Public Consultation on day-ahead and within-day multipliers
Based on Article 13(3) of the Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures for Gas

PC_2020_G_19

1. Objective

Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 2017 establishing a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas (‘NC TAR’) entered into force in 2017 and it has introduced a number of provisions on multipliers that are applicable for the calculation of short-term capacity products (quarterly, monthly, daily and within-day).

The NC TAR provides the possibility for the Agency to issue a recommendation to cap the multipliers used to calculate the reserve prices of day-ahead (‘DA’) and within-day (‘WD’) capacity products to 1.5.

The objective of this consultation is to gather views and information from stakeholders on the impact of DA and WD multipliers in order to assess the possibility of issuing a recommendation to limit the level of these multipliers.

The provision foreseeing this possibility is laid out in Article 13(3) of the NC TAR:

“By 1 April 2023, the maximum level of multipliers for daily standard capacity products and for within-day standard capacity products shall be no more than 1.5, if by 1 April 2021 the Agency issues a recommendation in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 that the maximum level of multipliers should be reduced to this level. This recommendation shall take into account the following aspects related to the use of multipliers and seasonal factors before and as from 31 May 2019:

- changes in booking behaviour;
- impact on the transmission services revenue and its recovery;
- differences between the level of transmission tariffs applicable for two consecutive tariff periods;
- cross-subsidisation between network users having contracted yearly and non-yearly standard capacity products;
- impact on cross-border flows.”
The Agency invites stakeholders to express their views on the points referred to in Article 13(3) of the NC TAR.

2. Target group

This consultation is addressed to European associations, national associations, TSOs, shippers or energy trading entities, end-users and others.

3. Deadline

Please provide your response by 9 December 2020, 23:59 hrs (CET).

4. Identification data and confidential information

Please indicate the following data:

Name:

Position held:

Phone number and contact e-mail:

Name and address of the company you represent:

Shell - York Road - London - UK

Your country:

IT - Italy

Other country, if not in the list above:

Please indicate, if your company/organisation is:

- European association
- National association
TSO  
Shipper or energy trading entity  
End-user  
Other (e.g. Power Exchanges, Storage Operator etc.).

If other, please specify below:

Any confidential information should be marked clearly as such, including the word ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ in the subject of the e-mail, as ACER will not treat e-mails which contain only a general disclaimer (usually automatically added) as containing confidential information. If respondents want to claim confidentiality, they should provide an explanation of their confidentiality interests and a non-confidential version of their response for publication. For more details on this, please see the Rules of Procedure of the Agency (Article 9 of Decision No 19/2019 of the administrative board of the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators of 11 December 2019).

Is your input into this consultation confidential?
- Yes
- No

5. Publication of responses and privacy

The Agency will publish all non-confidential responses, and it will process personal data of the respondents in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, taking into account that this processing is necessary for performing the Agency’s consultation task. For more details on how the contributions and the personal data of the respondents will be dealt with, please see the Agency’s Guidance Note on Consultations and the specific privacy statement attached to this consultation.

6. Related documents

- ACER Guidance Note on Consultations
- Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 2017 establishing a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas

7. Background
Multipliers are used to set tariffs for short-term gas transmission capacity products in comparison with the reference prices applied to yearly capacity products. Article 13 of the NC TAR sets out that the level for DA and WD multipliers for standard capacity products shall be no less than 1 and no more than 3. In duly justified cases, the level of the respective multipliers may be less than 1, but higher than 0, or higher than 3.

Overall, shippers use different capacity booking strategies taking into account their supply and demand portfolios, market dynamics and gas transmission tariffs both on yearly and short-term capacity products. For example, shippers may secure a certain amount of capacity with yearly capacity products while they cover the seasonal and short-term variations with short-term capacity products.

Multipliers can impact the gas market in various ways, depending on the balance between the short-term and the long-term:

On the first hand, relatively high multipliers on short-term products can deter network users from booking short-term capacity for trading or balancing purposes. On the other hand, high multipliers incentivises yearly bookings which are deemed favourable to TSOs revenue recovery and which allow shippers to flow gas across hubs even when spot market spreads are below the capacity reference price.

From a competition perspective, multipliers can also lead to different outcomes. They have a distributional effect, through the share of revenue recovered from users holding short-term or long-term capacity products. Multipliers can be set with the primary objective of avoiding cross-subsidisation between network users and enhancing the cost-reflectivity of reserve prices. In contrast, low short-term multipliers can be considered as a way to foster competition and to incentivise more dynamic booking strategies.

When setting multipliers, NRAs should consider these different interactions, as required by Article 28 of the NC TAR, to avoid a potential welfare loss for EU consumers.

8. Consultation topics and questions

For all the questions, please provide supporting evidence, which can include the identification of IPs were a referred event is relevant and/or a time period for the phenomena observed (how, when and for how long it applies). Supportive evidence can include data, tables and it can be accompanied by examples.

Factual evidence on the effects of the current provisions is highly relevant to evaluate their effectiveness and to assess whether a recommendation could lead to an improvement.

Topic 1: Changes in booking behaviour

1. What role do short-term capacity products (DA and WD) play in your capacity booking strategy (balancing activities, market arbitrage, supply profiling…)?

