

## STUDY ON THE CONDITIONALITIES STIPULATED IN CONTRACTS FOR STANDARD CAPACITY PRODUCTS FOR FIRM CAPACITY SOLD BY GAS TSOs

# Outline of the Project & Stakeholders' Views

REF4E

**Stakeholders' Workshop Brussels, 4 December 2018** 









### Outline of the Project

- Task 1: Overview & Description of Conditional Capacity Products (CCP) offered in the EU Member States
  - Information and opinions collected by Questionnaires and Interviews with all NRAs and TSOs
  - Quantitative data mining from TSO / ENTSOG websites
- Task 2: Analysis of CCP impacts on the gas market
  - Assessing Impacts of CCP removal on hub prices, key market concentration and Security of Supply indicators
  - Estimating changes in flows and suppliers' market shares
  - Cost-benefit analysis of CCP: pilot study on a Member State
- Task 3: Other stakeholders' views
  - Collected by Questionnaires and Interviews with stakeholders', their Associations and Brussels Workshop










### Stakeholders' Consultations

- □ Few answers but from important gas traders and storage operators (also on behalf of their clients)
- Large majority of respondents is based or active in Germany
- Respondents reports significant use of CCP



(Based on Respondents' qualitative assessment – no quantitative estimate)







### CCPs: Stakeholders' views & issues

- CCP Benefits:
- Allow higher capacity use for a given network
- Are preferable to "hidden" (i.e. unconditional) interruptibility
- May enhance cost effective cross-border trade

- CCP Drawbacks:
- Limit access and hence reduce volume on hubs (VTPs)
- Reduced VTP liquidity damages storage operators
- Increase complexity and costs for network users
- Hamper the creation of Virtual Interconnection Points



Should CCPs be eliminated?









### CCP Removal: Stakeholders' Views

- Scheduled NCG—Gaspool merger expected to require even more CCPs, to avoid capacity cuts
- Most interviewed shippers believe that capacity expansion as a way of turning CCPs into firm capacity would be probably too costly and inefficient
- However, some suggest alternative solutions:
  - Enhanced overcapacity and buy-back mechanism
  - Flow commitments
- Others would not agree:
  - In tight systems, overbooking and buy back may become very costly – and paid by network users, consumers
  - Flow commitments not better than BZK/DZK, feared by regulators as anti-competitive










### **CCP Removal: What would happen?**



### Buying more interruptible capacity:

 Interruptible capacity demand hard to foresee, as it can be currently sold only once firm capacity is sold out

### Purchasing more capacity in the secondary market:

- Through capacity booking platforms or over the counter
- Currently a small market, few data available







### **Cost-Benefit Analysis of CCPs: Principles**

- ☐ In principle, CBA should be based as much as possible on market valuations
- Market valuations should be surrogated/integrated by other assessment methods only in case of externalities...
  - e.g. environmental impacts, impacts on other TSOs/markets
- ... or public goods
  - e.g. security of supply
- Externalities: impact of CCP introduction or elimination may partly fall on third countries
  - E.g. BZK or DZK may move liquidity "downstream", as access to the VTP is restricted or provided on interruptible basis only
  - EU-GaME (European gas market model) used to estimate market impacts









### **CCP Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Framework**

- Investment projects aimed at removing conditionalities may also pursue other goals
  - For instance, the project that is upgrading capacity from DZK to FZK at Arnoldstein (TAG, Austria) allows access to new supply sources, enhancing market competitiveness and security of supply
  - In fact, the Austrian regulator approved the project mostly on improved security of supply grounds
- Assessment of investment projects should be consistent with the (ENTSOG) methodology, used to assess other projects







### **Cost-Benefit Analysis: How to assess benefits**

- In general, market demand (Willingness To Pay) should be key criterion for benefit assessment
- Market players certainly prefer firm to conditional or interruptible capacity, but: how much are they ready to pay for it?
  - Econometric analysis has found some inverse relation between tariffs and capacity demand
  - This offers some insight into willingness to pay for different capacity types
  - Regulation of interruptible capacity tariffs limits the possibility to detect market players willingness to pay for it
- Alternative approach: market tests
  - Market tests could be arranged, in line with the Incremental Capacity framework (CAM NC)









### **Cost-Benefit Analysis: Estimating costs**

- Main problem: TSOs did not answer Questions requesting to estimate costs of conditionality removal
  - An aggregated estimation of costs needed to remove conditionalities and retain capacity offer has been provided by TSOs for Germany (approx. 10 bn. Euros)
  - If related to current CCP offer, this estimate yields an average cost of over 2 MEUR / (GWh/d)
  - Project is developing a pilot case-study
  - Seeking investment costs for TAG, Austria where a project is ongoing for upgrading of DZK to FZK
- Costs of capacity upgrade likely to be very casespecific











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### Thank You!

**Comments and views very welcome** 







