

ACER Decision on the third amendment of the implementation framework for the European platform for the exchange of balancing energy from frequency restoration reserves with manual activation: Annex III

For information only

**Evaluation of responses to the public consultation on
the proposal for amendment of the implementation framework for the European platform for the exchange of
balancing energy from frequency restoration reserves with manual activation**

1 INTRODUCTION

On 18 December 2025, the European Network of Transmission System Operators of Electricity ('ENTSO-E'), submitted a proposal for amendment of the implementation framework for the European platform for the exchange of balancing energy from frequency restoration reserves with manual and automatic activation ('the Proposal') on behalf of all transmission system operators ('TSOs') to ACER for approval.

In order to take an informed decision and in accordance with Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942, ACER launched a public consultation on 26 January 2026 inviting all interested stakeholders, including regulatory authorities and TSOs, to provide any comments on the Proposal. The closing date for comments was 23 February 2026.

This document provides a summary of responses to ACER's public consultation and ACER's evaluation of responses.

2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2195 ('Electricity Balancing (EB) Regulation') lays down a range of requirements for electricity balancing, platforms for the exchange of balancing energy as well as terms and conditions related to balancing. In particular, Articles 20(1) and 21(1) of the EB Regulation requires all TSOs to develop an implementation framework for a European platform for the exchange of balancing energy from frequency restoration reserves with manual ('mFRRIF') and automatic activation ('aFRRIF'), respectively.

Article 20(3)(f) of the EB Regulation requires all TSOs to include in the mFRRIF and aFRRIF a framework for harmonisation of the terms and conditions related to balancing set up pursuant to Article 18 of the EB Regulation. In particular, Article 18(1)(a) of the EB Regulation requires each TSO to develop a proposal regarding the terms and conditions for balancing service providers (BSPs). Further, Article 20 of the mFRRIF and aFRRIF sets out the framework for the harmonisation process of terms and conditions for BSPs, which requires amending the mFRRIF and aFRRIF to include common harmonisation proposal including the harmonised terms and conditions for BSPs. Consequently, all TSOs have developed harmonised terms and conditions for BSPs with primarily focus on the prequalification process. The requirements for the prequalification process are set out in Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 of 2 August 2017.

As highlighted in the ACER Wholesale Electricity Market Monitoring Report 2021¹, prequalification has historically been governed by national procedures, resulting in significant differences across Member States. At the same time, stakeholder feedback to ACER's public consultation 2024 on the draft Demand Response Network Code², highlighted strong expectations for lowering entry barriers, simplifying procedures, and creating a more harmonised prequalification process to facilitate faster access to balancing markets. ACER therefore considers it necessary to strike a balance between facilitating faster market access and maintaining system reliability in the prequalification process, to eventually establish a harmonised prequalification process that creates a level playing field across Member States, reduces entry barriers for all technologies, and maintains system reliability.

¹ ACER Wholesale Electricity Market Monitoring Report 2021: Prequalification processes for the provision of balancing services

² ACER public consultation on the draft network code on demand response, available at: <https://www.acer.europa.eu/public-consultation/pc2024e07-public-consultation-draft-network-code-demand-response>

3 LIST OF RESPONDENTS

By the end of the consultation period, ACER received comments from sixteen respondents.

Organisation	Country	Type
France	Energy Pool	Aggregator
Sweden	Modity Energy Trading AB	Energy supplier; Utility Company; Trader
Italy	Enel SpA	Utility Company; End-user; Market operator
Germany	RWEST	Energy supplier; Utility Company; Trader; Generator
Belgium	ENTSO-E	Transmission network operator
Denmark	Centrica	Trader; Aggregator
Belgium	EPIA SolarPower Europe	Other
France	RTE - réseau de transport d'électricité	Transmission network operator
France	EDF	Energy supplier; Utility Company; Generator; Market operator
Belgium	IFIEC Europe	End-user
Belgium	Eurelectric aisbl	Utility Company
Spain	Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L.	Other
Slovakia	Slovenské elektrárne, a.s.	Generator
Belgium	Energy Traders Europe	Trader
Spain	ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE)	Other
Belgium	smartEn - Smart Energy Europe	Aggregator (or association)

4 RESPONSES

ACER has carefully considered all stakeholders' comments in assessing the proposed amendment of the implementation framework for the European platform for the exchange of balancing energy from frequency restoration reserves with manual and automatic activation and finalising its position. This evaluation paper summarises all the respondents' comments and how these were considered by ACER. The table below is organised according to the consultation questions and provides the respective views from the respondents, as well as a response from ACER clarifying how their comments were considered in the present Decision.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 1.1: Do you agree with ACER's proposed modification to reduce the frequency of the stakeholder survey to every two years? 1.2: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
Energy Pool, Modity Energy Trading AB, Enel SpA, RWEST, Centrica, EPIA SolarPower Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), smartEn	The stakeholders broadly support moving from a three-year to a biennial stakeholder survey cycle, considering two years to be the most appropriate balance between regulatory stability and the need to respond to rapidly evolving market, technological and integration developments. Many respondents argue that annual assessments are too frequent given the time needed to develop and implement harmonisation proposals, while a three-year interval risks delaying necessary adaptations and slowing harmonisation progress. Several stakeholders stress that harmonisation efforts should go beyond timelines and qualification procedures to include a comprehensive comparative assessment of prequalification, ex-post verification and performance-monitoring requirements across Member States, which they view as essential to ensuring equivalent balancing service quality, fair competition and a level playing field for BSPs. Some respondents condition their support for a two-year cycle on such broader harmonisation efforts being undertaken and on identified priorities being consolidated and addressed in consultation with market participants. A minority view also suggests that flexibility should be retained so that emerging issues can be addressed outside fixed survey cycles when necessary.	ACER takes note of stakeholders' support for increasing the frequency of stakeholder engagement by reducing the interval between stakeholder surveys. ACER also supports the stakeholders' comments on increasing the frequency of stakeholder engagement by reducing the interval between stakeholder surveys from three years to two years and therefore proposes an amendment to Article 20 of the Proposals to reflect this change. ACER further agrees with increasing the frequency of stakeholder engagement by reducing the interval between stakeholder surveys. However, taking into account the need to strike an appropriate balance between market needs,

Respondents' views		ACER views
		sufficient opportunities for stakeholder feedback through multiple consultation and engagement processes, and the risk of overlap with national implementation, therefore, ACER considers that reducing the survey interval from three years to two years provides an appropriate balance. This amendment is reflected in Article 20 of the aFRRIF and mFRRIF in the corresponding Decisions.
ENTSO-E, RTE, IFIEC	In contrast, all TSOs and EDF maintain their preference for a three-year cycle, arguing that a two-year process would overlap with implementation phases, leave insufficient time for national implementation and stakeholder feedback, and create procedural confusion. IFIEC Europe does not require a frequency of two years. However, whenever issues arise, these should be tackled, independently of any pre-determined frequency of the stakeholder survey. As such, IFIEC Europe would be in favour of more flexibility in this regard.	ACER supports increasing the frequency of stakeholders' engagement by reducing the interval between stakeholder surveys from three years to two years. Taking into account the need to strike an appropriate balance between market needs, sufficient opportunities for stakeholder feedback through multiple consultation and engagement processes, and the risk of overlap with national implementation, ACER considers that reducing the survey interval from three years to two years provides an appropriate balance.

