

**DECISION No 03/2026  
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY  
FOR THE COOPERATION OF ENERGY REGULATORS**

**of 4 February 2026**

**on the Nominated Electricity Market Operators proposal for the  
harmonised maximum and minimum clearing price methodology for the  
single intraday coupling**

THE EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR THE COOPERATION OF ENERGY REGULATORS,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators<sup>1</sup>, and, in particular, Article 5(2) thereof,

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management<sup>2</sup>, and, in particular, Articles 9(5), 9(6)(i) and 9(13) as well as Article 54(1) thereof,

Having regard to the outcome of the consultation with the concerned regulatory authorities and nominated electricity market operators,

Having regard to the outcome of the consultation with ACER's Electricity Working Group ('AEWG'),

Having regard to the favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators of 28 January 2026, delivered pursuant to Article 22(5)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942,

Whereas:

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> OJ L 197, 25.7.2015, p. 24.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

- (1) Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management (the ‘CACM Regulation’) laid down a range of requirements for cross-zonal capacity allocation and congestion management in the day-ahead and intraday markets in electricity. These requirements also include specific provisions for the single intraday coupling (‘SIDC’) in accordance with Chapter 5 of the CACM Regulation and, particularly, for setting the harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices in accordance with Article 54(1) of the CACM Regulation.
- (2) According to Article 9(13) of the CACM Regulation, read in conjunction with Articles 9(1), 9(6)(i) and 41(1) of the CACM Regulation, the NEMOs responsible for developing a proposal for terms and conditions or methodologies may propose amendments to the HMMCP methodology for SIDC. Since the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2019/942, such proposals must be submitted directly to ACER for revision and approval.
- (3) On 14 November 2017, ACER issued its Decision No 05/2017 on the nominated electricity market operators’ (‘NEMOs’) proposal for harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices for SIDC according to Article 54(1) of the CACM Regulation (the ‘HMMCP methodology for SIDC’).<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, on 10 January 2023, ACER issued Decision No 02/2023 on the first amendment of the HMMCP methodology for SIDC.<sup>4</sup>
- (4) The present Decision follows from the All NEMOs’ proposal to amend the HMMCP methodology for SIDC as approved by Decision No 02/2023. Annex I to this Decision sets out the amended HMMCP methodology for SIDC, pursuant to Article 54(1) of the CACM Regulation, as revised and approved by ACER.

## 2. PROCEDURE

- (5) On 4 August 2025, the All NEMO Committee submitted, on behalf of all NEMOs, a proposal for amendments to the HMMCP methodology for SIDC in accordance with Article 54(1) of the CACM Regulation (the ‘Proposal for amendment’).

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<sup>3</sup> Decision No 05/2017 of 14 November 2017 on the NEMOs’ proposal for harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices for single intraday coupling.

<https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/en/Electricity/MARKET-CODES/CAPACITY-ALLOCATION-AND-CONGESTION-MANAGEMENT/4%20Maxmin%20prices/Action%204b%20-20ID%20ACER%20Decision%2005-2017%20on%20NEMOs%20HMMCP%20for%20single%20intraday%20coupling.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Decision No 02/2023 of 10 January 2023 on the NEMOs’ proposal for harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices for single intraday coupling.

<https://www.acer.europa.eu/Individual%20Decisions/ACER%20Decision%2002-2023%20on%20HMMCP%20SIDC.pdf>

(6) Between the submission of the Proposal for the amendment on 4 August and 15 December 2025, ACER consulted with the NEMOs and regulatory authorities on the proposed amendments and definitions. During this period, a series of online meetings and email follow-ups were arranged, detailed as follows:

- 2 October: discussion with NEMOs and regulatory authorities during the dedicated working level meeting;
- 21 October: discussion with the regulatory authorities during the CACM Task Force<sup>5</sup> meeting;
- 18 November: discussion with the regulatory authorities during the AEWG<sup>6</sup>;
- 9 December: discussion with the regulatory authorities during the CACM Task Force meeting;

(7) On 28 November 2025, ACER shared its preliminary position on the Proposal for amendment with the NEMOs and the regulatory authorities and invited them to submit their written observations and any requests for an oral hearing by 10 December 2025.

(8) On 10 December 2025, the All NEMO Committee, on behalf of all NEMOs, provided all NEMOs' written feedback to ACER's preliminary position. The NEMOs did not request an oral hearing in response to ACER's preliminary position.

(9) An oral hearing was organised on 15 December 2025 on ACER's initiative. NEMOs' views (oral and written) are summarised in Section 5.1.