Short-term capacity plays all the functions mentioned and more, depending on the different markets as well on the specific long-term capacity portfolio available to us to serve a specific one. As such daily and within day capacity is essential to guarantee liquidity and efficient market functioning.
2. Have you observed that DA and WD multipliers impact booking behaviour and booking strategies (could be your own booking strategy or those of other market players)? For instance, have you observed that low DA and WD multipliers can shift contracted capacity from yearly capacity products to shorter-term capacity products?

- Yes
- No
- Other

2.1 Please explain your reasoning:

They do but not to the extent that they induce more long-term bookings which are materially driven by other considerations as explained further in subsequent answers. Their impact is more related to whether capacity in booked or not on a given day and therefore more or less gas flown from one market to the other.

---

**Topic 2: Impact on the transmission services revenue and its recovery**

3. Have you observed that DA and WD multipliers impact transmission services revenue and its recovery? In particular, could low DA and WD multipliers induce under-recoveries of TSOs’ revenues on a transitory basis (in most systems such under-recoveries are systematically rolled to next years by revenue reconciliation mechanisms)?

- Yes
- No
- Other

3.1 Please explain your reasoning:

---

**Topic 3: Differences between the level of transmission tariffs applicable for two consecutive tariff periods**

4. Have you observed significant changes in DA and WD multipliers in the 2016-20 period?

- Yes
- No
- Other

4.1 Please explain your reasoning:
Values set at the time of the implementation of the TAR NC have generally stayed unchanged across Europe, often in lack of a thorough cost/benefit analysis made available by NRAs and/or TSOs. On the contrary the discussion has remained on a qualitative basis limiting the possibility to argue in one or the other direction based on objective evidence.

5. Have you observed that changes in multipliers have led to changes in the tariffs applicable for other capacity products (e.g. yearly capacity product)?

- Yes
- No
- Other

5.1 Please explain your reasoning:

As per previous answer the situation has remained fundamentally unchanged across Europe in the past years. Where changes in tariffs have occurred, they have not been driven by the impact of multipliers or at least they have not been quantitatively justified in this way by NRAs. Also, where a change in booking behavior has materialized, this has been limited to the fact that less long-term bookings have been made at the end of previously existing reservations. This may point at short term multipliers' limited ability to steer booking behavior in a context of:

- Broader uncertainties linked to the future role of gas;
- European gas markets being sufficiently integrated and therefore needing no further investment to be undertaken.

**Topic 4: Cross-subsidisation between network users having contracted yearly and non-yearly standard capacity products**

6. Have you observed that DA and WD multipliers have placed or could place in the coming years excessive costs on short-term capacity compared to the costs recovered through yearly capacity products?

- Yes
- No
- Other

6.1 In the affirmative, how could it affect competition and market integration?

While we could say that multipliers have so far played a limited role in promoting long-term bookings, the less of the latter we see the more shippers preferring short-term ones will have to bear larger system costs, especially in the case of large multipliers. Finding the right balance is really the role of NRAs and their appreciation of future gas supply and demand scenarios. What we do observe regularly is that short term multipliers do contribute to larger spreads among markets (e.g. see TTF-PSV, VTP-PSV) and represent a barrier to market integration, potentially leading to vicious cycles and exasperating the risk mentioned in the question.

6.2 Please explain how you evaluate if costs for short-term bookings are excessive compared to yearly bookings and on what criteria you base your argument.
The assessment is primarily done by observing the spread between markets. If this is kept open by the sole cost of short-term capacity, then there might be a problem as it is unlikely that more short-term booking will materialize leading to a risk of stranded assets in the longer term.

**Topic 5: Impact on cross-border flows**

7. Have you observed that DA and WD multipliers have impacted or could impact in the coming years cross-border flows? Consider, in particular, situations where high DA and WD multipliers may prevent the use of available cross-border capacity or where high multipliers for DA and WD capacity product may negatively affect the correlation between gas prices in neighbouring hubs.

- Yes
- No
- Other

7.1 Please explain your reasoning:

Please see answers above.

8. Have you observed that DA and WD multipliers can be a market barrier (for instance by granting an advantage to holders of long-term bookings)?

- Yes
- No
- Other

8.1 Please explain your reasoning:

Please see answers above.

**Conclusion**

9. From your perspective, what would be the advantages and disadvantages of capping DA and WD multipliers at 1.5 across Europe?

Pretty intuitively the lower the multipliers, the more short-term capacity bookings, with all the implications this entails in terms of cost distribution, market integration, and market spreads. At the qualitative level the arguments for lower or higher multipliers have been extensively discussed. Therefore, in general we can say
that capping multipliers at 1.5 for DA and WD capacity would promote short-term capacity products to facilitate trading and market liquidity. A cap of 1.5 could strike the right balance between ensuring network users pay their fair share of the costs for the provision of capacity, whilst keeping in line with requirements to incentive network users only to book the required volume of capacity without adversely impacting spreads between markets.

This said a multiplier of 1 does give shippers the choice of booking long or short term without any cost differential and with the same liability and this should be given due consideration at least in mature markets.

What is probably missing are clear methodologies to set the most efficient level for multipliers. While market participants can express their views, these are inevitably influenced by their capacity portfolio and their business model. The TAR NC invites NRAs to consult on multipliers to be applied. Unfortunately, the role of these consultations has been marginal in triggering changes and insufficient in arguing in favor or against a change. Therefore, what is needed going forward are models and scenarios that match expected flows and expected TSOs’ revenues depending on different booking behaviors and the need for future network investment. Without the risk is that the debate remains inconclusive.

Thank you for your reply!