Respondents' views	ACER views
<i>Question 2.1: Do you agree that the prequalification process proposed by TSOs is sufficiently proportionate and inclusive for all types of market participants? 2.2: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>	

Respondents' views	ACER views
Energy Pool, Modity Energy Trading AB, Enel SpA, RWEST, Centrica, EPIA SolarPower Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn, IFIEC	The stakeholders broadly support further harmonisation and simplification of prequalification processes, considering this essential to reducing barriers, improving inclusiveness and ensuring a level playing field across increasingly integrated European balancing markets. Many respondents stress that current prequalification frameworks remain overly burdensome, lengthy and disproportionate for smaller, decentralised and aggregated assets such as demand response, storage, EV charging and renewable resources, as these processes were originally designed for large conventional generators. Stakeholders therefore call for more proportionate and streamlined procedures, including shorter timelines, simplified administrative requirements, representative or sample-based testing for portfolios of identical units, and harmonised technical requirements and verification practices across Member States. Several respondents highlight that divergent national approaches create competitive distortions for BSPs delivering identical balancing products. At the same time, many stakeholders emphasise that any simplification measures should remain technology-neutral, preserve system security and ensure equal treatment between market participants regardless of size. In this context, some respondents support conditional streamlining only where identical units or portfolios have already successfully completed prequalification, while others warn that aggregated failures of many small units can still pose significant system risks. ACER takes note of the stakeholder's support for further improving the proportionality of the prequalification process for all market participants across Member States and appreciates the additional observations provided. ACER supports further improving the proportionality of the prequalification process for all market participants across Member States and therefore proposes amendments to the Annex to the Proposals. This includes, among others, introducing an equal footing prequalification with ex-post verification and prequalification with activation test as defined in Article 5(6) in ACER Decision, simplification of the prequalification for small units with activation test and re- prequalification in Articles 6(4) and 9(4) in ACER Decision, respectively. These amendments aim to facilitate participation of small and identical units, introduce shorter and more proportionate timelines, and ensure a more balanced and equitable treatment between prequalification with activation test and with ex-post verification. ACER further agrees that there should be a level playing field for all market

Respondents' views		ACER views
		participants, regardless of their size, technology, or other characteristics, and across Member States. However, as prequalification processes were originally designed primarily for large conventional generators, the existing requirements and timelines are no longer fully fit for all market participants, including smaller FRR providers as new market participants in balancing markets. Therefore, it is important that prequalification processes become more inclusive and accessible for smaller FRR providers as well. Therefore, ACER amended the relevant provisions in Articles 5, 6 and 7 in the Decision, improving the proportionality of the requirements and timeline for prequalification processes.
ENTSO-E, RTE	All TSOs generally maintain that the existing framework is sufficiently proportionate and stressed the importance of robust qualification procedures to safeguard network operation and system security, although examples from several Member States are cited to demonstrate that faster and more flexible approaches can already be implemented successfully without compromising reliability.	ACER agrees that there should be a level playing field for all market participants, regardless of their size, technology, or other characteristics, and across Member States. However, as prequalification processes were originally designed primarily for large conventional generators, the existing requirements and timelines are no longer fully fit for all market participants, including smaller FRR providers as new market participants in balancing markets. Therefore, it is

Respondents' views		ACER views
		important that prequalification processes become more inclusive and accessible for smaller FRR providers.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 3.1: Do you agree that the current level of harmonisation in the Proposals fulfils the requirements for harmonising FRR prequalification and ex-post verification processes in order to provide a level playing field for all BSPs across Member States in an integrated European balancing market? 3.2: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
Energy Pool, Modity Energy Trading AB, Enel SpA, RWEST, Centrica, EPIA SolarPower Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn, IFIEC	The stakeholders express significant concerns that the current level of harmonisation proposed by all TSOs for FRR prequalification and ex-post verification is insufficient to ensure a genuine level playing field across European balancing markets. Many respondents highlight those key technical requirements, testing procedures, communication protocols, timelines and operational conditions remain heavily dependent on national terms and conditions, resulting in fragmentation, unequal treatment of BSPs and additional costs for market participants operating across multiple countries. Stakeholders particularly emphasise the lack of harmonised technical standards for areas such as response dynamics, communication systems, verification practices and balancing product quality, arguing that these inconsistencies distort competition despite participation in common European balancing platforms. Numerous respondents therefore call for a comparative assessment of existing national practices and the development of a roadmap towards deeper technical harmonisation of prequalification, ex-post verification and monitoring requirements, including harmonised standards during ramp-up and ramp-down phases. Several stakeholders also advocate shorter and more efficient prequalification timelines, improved switching processes between BSPs, and more proportionate approaches for small or aggregated assets.	ACER takes note of the stakeholder's support for further improving the harmonisation of the prequalification process for all market participants across Member States and appreciates the additional observations provided. While ACER fully supports stakeholders' calls for greater harmonisation to ensure a stronger level playing field for market participants across Member States, ACER considers that it is currently not feasible to fully harmonise all aspects and levels of detail of the prequalification framework. This is primarily due to the limited operational experience of TSOs with newer approaches such as ex-post verification, RPU switching, and re-prequalification processes, as well as the

Respondents' views	ACER views
	fact that many implementation aspects depend on operational and technical arrangements between TSOs and BSPs that may differ from country to country. ACER therefore considers that a certain degree of flexibility and national implementation discretion remains necessary at this stage. However, ACER underlines that, once sufficient practical experience has been gained and the implementation of the harmonised FRR prequalification framework has been monitored across Member States, further harmonisation and convergence of practices should be pursued over time. ACER further agrees that there should be a level playing field for all market participants, regardless of their size, technology, or other characteristics. However, as prequalification processes were originally designed primarily for large conventional generators, the existing requirements and timelines are no longer fully fit for all market participants, including smaller FRR providers as new market participants in balancing markets. Therefore, it is important that prequalification processes

Respondents' views		ACER views
		become more inclusive and accessible for smaller FRR providers.
ENTSO-E, RTE	All TSOs generally consider the current proposals sufficiently harmonised for the present stage of market integration and argue that the references to national terms and conditions remain necessary to reflect operational, regulatory and infrastructure differences between countries and to preserve system security. Several respondents further stress that harmonisation should remain technology-neutral and serve the broader objective of improving market access, flexibility and competition rather than becoming an objective in itself	While ACER fully supports greater harmonisation to ensure a stronger level playing field for market participants across Member States, however, ACER also agrees that it is currently not feasible to fully harmonise all aspects and levels of detail of the prequalification framework. This is primarily due to the limited operational experience of TSOs with newer approaches such as ex-post verification, RPU switching, and re-prequalification processes, as well as the fact that many implementation aspects depend on operational and technical arrangements between TSOs and BSPs that may differ from country to country. ACER therefore considers that a certain degree of flexibility and national implementation discretion remains necessary at this stage. However, ACER underlines that, once sufficient practical experience has been gained and the implementation of the harmonised FRR prequalification framework has been monitored across Member States, further harmonisation and convergence of practices should be pursued over time.