(10) ACER drafted minutes of the oral hearing and shared them with all NEMOs and participating NRAs on 15 December 2025. In the accompanying email ACER indicated that based on the new additional information gathered during the oral hearing (as further described in Section 5.1), the HMMCP methodology for SIDC would be revised to address the issue raised by the NEMOs in case of uncoupled NEMO Trading Hub in multiple NEMO bidding zone.

(11) Between 19 December 2025 and 9 January 2026, ACER consulted the AEWG, including a discussion during the 8 January 2026 AEWG meeting. The AEWG provided its advice on the draft decision on 12 January 2026 (see Section 5.2).

(12) On 28 January 2026, the Board of Regulators issued a favourable opinion pursuant to Article 22(5)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942 on the draft Decision.

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<sup>5</sup> ACER's platform for discussing all issues connected to the CACM Regulation with the regulatory authorities.

<sup>6</sup> ACER's high-level platform for discussing all issues connected to all network codes and guidelines.

### **3. ACER'S COMPETENCE TO DECIDE ON THE PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT**

- (13) According to Article 5(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942, ACER shall revise and approve proposals for terms and conditions or methodologies, based on network codes and guidelines adopted before 4 July 2019, which require the approval of all regulatory authorities.
- (14) Since the CACM Regulation was adopted before 4 July 2019 and Articles 9(5), 9(6)(i) and 54(1) thereof provide that the proposal for the HMMCP methodology for SIDC is subject to the approval of all regulatory authorities, the competence to decide on the proposal for amendment of these terms and conditions lies with ACER.
- (15) According to Article 9(13) in joint reading with Articles 9(1), 9(6)(i) and 54(1) of the CACM Regulation, NEMOs responsible for developing the proposal to the HMMCP methodology for SIDC (i.e. all NEMOs) may propose amendments to this methodology. In accordance with Article 5(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942, ACER is competent to decide on these amendments.
- (16) According to Article 5(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942 and Article 9(5) of the CACM Regulation, ACER, before approving the proposal for amendment, shall revise it where necessary, after consulting the respective NEMOs, in order to ensure that the methodology is in line with the purpose of the CACM Regulation and contributes to market integration, non-discrimination, effective competition and the proper functioning of the market.
- (17) Therefore, based on Article 5(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942 as well as Articles 9(5), 9(6)(i) and 9(13) and 54(1) of the CACM Regulation, ACER is competent to decide on the Proposal for amendment.

### **4. SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT**

- (18) The Proposal for amendment includes the following elements:
  - a) a 'Whereas' section;
  - b) general provisions, including on the scope of application and on harmonised definitions, set out in Title 1;
  - c) provisions on the maximum and minimum prices, including the values of the harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices for SIDC, criteria and process for adjusting the maximum and minimum prices for SIDC, set out in Title 2;
  - d) final provisions on the publication and implementation and language disclaimer, set out in Title 3;

(19) The Proposal for amendment, therefore, consists of the complete HMMCP methodology for SIDC as set out in Annex I to ACER's Decision No 02/2023, subject to the following amendments proposed by the NEMOs:

a) Whereas:

- i. addition of the information about public consultation and webinar, organised by NEMOs;
- ii. language improvements;

b) Article 4:

- i. the addition of a new rule for adjustment of the maximum or minimum clearing price, where the traded volume in the bidding zone per Market Time Unit (MTU) shall be at least equal to 5 MW;
- ii. in addition to the numerical digit, the corresponding word form of the number (and vice versa) is added;

## **5. SUMMARY OF THE OBSERVATIONS RECEIVED BY ACER**

### **5.1. Consultation on ACER's preliminary position**

(20) The following paragraphs provide a summary of the views which ACER received on its preliminary position during the hearing phase between 28 November and 10 December 2025 and during the oral hearing (requested by ACER) on 15 December 2025. Written and oral comments were submitted by the all NEMO Committee on behalf of all NEMOs.

(21) On the already existing provisions for excluding illiquid bidding zones, NEMOs confirmed that the existing methodology includes the conditions for the exclusions of bidding zones with no traded volumes or with no available cross-zonal capacity. In addition, NEMOs, in their written response, stated that the proposal should not be considered complementing the existing conditions for exclusion but as an additional condition arising from single market participants bids, possibly related to mistakes.

(22) On the fixed value of 5 MW as a proposed liquidity metric, NEMOs provide explanation that the 5 MW threshold was calibrated considering the 5% of 100 MW, which is the average referenced value, traded in all the bidding zones in IDAs in December 2024. In addition, NEMOs reference the 100 MW value in the Transparency Regulation, as the threshold for which a plant outage has to be declared in order not to be considered inside information according to the REMIT Regulation and as such being the minimum threshold to be considered for security reasons of the grid functioning. The choice of the 5% value was defined by NEMOs arbitrarily with the intention to set a minimum level of significance for traded volume.

