, underlying cost allocation within and between entry-exit zones; as well as revenue recovery consequences.
10.1. Please provide evidence of concrete problems with the current arrangements for mergers of entry-exit zones at national level. Any quantitative evidence, tables and examples (if necessary, subject to confidentiality) are welcomed.

10.2. Please advise, if there are alternatives or additional requirements within Tarification setting harmonization steps, to accommodate ‘Effects Entry-Exit Zone mergers’ (once there). Please consider the Initial (draft) Impact assessment, when answering.

Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples.

11. What additional tariff structure measures do you envisage could improve the network code?
Please give reasons for your answer, including any quantitative evidence, tables and examples. Please also, if relevant, suggest and explain reasons why any of the proposed measures should rather have been left to voluntary exchange of best practices at national level (e.g. via Guidelines of Good Practice). 9

12. Please share below any further comments concerning the draft Framework Guideline.

13. Please comment on any factual incorrectness of the attached Initial (draft) Impact Assessment, if possible with specific page references, including quantitative evidence, tables and examples from your experience in the gas market(s) (if necessary, subject to confidentiality).

Thank you very much for your contribution, and do not hesitate to contact ACER staff if you have any questions regarding the questions.

9 Please e.g. specifically consider if the FG/NC should include an EU-wide provision providing for “incentives” for implementation of CMP measures, and or additional EU-wide provisions ensuring that transmission system operators do not experience detrimental effects as consequence of the roll-out of EU-wide implementation of the auctions under CAM NC and/or other NC.