Respondents' views	ACER views
<i>Question 4.1: Do you agree that the FRR prequalification process proposed by the TSOs is compatible with all types of market participants features? 4.2: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>	
Energy Pool, Modity Energy Trading AB, Enel SpA, RWEST, Centrica, EPIA SolarPower Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), IFIEC	The stakeholders widely agree that the current FRR prequalification timelines are too long and risk creating unnecessary barriers to market entry, particularly for smaller and decentralised assets, with several respondents arguing that processes taking up to nine months are disproportionate and discourage participation by delaying revenue access for BSPs. There is strong support for significantly shorter and more predictable timelines, with multiple stakeholders suggesting that step-based deadlines (including fixed time limits for test result notifications) would improve legal certainty and efficiency, and some proposing end-to-end timelines of a few weeks to a couple of months as already demonstrated by certain TSOs. While many respondents emphasise the importance of preserving system security and maintaining robust qualification standards, they consistently argue that simplification and proportionality should apply to all units, not only to small ones and that flexibility should be allowed for TSOs to maintain or implement shorter timelines where feasible, potentially with transitional arrangements. Views diverge on differentiation by asset size: some advocate tailored approaches or reduced requirements for smaller installations (including the possibility of ex-post verification for small mFRR units or simplified testing via representative subsets), while others argue that no distinction should be made to preserve a level playing field. There is also support for streamlining procedures for standardised or previously qualified technologies, including allowing simplified or subset-based re-prequalification for similar units within portfolios, provided that such approaches remain accessible to all market participants and do not undermine competition or consistency across Member States. Finally, Modity Energy Trading AB adds that prequalification process harmonization should also include regions not in EU, like Nordic harmonization with Norway should also be included in harmonization. ACER agrees that prequalification processes should be further simplified and that opportunities to reduce procedural timeframes should apply to all units, where feasible, to ensure a level playing field. ACER also recognises that shorter timelines can facilitate market entry for new providers and reduce unnecessary financial barriers. ACER considers that it should be able to apply shorter timelines where this can be achieved without compromising the quality and reliability of the prequalification process. To this end, ACER has reduced the prequalification timeline set out in Articles 5-7 in ACER Decision for the extended timeline applicable where an error occurs at any stage of the prequalification process, from up to nine months to a maximum of six months and ten working days. In Articles 8 and 9, ACER has also reduced the timeline for switching and re-prequalification from six weeks to 15 working days.

Respondents' views		ACER views
		ACER further agrees that there should be a level playing field for all market participants, regardless of their size, technology, or other characteristics. However, as prequalification processes were originally designed primarily for large conventional generators, the existing requirements and timelines are no longer fully fit for all market participants, including smaller FRR providers as new market participants in balancing markets. Therefore, it is important that prequalification processes become more inclusive and accessible for smaller FRR providers.
ENTSO-E	All TSOs considers that all TSOs proposals are compatible with all types of units (RPG or RPU). However, all TSOs would not have an opinion on whether the proposal is compatible for all types of market participants (all TSOs are not clear what is meant by all types of market participants).	ACER takes note of all TSOs clarification. By 'all types of market participants', ACER refers to different types of BSPs, e.g. decentralised, using different technologies and with smaller and identical RPUs/RPGs. ACER considers that the prequalification framework should be designed in a technology-neutral and proportionate manner, so that it does not create unnecessary barriers to the participation of different types of BSPs, while ensuring that the applicable technical requirements are met.

Respondents' views	ACER views
<i>Question 4.3: Do you agree that the timeline for the FRR prequalification process proposed by the TSOs in Article 5 of the Annexes to the Proposals is excessively long? 4.4: In case your answer to Question 4.3 is “Fully agree” or “Partially agree” or “Partially disagree”, could you propose a specific timeline or deadline for different phases of the prequalification process as outlined in Article 5(2)(b) (timeline for ‘Confirmation of application’), Article 5(2)(c) (timeline for ‘Technical evaluation’), Article 5(3) (timeline in case of incorrect and missing information) and Article 5(4) (timeline in case of negative results)?</i>	
Energy Pool, Enel SpA, RWEST, Centrica, Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn	The stakeholders broadly consider the proposed prequalification timelines to be too long and potentially harmful to market entry, especially for new and smaller BSPs, with concerns that the overall process could delay participation by 5-9 months. Most respondents support significantly shortening the administrative “confirmation of application” step, typically to around two weeks (with up to four weeks only in exceptional cases), and argue that it is largely procedural and should be streamlined through staffing and automation. For the technical evaluation phase, many suggest reducing the proposed three months to between one month and six weeks, emphasising that faster processing is feasible without compromising system security. There is also strong support for harmonising timelines across TSOs based on best practices rather than minimum standards, alongside calls to allow faster national processes, avoid overly rigid upper limits, and in some cases remove the possibility of regulatory derogations. Several stakeholders also propose that delays due to missing information, or resubmissions should not define the standard timeline, and some advocate for more radical simplification such as abbreviated procedures, differentiated timelines for small vs. large facilities, and even “administrative silence” leading to deemed approval if deadlines are missed. Stakeholders generally support shorter, more flexible timelines, while acknowledging the need for robustness. ACER supports stakeholders' views calling for shorter prequalification timelines and has therefore proposed amendments to reduce the duration of several steps in the prequalification process where timelines are not already prescribed in the existing legislation. ACER notes that certain timelines are already defined in Article 159 of the SO Regulation and therefore should remain unchanged, including the timelines related to the application submission phase, the technical evaluation process, and the deadlines for BSPs to provide additional information where applications are incomplete or errors are identified, as set out in the relevant Articles of the Annex to the Proposals. However, for other timelines established directly in the Annex of the Proposals,

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		ACER considers that reductions are possible without negatively affecting system security or operational reliability. Accordingly, ACER's amendments shorten several procedural deadlines and reduce the overall maximum prequalification duration from nine months to approximately six months and 15 working days (including additional time required if there are missing information in the application submission step and/or negative results in the technical evaluation step). To this end, ACER has reduced the prequalification timeline set out in Articles 5-7 in ACER Decision for the extended timeline applicable where an error occurs at any stage of the prequalification process, from up to nine months to a maximum of six months and ten working days. In Articles 8 and 9, ACER has also reduced the timeline for switching and re-prequalification from six weeks to 15 working days.
RTE	RTE does not recommend shortening the timelines proposed by all TSOs, as several steps are technically necessary and cannot be compressed. It highlights that different approaches are needed for aFRR and mFRR, since aFRR involves faster dynamics that cannot be adequately verified using 10-second resolution monitoring data, requiring BSPs to provide higher-resolution	ACER acknowledges that certain steps of the prequalification process may require time that cannot be compressed without compromising the necessary technical