(23) On the role of cross zonal capacity, in their written response, NEMOs provided further clarification that although “the availability of cross-zonal capacity can mitigate the effect of scarcity, what was observed in IDAs is that in many bidding zones there were no

offered volumes, so it seems that the main cause for scarcity is not the lack of interconnection capacity among bidding zones but the poor market interest, in some bidding zones, from market participants to participate in the market. Such conditions should not, at least to the NEMOs understanding, be considered as events reflecting market fundamentals”.

(24) During the oral hearing, NEMOs provided additional clarification regarding the representativeness of SDAC volumes and confirmed that that the bidding zones currently participating in SDAC demonstrate a sufficient level of liquidity, such that the introduction of an additional liquidity metric may not be necessary. At the same time, they also provided an example of how a normally liquid SDAC bidding zone could become illiquid. Such a situation may occur in bidding zones where two or more NEMOs operate. If at least one NEMO trading hub becomes uncoupled while another NEMO trading hub remains coupled within the same bidding zone, this could potentially lead to the emergence of price spikes. This is because bids submitted via the uncoupled NEMO, which under normal circumstances contribute to bidding zone liquidity, would no longer participate in the price formation process. As a result, only bids submitted through the remaining coupled NEMOs would be reflected in price formation, which may not provide sufficient liquidity for the bidding zone and may not reflect the market fundamentals.

## 5.2. Consultation of the AEWG

(25) The AEWG provided its advice on 12 January 2026 and endorsed the draft Decision.

## 6. ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSAL FOR THE AMENDMENT

### 6.1. Legal framework

(26) According to Article 3(b) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 ('the Electricity Regulation'), electricity market rules shall encourage free price formation and shall avoid actions which prevent price formation on the basis of demand and supply.

(27) According to Article 3(g) of the Electricity Regulation, market rules shall deliver appropriate investment incentives for generation, in particular for long-term investments in a decarbonised and sustainable electricity system, energy storage, energy efficiency and demand response to meet market needs, and shall facilitate fair competition thus ensuring security of supply.

(28) Pursuant to Article 7(2)(d) of the Electricity Regulation, day-ahead and intraday markets shall provide prices that reflect market fundamentals, including the real time value of energy, on which market participants are able to rely when agreeing on longer-term hedging products.

(29) According to Article 10(1) of the Electricity Regulation, there shall be neither a maximum nor a minimum limit to the wholesale electricity price.

(30) According to Article 10(2) of the Electricity Regulation, the harmonised limits on maximum and minimum clearing prices for intraday applied by the NEMOs shall be

sufficiently high so as not to unnecessarily restrict trade, be harmonised for the internal market and take into account the maximum value of lost load (VoLL). NEMOs shall also implement a transparent mechanism to automatically adjust the technical bidding limits in due time in the event that the set limits are expected to be reached. The adjusted higher limits shall remain applicable until further increases under that mechanism are required.

- (31) Article 3 of the CACM Regulation sets out the objectives of capacity allocation and congestion management cooperation. Pursuant to Article 3(h) of the CACM Regulation, the Regulation aims, *inter alia*, at respecting the need for a fair and orderly market and fair and orderly price formation.
- (32) Article 54 of the CACM Regulation sets out specific requirements for the HMMCP methodology for SIDC. According to Article 54(1), the HMMCP methodology for SIDC shall be developed by all NEMOs, in cooperation with the relevant TSOs, and shall take into account an estimation of the VoLL. It shall be subject to consultation in accordance with Article 12 of the CACM Regulation. Moreover, in accordance with Article 9(13) of the CACM Regulation, the NEMOs' proposals for amendment to the terms and conditions or methodologies shall also be subject to consultation in accordance with Article 12 of the CACM Regulation.
- (33) As a general requirement, Article 9(9) of the CACM Regulation sets out that every proposal for terms and conditions or methodologies includes a proposed timescale for their implementation and a description of their expected impact on the objectives of the CACM Regulation.
- (34) Further, for coherence reasons and as confirmed by Article 9(9) of the CACM Regulation, the proposal for terms and conditions or methodologies must be in line with the objectives of the CACM Regulation defined in its Article 3.