Respondents' views	ACER views
data during prequalification. The confirmation of an application may also take more than four weeks, as applications often require amendments and may include extensive technical descriptions; while RTE generally completes this phase within four weeks, the longest cases have taken up to six weeks. Finally, the three-month timeline is mainly driven by the configuration and communication setup between RPU/RPGs and SCADA, which is a prerequisite for aFRR activation tests. Although the activation tests themselves take around one month, the full configuration process needs to be taken into account.	assessments. Nevertheless, ACER considers that the proposed timelines should be understood as maximum timeframes rather than standard processing times and encourages TSOs to complete the relevant steps sooner where feasible, particularly for standardised units or applications that do not require additional assessment. In addition, ACER supports stakeholders' views calling for shorter prequalification timelines and has therefore proposed amendments to reduce the duration of several steps in the prequalification process where timelines are not already prescribed in the existing legislation. ACER notes that certain timelines are already defined in Article 159 of the SO Regulation and therefore should remain unchanged, including the timelines related to the application submission phase, the technical evaluation process, and the deadlines for BSPs to provide additional information where applications are incomplete or errors are identified, as set out in the relevant Articles of the Annex to the Proposals. However, for other timelines established directly in the Annex of the Proposals, ACER considers that reductions are

Respondents' views	ACER views
	possible without negatively affecting system security or operational reliability.

Respondents' views	ACER views
<i>Question 4.5: Do you agree with ACER that the timeline and steps required to complete the prequalification process, as outlined in Article 5 of the Annexes to the Proposals, are excessively long and not fully compatible with small, identical, and standardised units? 4.6: If your answer to Question 4.5 is “Fully agree” or “Partially agree” or “Partially disagree”, could you propose a specific timeline or deadline, and indicate which phases of the prequalification process should be included or excluded, as set out in Article 5 of the Annexes of the Proposals?</i>	
Enel SpA, RWEST, Centrica, Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn, IFIEC	The stakeholders strongly support introducing streamlined and accelerated prequalification processes for small, standardised, and identical units, particularly where the same BSP and TSO have already successfully prequalified equivalent assets for the same services. A common view is that, in such cases, the technical evaluation phase is unnecessarily duplicative and should either be significantly reduced or largely skipped, focusing only on consistency checks rather than full re-prequalification, with suggested timelines ranging from around two weeks down to as little as 10 working days. Several respondents emphasise that this simplification should apply broadly and fairly to all market participants and technologies, provided that identical technical configurations have already been proven in operation, and some cite existing experimental approaches (e.g., simplified prequalification for aggregated or repeated identical assets). There is also agreement that aggregation of small units can still have system relevance, so any streamlined approach should be conditional on prior successful prequalification to maintain system security. More generally, stakeholders argue that the overall prequalification process remains excessively long and counterproductive, with some suggesting a full process should not exceed two to three months in any case, and that clearer, shorter procedures would improve preparedness incentives for BSPs while still ensuring system reliability. Overall, the responses consistently push for differentiation between standardised/identical units and more complex cases, enabling faster, simpler approval pathways without undermining operational security. ACER welcomes stakeholders' support for shortening and simplifying the prequalification process for identical units and products where the BSP and relevant units have already successfully completed prequalification. ACER agrees that, where the relevant technical capabilities have already been demonstrated, the process should avoid unnecessary repetition while ensuring that the applicable technical requirements and reliability of the balancing service continue to be adequately demonstrated. Therefore, ACER considers that streamlined prequalification procedures should, where technically justified, be available to all units and market participants, irrespective of their size, in order to ensure a level playing field. ACER

Respondents' views	ACER views
	agrees that such streamlining should be based on the relevant technical characteristics and demonstrated capabilities of the units, rather than their size alone, and should avoid unnecessary repetition of prequalification assessments while maintaining the reliability of balancing services. Nevertheless, due to the limited operational experience of TSOs with harmonised prequalification processes, as well as the fact that many implementation aspects depend on operational and technical arrangements between TSOs and BSPs that may differ from country to country, therefore ACER considers that a certain degree of flexibility and national implementation discretion remains necessary at this stage. However, ACER underlines that, once sufficient practical experience has been gained and the implementation of the harmonised FRR prequalification framework has been monitored across Member States, further harmonisation and convergence of practices should be pursued over time

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 4.7: Do you agree with ACER that the timeline in the event of a negative result of the technical evaluation proposed by the TSOs in Article 5(4) of the Annexes to the Proposals should be shorter than the general FRR prequalification process? 4.8: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
RWEST, Centrica, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE)	The stakeholders express mixed views on whether current prequalification timelines are appropriate, but a clear majority support the principle that re-verification or follow-up technical assessments should be significantly shorter than the full prequalification process, since they do not require a complete re-prequalification of technical data and can often be based on subsets or previously validated information. Several respondents argue that non-standard cases such as negative technical evaluations or repeated activation tests should not set the benchmark for standard timelines and should instead be handled within a few weeks rather than extending the process by months. Other stakeholders advocate for generally shorter deadlines (often around 10–15 working days per step), arguing that clearer and faster processes would reduce financial burdens and improve market entry conditions. Overall, while there is some divergence on how far timelines can safely be reduced, respondents broadly agree that re-prequalification phases should be more streamlined than initial prequalification, and that efficiency gains are possible without compromising system security.	ACER supports the views expressed by the stakeholders and agrees that prequalification timelines should be as short as feasible to facilitate market entry and avoid unnecessary financial costs for prospective BSPs. ACER considers that the proposed timelines should be understood as maximum timeframes and encourages TSOs to complete the relevant steps sooner where feasible, while ensuring that the necessary technical requirements and reliability of balancing services are maintained.
ENTSO-E, RTE	All TSOs and RTE emphasise that the proposed timelines represent maximum durations designed to ensure feasibility for BSPs, warning that overly short deadlines could create unnecessary pressure and even lead to application withdrawals without benefit to either side.	ACER supports the views expressed by stakeholders' responses. In particular, Article 159(3) of the SO Regulation establishes a fixed deadline of three months for the assessment of FRR prequalification applications following confirmation of application completeness, after which the reserve connecting TSO must notify its decision. ACER therefore considers that the possibility of subsequent negative technical evaluation results should not