## 6.2. Assessment of legal requirements

### 6.2.1. Assessment of the requirements of the Electricity Regulation

- (35) In Articles 4(1)(d) and 4(2)(d) of the Proposal for amendment, the NEMOs adapted the list of conditions that are to be met to trigger an adjustment of the harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices for SIDC ('the Triggering conditions'), by adding the following requirement: The traded volumes in the bidding zone per market time unit in the auction shall be at least equal to the 5 MW.
- (36) The Triggering conditions introduced in ACER decisions 05/2017 and 02/2023 ensure that the requirement under the third sentence of Article 10(2) of the Electricity Regulation is met: '*NEMOs shall implement a transparent mechanism to adjust automatically the technical bidding limits in due time in the event that the set limits are expected to be reached.*' Those Triggering conditions are defined as the minimum conditions that lead to an expectation of the harmonised maximum or minimum clearing price to be reached. Indeed, single events that can occur due to a specific, circumstantial set of conditions should not be considered as events leading to an expectation of the harmonised maximum

or minimum clearing price to be reached and should therefore be excluded from the Triggering conditions.

- (37) The existing HMMCP methodology for SIDC is already effective in ensuring that the automatic adjustment of the clearing prices is not triggered by a single market participants bid, possibly related to mistakes or isolated events of price spikes. The automatic adjustment is triggered only in case when the clearing price exceeds a value of 70 percent of the maximum or minimum clearing price in at least two market time units in at least two different days within 30 rolling days from the first price spike, as defined in the existing methodology, Articles 4(1)(a) and 4(2)(a). Moreover, Articles 4(1)(b) and 4(2)(b) of the existing methodology set the transition period to 28 days following the completion of the event, during which the harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices are limited to their current values and during which no further adjustments are triggered.
- (38) In ACER's view, further extending the set of Triggering conditions, solely based on the minimum traded volume, as defined in the Proposal for amendment, would unnecessarily restrict an orderly and free price formation, which is in principle to be pursued according to Article 3(b) of the Electricity Regulation and Articles 3(a) and 3(h) of the CACM Regulation. Furthermore, by limiting the harmonised maximum or minimum clearing price to its then applicable levels, it would restrict investment incentives for generation and demand response which are to be achieved according to Article 3(g) of the Electricity Regulation. The harmonised maximum or minimum price limit for SIDC would therefore be insufficiently high to avoid unnecessary restrictions on trade. In that regard, it would not comply with the second sentence of Article 10(2) of the Electricity Regulation: '*Those limits shall be sufficiently high so as not to unnecessarily restrict trade [...]*'.
- (39) Available cross-zonal capacities are reducing or completely removing the potential impact of limited liquidity in some of the bidding zones and as such the available cross-zonal capacities are part of the free, fair and orderly price formation and reflect the market fundamentals, as required by Article 7(2)(d) of the Electricity Regulation. While the proposed new metric does not directly affect free price formation, its fixed value effectively excludes certain auction results and, consequently, the cross-zonal capacities used to determine those results from being considered as potential triggering events. This removes such cross-zonal capacities from the market fundamentals that should impact the maximum or minimum clearing price and reflect actual market conditions, as required by the Electricity Regulation.
- (40) ACER considers that this additional condition for the automatic adjustment of the harmonised maximum and minimum clearing price for SIDC of the Proposal for amendment can have negative impacts on the efficient functioning of the SIDC market.
- (41) Therefore, in ACER's view, Articles 4(1)(d) and 4(2)(d) of the Proposal for amendment are not in line with the Electricity Regulation and the proposed changes therein were removed.

(42) In addition, ACER introduced an amendment to address the concern raised by the NEMOs regarding the situation where one NEMO Trading Hub becomes uncoupled while at least one other NEMO Trading Hub remains coupled within the same bidding zone. The NEMOs described this situation during the oral hearing in the context of SDAC; however, ACER considers that the same situation is also applicable to SIDC. ACER agrees with the NEMOs that decoupling event constitutes a procedural step within SIDC operations, arising from technical reasons, and therefore is entirely unrelated to market fundamentals or free price formation. While ACER considers that the current HMMCP methodology for SIDC is already effective in ensuring that the automatic adjustment of clearing prices is not triggered by isolated price spike events, such as those described in Paragraphs (36) and (37), it nevertheless recognises that the occurrence of such a procedural event is not in line with Article 7(2)(d) of the Electricity Regulation. Accordingly, ACER introduces amendments to Articles 4(1)(d) and 4(2)(d) of the Proposal for amendment in order to exclude such event and bidding zone from the adjustment mechanism.

(43) Subject to the changes and amendments proposed and described above, the Proposal for Amendment complies with the requirements set out in Article 10(2) of the Electricity Regulation.