Respondents' views		ACER views
		justify extending the prequalification timeline beyond the period prescribed in the SO Regulation. Where technical evaluation with negative result is identified, or where non-delivery or non-compliance occurs, Article 11 provides TSOs with appropriate measures, including the termination of prequalification status.
IFIEC Europe	IFIEC Europe did not have the opportunity to come with a harmonized proposal but insists that the goal should not be harmonization to the lowest common denominator	ACER agrees that harmonisation should not result in the lowest common denominator. The objective is to establish a common and appropriate framework while allowing shorter and more efficient practices where feasible, provided that the necessary technical requirements and a level playing field across Member States are maintained.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 5.1: Do you agree with ACER that ex-post verification should be considered an alternative to prequalification with an activation test, provided that the conditions required to ensure system security are fulfilled? 5.2: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
Energy Pool, RWEST, Centrica,	The stakeholders see ex-post verification as a potentially useful complement to traditional prequalification, particularly for reducing burdensome and costly activation tests especially for	ACER agrees that ex-post verification can facilitate participation in balancing

Respondents' views	ACER views
EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE)	small, standardised, or demand-side resources while maintaining system security through appropriate penalties and monitoring. Many respondents argue that current activation tests can be lengthy, expensive, and sometimes disproportionate, and that a simpler prequalification process combined with robust ex-post controls could improve market entry and participation without undermining reliability. Several stakeholders including demand-side and consumer-focused respondents support broader use of ex-post verification where adequate monitoring and penalties exist, highlighting that it can reduce barriers, speed up market entry, and improve flexibility provision, provided fairness is ensured. Across responses, there is strong and repeated concern that criteria for applying ex-post verification must be harmonised across Member States to avoid unequal treatment and distortions in the balancing market warning that fragmented national approaches could undermine a level playing field. Overall, while ex-post verification is widely seen as beneficial in specific, well-defined cases (e.g., small units, switching to a different BSP, or minor changes), stakeholders consistently emphasise that it must be clearly regulated, consistently applied, and supported by penalties and monitoring to preserve system integrity and market fairness. markets, provided that the necessary conditions to ensure system security and the reliable provision of balancing services are fulfilled. ACER also recognises the importance of avoiding unjustified differences in the application of ex-post verification across Member States. However, due to the current lack of experience, ACER acknowledges that not all criteria and characteristics of ex-post verification can be harmonised at this stage. Therefore, in Article 7 in ACER Decision, ACER has left it to the national terms and conditions for BSPs to define the verification criteria. However, with increased experience from TSOs, further improvements to harmonisation of ex-post verification criteria and requirements may become possible. In this context, ACER considers that introducing an equal-footing approach for prequalification with ex-post verification and prequalification with activation tests constitutes an appropriate first step towards a more harmonised and non-discriminatory prequalification framework across Member States. Therefore, while the framework should ensure sufficiently

Respondents' views		ACER views
		clear and consistent conditions for its application, it should allow the relevant national terms for BSPs and conditions to address specific operational requirements. ACER also recognises the importance of ensuring a level playing field between BSPs subject to activation tests and those for which ex-post verification is applied. In this respect, ACER considers that the use of ex-post verification should be subject to clear and appropriate conditions, while allowing sufficient flexibility to account for the relevant circumstances, including re-prequalification or switching of BSPs.
ENTSO-E, RTE	All TSOs stress that there is a clear split on whether ex-post verification can replace activation tests and that prequalification with activation tests should remain the standard approach, since ex-post verification may only reflect favourable operating conditions and does not always demonstrate performance under stress, while also cautioning against weakening system security requirements.	ACER supports stakeholders' view that the prequalification process should be simplified to enable faster market access. ACER further considers that prequalification with ex-post verification, as a means of facilitating faster market access for market participants, should be treated on an equal footing with prequalification based on activation tests. Accordingly, once the reserve connecting TSO has confirmed the completeness of an application, it should be able to determine, in accordance with the applicable national terms and

Respondents' views		ACER views
		conditions for BSPs, whether the applicant will undergo prequalification with activation test, prequalification with ex-post verification, or, where provided for, a simplified or “fast-track” prequalification process. This is reflected in Article 5(6) in ACER Decision. ACER considers that these approaches should be available on a non-discriminatory basis and should be subject to equivalent regulatory treatment. The conditions governing the application of prequalification with activation test, prequalification with ex-post verification, and any fast-track process should therefore be specified in the applicable national terms and conditions for BSPs and approved by the relevant regulatory authority.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 5.3: Do you agree that Article 6 of the Annexes of the Proposals correctly defines the conditions for RPU and RPGs to carry out ex-post verification? 5.4: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
Energy Pool, Enel SpA, RWEST, Centrica, EPIA	The stakeholders express strong concern that leaving the decision to allow ex-post verification largely to national terms and conditions risks undermining harmonisation and creating an uneven competitive playing field for BSPs operating across the same European balancing platforms. While	ACER supports stakeholders' view that prequalification with ex-post verification, as proposed by all TSOs, requires further

Respondents' views		ACER views
SolarPower Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn, IFIEC	many respondents agree that Article 6 of the Annex of the Proposals introduces useful clarity and a proportionate framework for ex-post verification, particularly with differentiated conditions depending on participation in balancing capacity markets versus balancing energy markets, they consistently argue that the provisions remain too high-level and give excessive discretion to TSOs and national frameworks. This discretion includes the ability to define additional eligible cases, set key criteria nationally, and apply differing conditions across Member States, which stakeholders warn could lead to significant inconsistencies in implementation and product quality standards. stakeholders stress that without stronger harmonisation principles, the framework risks persistent divergence across Member States, potentially undermining both fair competition and the ability to ensure uniform quality of standard balancing products. Some stakeholders similarly emphasise the need for a more coordinated, EU-level comparative assessment and harmonised criteria, arguing that current provisions are too flexible and could result in fragmented implementation. Overall, while ex-post verification is broadly supported as a useful tool in principle, stakeholders consistently call for tighter, more harmonised rules to avoid national divergence and ensure a level playing field across Europe.	harmonisation. However, due to the current lack of experience, ACER acknowledges that not all criteria and characteristics of ex-post verification can be harmonised at this stage. With increased experience from TSOs, further improvements to harmonisation of ex-post verification criteria and requirements may become possible. In this context, ACER considers that introducing an equal-footing approach for prequalification with ex-post verification and prequalification with activation tests constitutes an appropriate first step towards a more harmonised and non-discriminatory prequalification framework across Member States.
ENTSO-E, RTE	All TSOs, generally consider the proposed conditions appropriate, whereas RTE, acknowledge proportionality but also highlight the need for clearer definitions of process, timelines, and eligibility criteria. In contrast,	While ACER acknowledges that due to the current lack of experience, not all criteria and characteristics of ex-post verification can be harmonised at this stage, however, with increased experience from TSOs, further improvements to harmonisation of ex-post verification criteria and requirements may become possible.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 5.5: Do you agree with the steps and timeline of the ex-post verification process proposed by the TSOs in Article 6 of the Annexes of the Proposals? 5.6: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
Enel SpA, RWEST, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), ENTSO-E, RTE	The stakeholders generally consider the proposed ex-post verification processes and timelines to be broadly reasonable and, in some cases, an improvement over existing arrangements, particularly the proposed maximum period of around three months, provided that PRU/RPG retain market access during the process. However, there is a recurring concern that while timelines are acceptable, the key issue lies in the degree of discretion left to national terms and conditions, especially regarding the criteria for successful ex-post verification under Article 6(6) of the Annex of the Proposals. Many respondents argue that delegating these criteria nationally risks undermining harmonisation and could lead to inconsistent quality and reliability standards for balancing services across Member States, ultimately affecting the level playing field on European balancing markets. Stakeholders emphasise that harmonised principles are more important than precise timelines and call for EU-level consistency in defining what constitutes successful ex-post verification, including representative testing conditions and appropriate sanctions to preserve system security. Several respondents also note that provisions may need to be revisited once the proposed Network Code on Demand Response is finalised, and a recurring additional point is that delays not attributable to the facility or caused by TSOs should not penalise applicants, with some suggesting that in such cases completion should be deemed approved. All TSOs and RTE generally support the proposed structure, including the timelines and the ability to accommodate national specificities, and highlight that such flexibility can facilitate faster market access in certain cases. Overall, while there is general acceptance of the proposed timelines, the dominant message is a need for stronger harmonisation of criteria to avoid national divergence and ensure consistent quality standards across Europe.	ACER supports stakeholders' view that prequalification with ex-post verification, as proposed by all TSOs, requires further harmonisation. However, due to the current lack of experience, ACER acknowledges that not all criteria and characteristics of ex-post verification can be harmonised at this stage. With increased experience from TSOs, further improvements to harmonisation of ex-post verification criteria and requirements may become possible. In this context, ACER considers that introducing an equal-footing approach for prequalification with ex-post verification and prequalification with activation tests constitutes an appropriate first step towards a more harmonised and non-discriminatory prequalification framework across Member States.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 6.1: Do you agree with the current level of detail in the application submission requirements proposed by TSOs in Article 7 of the Annexes of the Proposals? 6.2: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		

Respondents' views		ACER views
Energy Pool, RWEST, Centrica, EPIA SolarPower Europe, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn, ENTSO-E, RTE	The stakeholders highlight a clear tension between the need for detailed controllable-unit level information in prequalification and the desire to reduce administrative burden, particularly for distributed, small, or aggregated resources. Many respondents acknowledge that in some Member States, such as the Netherlands, portfolio-level prequalification is used, while in others, such as France, each individual asset within an RPU/RPG must be prequalified and documented separately, which is seen as more cumbersome and potentially delaying market entry. A broad view across responses is that excessive or overly granular data requirements risk creating disproportionate barriers, especially for small-scale flexibility providers, and that system operators should only request data strictly necessary for system security, with aggregated assessment preferred where possible. However, all TSOs and RTE argue that the current level of detail is necessary to ensure correct system operation, including accurate pre-information for system operators, imbalance settlement, and reliable activation and processing. In contrast, other stakeholders including demand-side and flexibility-focused respondents, stress that harmonisation should also mean simplification, warning against allowing national discretion to expand data requirements beyond what is proportionate, which could lead to inconsistent and overly strict implementation across Member States. Several respondents also call for a comparative EU-wide analysis of prequalification and verification practices to support a roadmap toward greater technical harmonisation and consistent asset requirements. Overall, while there is agreement that some unit-level information is necessary, stakeholders diverge on the extent of granularity required, with one side prioritising operational robustness and the other emphasising proportionality, simplification, and fair market access across Europe.	ACER supports stakeholders' views that reducing the level of detail of information required in the prequalification process can help lower administrative burdens, particularly for smaller units. However, ACER also emphasises that any simplification must not negatively affect system security and reliability. Therefore, ACER proposes amendments clarifying that only the core information that is strictly necessary for TSOs to assess compliance and system requirements should remain mandatory at EU level, while additional or optional information requirements may be defined at national level in terms and conditions for BSPs where needed.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 7.1: Do you agree with the requirements and conditions and timeline of switching RPUs between BSPs proposed by the TSOs in Article 8 of the Annexes of the Proposals? 7.2: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
RWEST, Centrica, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera	The stakeholders broadly support the principle of allowing RPUs and RPGs to retain their prequalification status when switching between BSPs within the same system area, as this is seen as an important measure to improve market liquidity, reduce unnecessary duplication of testing,	ACER supports stakeholders' views on further harmonisation of the switching requirements, as expressed in the

Respondents' views		ACER views
Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn, IFIEC	and maintain operational continuity. There is general agreement that switching should be limited to assets whose technical and functional scope remains unchanged, and several respondents stress that this condition should be explicitly and clearly defined in the legal text, including a requirement that the transfer represents a complete asset transfer without modifications. Many stakeholders also support the idea that BSP switching should be accompanied by at least a communication test, while views diverge on whether additional real-condition or system tests should be systematically required, with some arguing that such tests are already common national practice and important for ensuring safe integration of the asset under a new BSP. At the same time, respondents differ on how harmonised and prescriptive the framework should be. EDF and Eurelectric argue that the criteria for switching are still not sufficiently precise or harmonised across Member States, particularly regarding eligibility conditions and the circumstances under which re-prequalification or additional testing is required. IFIEC Europe similarly emphasises that switching processes should not be more burdensome than the current status quo and should avoid unnecessary delays, especially where assets have already demonstrated capability in another BSP context. General speaking, while there is strong support for enabling smoother BSP switching as a pro-competition and efficiency measure, stakeholders consistently call for clearer definitions of eligibility, stronger safeguards around unchanged asset scope, and greater harmonisation to avoid divergent national practices, alongside a preference for simplified procedures for already proven or experienced asset types	previous questions. ACER also agrees that switching should be regarded as a process that does not affect technical capability and therefore differs from re-prequalification, where changes in technology, ICT systems, or installed capacity may alter the RPUS and RPGs technical capability. Theretofore, for clarification ACER has include the definition of switching of RPU in Article 2 in ACER Decision. Moreover, ACER supports less strict and more proportionate switching requirements and timeline and therefore proposes amendments to several provisions in Article 8 of the Annex to the Proposal.
ENTSO-E, RTE	All TSOs and RTE consider the proposed conditions and timelines of the switching process are broadly sufficient.	ACER considers that the switching process should not take longer than the re-prequalification process which is generally more time-consuming than switching. Re-prequalification is required when there is a change in the RPU/RPG technical capabilities that may affect system security. By contrast, the