#### **6.2.2. Assessment of the requirements in Article 54(1) of the CACM Regulation**

(44) The Proposal for amendment does not affect the finding in ACER's Decisions No 05/2017 and 02/2023 that the requirements of Article 54(1) of the CACM Regulation are fulfilled, except the amendments introduced in Articles 4(1)(d) and 4(2)(d) of the Proposal for amendment which, however, cannot be approved for the reasons explained in Section 6.2.1 above.

(45) Therefore, the Proposal for amendment, except for the amendments proposed in Articles 4(1)(d) and 4(2)(d), fulfils the requirements of Article 54(1) of the CACM Regulation.

#### **6.2.3. Assessment of the requirements in Articles 9(13) and 12 of the CACM Regulation**

(46) The NEMOs, through the All NEMO Committee, consulted the public on the reassessment of the HMMCP methodology for SIDC from 24 February until 24 March 2025 and published the responses received and summaries thereof.

(47) Therefore, ACER considers that the Proposal for amendment and its subject matter has been consulted with the public in such a way that stakeholders could present their views effectively and that Article 12 of the CACM Regulation and Article 9(13) of the CACM Regulation can be deemed as satisfied.

#### **6.2.4. Assessment of the requirements in Article 9(9) of the CACM Regulation**

(48) Recitals (7) to (14) of the 'Whereas' section in the Proposal for amendment describe the expected impact of the HMMCP methodology for SIDC on the objectives listed in Article 3 of the CACM Regulation and remained unchanged in comparison to the version

of the HMMCP methodology for SIDC according to ACER's Decisions No 05/2017 and 02/2023.

(49) Therefore, the Proposal for amendment complies with the requirement of the inclusion of the implementation timescale and of the description of the expected impact on the objectives, in accordance with Article 9(9) of the CACM Regulation, except the amendments introduced in Articles 4(1)(d) and 4(2)(d) of the Proposal for amendment which, however, cannot be approved for the reasons explained in Section 6.2.1 above.

#### **6.2.5. Assessment of other points of the Proposal for amendment**

(50) ACER introduced some necessary editorial changes to improve the readability and the form.

### **7. CONCLUSION**

(51) For all the above reasons, ACER considers the Proposal for amendment in line with the requirements of the CACM Regulation, provided that the amendments described in this Decision are integrated in the Proposal for amendment, as presented in Annex I to this Decision. The amendments are necessary to ensure that the Proposal is in line with the purpose of the Electricity Regulation and the CACM Regulation and contributes to market integration, non-discrimination, effective competition and the proper functioning of the market.

(52) Therefore, ACER approves the Proposal for amendment subject to the necessary amendments. To provide clarity, Annex I to this Decision sets out the Proposal for amendment as amended and approved by ACER,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

#### *Article 1*

The harmonised maximum and minimum clearing price methodology for single intraday coupling pursuant to Article 54 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 is amended and approved as set out in Annex I to this Decision.

#### *Article 2*

This Decision is addressed to:

Bursa Română de Mărfuri S.A. (BRM)

BSP Energy Exchange LLC (BSP)

CROATIAN POWER EXCHANGE Ltd (CROPEX)

EirGrid plc (EirGRID)

EPEX SPOT SE (EPEX SPOT)

ETPA Holding B.V. (ETPA)

Gestore dei Mercati Energetici S.p.A. (GME)  
Hellenic Energy Exchange S.A. (HENEx)  
HUPX Hungarian Power Exchange Company Limited by Shares (HUPX)  
Independent Bulgarian Power Exchange EAD (IBEX)  
Nord Pool European Market Coupling Operator AS (Nord Pool)  
OKTE, a.s. (OKTE)  
OMI Polo Español S.A. (OMIE)  
Operatorul Pieței de Energie Electrică și de Gaze Naturale “OPCOM” SA (OPCOM)  
OTE, a.s. (OTE)  
SONI Limited (SONI)  
Towarowa Giełda Energii S.A. (TGE)

Done at Ljubljana, on 4 February 2026.

***- SIGNED -***

*For the Agency  
The Director ad interim*

V. ZULEGER

Annexes:

Annex I – Harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices to be applied in all bidding zones which participate in single intraday coupling pursuant to Article 54 of the Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management

Annex Ia – Harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices to be applied in all bidding zones which participate in single intraday coupling pursuant to Article 54 of the Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management in track change compared to the Proposal for amendment - (for information only)

*In accordance with Article 28 of Regulation (EU) 2019/942, the addressees may appeal against this Decision by filing an appeal, together with the statement of grounds, in writing at the Board of Appeal of the Agency within two months of the day of notification of this Decision.*

*In accordance with Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2019/942, the addressees may bring an action for the annulment before the Court of Justice only after the exhaustion of the appeal procedure referred to in Article 28 of that Regulation.*