Respondents' views		ACER views
		switching process should not involve any changes to their technical capabilities.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 7.3: Do you agree that the scope of Article 8 of the Annexes of the Proposals should be limited to switching RPU's and not RPG's between BSP's? 7.4: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
RWEST, Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), IFIEC	The stakeholders generally support extending Article 8 switching provisions to include RPGs, provided they meet the same technical conditions and requirements as RPU's. Many respondents emphasise that the key criterion should be the preservation of identical technical and functional configurations, rather than a formal distinction between RPU's and RPGs, with the underlying focus being the impact on system security rather than asset classification. Stakeholders such as RTE and EDF support extending switching provisions to RPGs, but only under strict safeguards such as unchanged technical scope and prior experience with identical technologies within the receiving BSP. IFIEC Europe similarly supports inclusion of RPGs, stressing that identical configurations should be treated consistently across BSPs and that rules should focus on system security implications rather than organisational categorisation. Overall, while there is broad convergence on the principle of enabling smoother switching for both RPU's and RPGs, there remains a clear divergence on implementation, particularly regarding whether RPG switching can be treated similarly to RPU switching or whether it inherently requires a more rigorous requalification process.	After discussion with all TSOs during working level meetings, all TSOs raised several concerns regarding allowing switching of RPG between BSPs along another BSPs. Key concerns included the operational behaviour of an RPG is highly dependent on BSP-specific systems and processes. These systems cannot be replicated or transferred between BSPs due to confidentiality and data protection constraints; also, a change in BSP may therefore alter the operational behaviour of the RPG, even when no physical changes occur. TSO also mentioned that there is currently insufficient operational experience with RPG switching; RPG switching should therefore be excluded from the harmonised framework at this stage. Therefore, ACER agrees with all TSOs' concerns and, to avoid negative impacts on system reliability and longer

Respondents' views		ACER views
		implementation timelines for TSOs, supports the exclusion of switching RPGs between BSPs from Article 8. At the same time, ACER understands that, in the future, RPGs or aggregators consisting of several small units may switch more frequently between BSPs. ACER therefore considers that, after the harmonised FRR prequalification process has been implemented and TSOs have gained sufficient experience, the possibility of allowing switching of RPGs between BSPs should be reassessed.
ENTSO-E, RTE	All TSOs argue that while harmonising RPU switching is a priority, RPG switching is inherently more complex due to the need to (re)prequalification aggregation logic, control systems, steering arrangements, and compliance with the connecting system operator, which in most cases requires (re)prequalification rather than a simple transfer. In contrast,	ACER agrees with the TSOs' concerns and, to avoid negative impacts on system reliability and longer implementation timelines for TSOs, supports the exclusion of switching RPGs between BSPs from Article 8. At the same time, ACER understands that, in the future, RPGs or aggregators consisting of several small units may switch more frequently between BSPs. ACER therefore considers that, after the harmonised FRR prequalification process has been implemented and TSOs have gained sufficient experience, the possibility of allowing switching of RPGs between BSPs should be reassessed.

Respondents' views	ACER views
<i>Question 7.5: Do you agree with the level of harmonisation for the ex-post verification for the switching of RPU between BSPs as outlined in Article 6(3)(a) and Article 8(1) of the Annexes of the Proposals? 7.6: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>	
RWEST, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), ENTSO-E, RTE	The stakeholders broadly view the proposed provisions for BSP switching as a positive development, particularly because they can reduce periods of asset inactivity by avoiding unnecessary full prequalification when RPUs or RPGs are already qualified. However, there is a strong and consistent call for greater procedural clarity, especially regarding how and when a switch request should be submitted, when TSOs and reserve connecting TSOs must be notified, what triggers the start of the six-week timeline, and by when TSOs must decide whether a new prequalification is required. Several respondents also emphasise that the process should be more precisely defined to ensure transparency and legal certainty, while still remaining efficient and, where possible, relying on ex-post verification to minimise administrative burden. Across responses, there is broad agreement on key safeguards: the transfer of prequalification should only apply where the asset is fully transferred without any modification to its technical or functional scope, and if substantial changes occur, evidence of continued compliance with reliability and quality standards should be required. All TSOs and RTE consider that the proposed framework already provides an adequate level of harmonisation for RPU switching, while others, including EDF and IFIEC Europe, argue that further clarification and strengthening are needed particularly around conditions such as technology equivalence within the receiving BSP, compatibility of infrastructure, and the definition of “experience” when switching operators. A recurring concern is that several provisions, especially those referring to national TSO terms and conditions or broadly defined compatibility requirements, introduce too much national discretion and risk undermining a level playing field across Member States. Overall, while stakeholders support the principle of enabling smoother and faster BSP switching, they consistently call for a more precisely defined, harmonised, and transparent process that avoids ambiguity, reduces unnecessary barriers, and ensures consistent implementation across Europe. ACER supports stakeholders’ views on the need for further harmonisation to ensure a level playing field among market participants across Member States. However, as previously expressed, further harmonisation at this stage, following discussions with TSOs and considering the lack of experience of many TSOs in Europe in performing ex-post verification, may create operational risks and could undermine the specificities of BSPs and TSOs in each country. Therefore, ACER believes that, at this stage, ex-post verification for switching cannot be further harmonised and that certain requirements may need to be defined in the national terms and conditions for BSPs. However, ACER also believes that, in the future, with increased experience and practical implementation, the level of harmonisation may be reassessed.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 8.1: Do you agree with the proposed timeline for re-prequalification by TSOs in Article 9(1) and 9(2) of the Annexes of the Proposals?</i> <i>8.2: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
Enel SpA, RWEST, Centrica, EDF, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn, IFIEC	The stakeholders broadly recognise the value of a structured re-prequalification process but raise concerns that the proposed timelines, particularly the six-week notification period and four-week TSO assessment window, may be overly restrictive and could slow down market responsiveness, competition, and innovation. A common view is that once an asset has been prequalified, its status should be preserved as far as possible, and re-prequalification should only be triggered by material or significant changes to technical characteristics, with minor modifications handled through lighter-touch processes or ex-post verification. Several respondents propose shortening or simplifying the notification period (for example, reducing it to four weeks, or splitting it into shorter notification and decision phases), while emphasising that TSOs should focus only on reassessing the affected elements rather than repeating full qualification procedures. Stakeholders such as EDF and IFIEC Europe stress that the current proposals still leave too much room for national discretion and risk introducing unnecessary duplication of already completed tests, which could undermine market functioning and create inconsistent implementation across Member States. Across responses, there is also strong agreement that where no material changes occur, extensive requalification should not be required, and that in cases of significant changes, TSOs should be allowed to carry out targeted technical tests or verifications. Overall, while the structure of re-prequalification is generally supported, stakeholders consistently call for greater proportionality, clearer thresholds for when it applies, and faster, more streamlined timelines to avoid unnecessary administrative burden.	ACER supports stakeholders' views on establishing a more streamlined and proportionate timeline for the prequalification process and has taken these views into account in its amendments to the relevant provisions related to the re-prequalification timeline in Article 9 on re-prequalification process. Moreover, ACER supports the stakeholders' views on simplifying the conditions and requirements applicable to re-prequalification to establish a more proportionate, efficient and inclusive re-prequalification process. ACER considers that re-prequalification requirements should be commensurate with the nature and extent of the changes affecting the relevant RPU or RPGs, while continuing to ensure system reliability. To this end, ACER amended Article 9 in the Decision shortening the corresponding timeline.

Respondents' views		ACER views
ENTSO-E, RTE	All TSOs and RTE support the proposed timelines and argue that the six-week notification and four-week assessment periods provide a balanced and efficient framework that ensures TSOs can properly assess system impacts while limiting unnecessary re-prequalification to only what is required.	ACER support stakeholders' views on establishing a more simplified and proportionate re-prequalification process and avoid unnecessarily long timelines that may unduly restrict BSPs. Therefore, ACER amend Article 9 and shortened the timeline for BSPs to notify the reserve connecting TSO of planned changes to their RPU(s) or RPG(s) that may trigger re-prequalification from six (6) weeks to four (4) weeks. This amendment is also consistent with stakeholder feedback received during ACER's public consultation, where several respondents considered the six-week notification period unnecessarily long and proposed reducing it to four (4) weeks.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 8.3: Do you agree with the proposed conditions by the TSOs to request re-prequalification in Article 10(1) of the Annexes of the Proposals? 8.4: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
Energy Pool, Enel SpA, RWEST, Europe, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L.,	The stakeholders broadly agree that re-prequalification should remain a targeted and proportionate process, triggered only by material changes to technical characteristics, while preserving the validity of prequalification as far as possible to avoid unnecessary repetition of tests and administrative burden. There is a shared view that minor or non-significant changes should not require a full re-prequalification but instead could be handled through lighter procedures or	ACER supports stakeholders' views on establishing more streamlined and proportionate prequalification requirements in cases where there are no significant changes to, for example, installed capacity, technology, or ICT

Respondents' views		ACER views
Slovenské elektrárne, a.s., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), SmartEn, IFIEC, ENTSO-E, RTE	ex-post verification, with full technical re-prequalification reserved for substantial modifications to equipment or operational parameters. A key point of divergence concerns the proposed timelines. Several stakeholders consider the six-week notification period and four-week TSO assessment window excessive, arguing that they may restrict competition, slow down market entry, and create unnecessary rigidity. Proposals include shortening the process and ensuring that TSOs focus only on the specific elements affected by the change. Other stakeholders, including EDF and IFIEC Europe, stress that the framework still leaves too much discretion to national implementation, risking fragmentation across Member States and inconsistent application of harmonised FRR rules. They also highlight the importance of avoiding duplication of already completed technical assessments, ensuring that switching and requalification processes do not introduce unnecessary barriers or costs. Overall, while there is general acceptance of the principle and structure of re-prequalification, stakeholders consistently call for greater proportionality, clearer thresholds for material changes, and, for many, shorter and more flexible timelines to support competition and market efficiency. All TSOs and RTE support the proposed timelines, emphasising that they provide a structured, efficient framework that allows TSOs sufficient time to assess system impacts while limiting re-prequalification to what is strictly necessary, including the option of targeted activation tests or ex-post verification.	systems provided that such changes do not adversely affect system reliability and security. To this end, ACER amended the relevant provisions in Article 10 in ACER Decision on re-prequalification conditions including simplification of the procedures through shorter timelines and greater use of ex-post verification for small and identical units.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 8.5: Do you agree with the level of harmonisation for the ex-post verification for the re-prequalification in Article 6(3)(c) and Article 10(1)(d) of the Annexes of the Proposals? 8.6: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
RWEST, Eurelectric aisbl, Gnera Energía y	The stakeholders generally highlighted concerns about the lack of harmonisation in the proposed re-prequalification framework, noting that many provisions are left to national TSO terms and conditions, which could result in inconsistent practices across Member States and undermine the	ACER supports stakeholders' views on the need for further harmonisation in order to ensure a level playing field among market

Respondents' views		ACER views
Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), IFIEC, ENTSO-E	level playing field. Several respondents stressed that TSOs have too much discretion, particularly regarding the use of ex-post verification and the possibility to waive re-prequalification requirements, leading to potential divergence between countries. A recurring concern was that installations which have already been approved and continue to operate regularly should not be required to repeat tests simply because they have not recently participated in balancing services, as this would create unnecessary burdens and negatively affect market functioning and business cases. While some stakeholders considered the proposals reasonable and all TSOs expressed support for the current level of harmonisation, others argued that re-testing should only be considered where installations have been inactive for a prolonged period or have undergone significant technical changes.	participants across Member States. However, as previously expressed, further harmonisation at this stage, following discussions with TSOs and considering the lack of experience of many TSOs in Europe in performing ex-post verification, may create operational risks and could undermine the specificities of BSPs and TSOs in each country. Therefore, ACER believes that, at this stage, ex-post verification for harmonisation cannot be further harmonised and that certain requirements and criteria may need to be defined in the national terms and conditions for BSPs. However, ACER also believes that, in the future, with increased experience and practical implementation, the level of harmonisation may be reassessed.

Respondents' views		ACER views
<i>Question 8.7: Do you agree with ACER that, it is unclear whether re-prequalification for RPU's or RPGs should include all the steps of the prequalification process as outlined in Article 5 of the Annexes to the Proposals? 8.8: Please provide an explanation for your answer above.</i>		
Energy Pool, Enel SpA, RWEST, EDF, Eurelectric aisbl,	The stakeholders broadly called for greater clarity and proportionality in the re-prequalification framework, expressing concerns that the current wording gives TSOs excessive discretion and could result in unnecessary testing, administrative burdens, and delays that would negatively	ACER takes note of stakeholders' comments.

Respondents' views	ACER views
Gnera Energía y Tecnología, S.L., Energy Traders Europe, ASOCIACIÓN DE REPRESENTANTES (ARMIE), IFIEC, ENTSO-E affect market functioning and business cases. Several respondents emphasised that BSPs should be allowed to continue providing balancing services during re-prequalification processes for both energy and capacity products. Many stakeholders highlighted that re-testing requirements should be limited strictly to the parts of a facility or aggregated portfolio that have changed, particularly for demand-side aggregation portfolios where customers frequently join, leave, or switch aggregators, as repeated activation testing can be costly and inefficient. Respondents also argued that only necessary and proportionate tests should be performed during the re-prequalification, with more intermediate or flexible approaches introduced for minor technical modifications or small capacity variations, rather than treating facilities as entirely new assets. Concerns were also raised regarding unclear triggers for re-prequalification and withdrawal of prequalification status, especially where TSOs may determine that an asset has caused a “detrimental impact on system operation.” Stakeholders stressed that isolated delivery failures should not automatically lead to re-prequalification or loss of full prequalification status, as existing verification rules and penalties already provide adequate incentives for compliance. While all TSOs stated that the proposal already limits re-prequalification to relevant changes, several respondents remained unconvinced that the text provides sufficient legal certainty and harmonisation.	ACER supports stakeholders' views on clarifying the conditions and avoiding full re-prequalification where the impact of changes is insignificant for the technical capability of the assets and, consequently, for system reliability. ACER believes that the conditions triggering pre-qualification should be harmonised and defined in the proposal, rather than left to national terms and conditions for BSPs, in order to ensure a more level playing field among Member States. Accordingly, ACER amended the relevant provision in Article 10 in ACER Decision on prequalification conditions to reflect this view.