

## Assessment of the annual cross-border infrastructure compensation sum

Study commissioned by ACER

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## Overview

- Background and approach
- Review of policy context and requirements
- Methodology options
- Numerical assessment
- Preliminary conclusions

## Background and scope of the study

ITC = Inter-TSO  
Compensation

### Legal framework for ITC mechanism: Annex A of Regulation 838/2010

- > 2 components: Losses and costs of making infrastructure available to host cross-border flows
- > Latter based on annual cross-border infrastructure compensation sum which shall be apportioned among TSOs (called “ITC infrastructure fund” hereafter)
- > Article 5.4 sets fund size to 100 m€/a for time being
- > Article 5.3 requests ACER to carry out review and make proposal to European Commission on future ITC infrastructure fund

### Scope of the study: Assist ACER with the above review

- » Develop and evaluate methodical options for determining ITC infrastr. fund
- » Provide opinion on suitability of LRAIC

### Out of scope

- > Methods for determining contributions to and compensations from ITC infr. fund
- > Losses
- > General discussion of ITC beyond current legal framework

## Approach

### Qualitative and quantitative analysis

- > Review of policy context
- > Input from TSOs and NRAs
  - » Data for quantitative analysis
  - » Opinions regarding the appropriate size of the ITC infrastructure fund
- > Meetings with European Commission and ENTSO-E
- > Development of methodical options
  - » Policy context provides guidance and restrictions
  - » But no single options clearly preferable by principle
- > Assessment of options

We would like to thank all who have provided input to the study

### Current status and next steps

- > This presentation summarises the draft final report
  - » [http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official\\_documents/Public\\_consultations/PC\\_2012\\_E\\_15/Consentec ACER ITC-Fund FinalReport Draft.pdf](http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Public_consultations/PC_2012_E_15/Consentec_ACER_ITC-Fund_FinalReport_Draft.pdf)
- > Final report on the basis of input from public consultation: By end of 2012
- > ACER to decide on further steps

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# Review of policy context and requirements

## Dimensions and criteria

### Principal dimensions to consider

- > Scope
  - » the question which share of the TSOs' infrastructure is to be considered relevant for the infrastructure fund under ITC
- > Costing methodology
  - » the question how the relevant share of the TSOs' infrastructure is valued when determining the size of the ITC infrastructure fund

### Criteria

- > Compliance with legal provisions defining the ITC mechanism
- > Coherence with other instruments relating to financing of infrastructure for cross-border power flows
  - » Congestion management
  - » Proposed Energy Infrastructure Package

# Review of policy context and requirements

## Compliance with legal provisions

### Relevant articles of Regulations 714/2009 and 838/2010

- > Article 13 of Regulation 714 lays down high level requirements for ITC
- > Reg. 838 implements current ITC mechanism (specifics in Annex A)
  - » Methods for contributions and compensations firmly defined in 6.1 and 6.2
  - » Infrastructure fund size is 100 m€/a for time being (Art. 5.4)
  - » Cornerstones of assessment which this study provides input to (Art. 5.1/5.3):
    - > Costing principles adopted from Art 13.6 of Regulation 714/2009
    - > Adjustment where infrastr. is financed by sources other than network access charges
    - > Specification of geographical scope

### Overarching aspects

- > Regulation 838 is the more specialised provision, specifying the current ITC mechanism within the requirements set by Regulation 714
  - » **Currently valid annual fund size of 100 m€ de facto constitutes an interpretation of the goals and principles of Regulation 714**
- > Fund size is only degree of freedom, while relative payments are fixed
  - » Clear restriction if appropriateness of ITC is assessed by net financial positions → **Justification of (if not demand for) methodical simplicity**

## Review of policy context and requirements

Coherence with other instruments: Congestion Management (1/2)

Coherence of ITC and congestion revenues discussed for long time

> Reason: Origins of congestion revenues and ITC payments are similar

Here: Confinement to restrictions imposed by current legal framework

> Analysis of the way in which the legislator has interpreted the requirements as to the coherence of ITC and congestion management

» Different interpretation would require amending Reg. 838 → out of scope

> Regulation 838 requires the infrastructure fund to be appropriately adjusted to reflect infrastructure financed from other sources than network access charges

» Congestion revenues (cf. Art. 16.6 of Regulation 714/2009)

» Private investment with exemption according to Art. 17 of Reg. 714/2009

> Legislator has established a connection between congestion revenues and the scope of the ITC infrastructure fund

» Some infrastructure to be deducted from total infrastructure before determining which share of the remainder falls under ITC

> Allows for different interpretations with regard to the options for using congestion revenues → next slide



## Review of policy context and requirements

Coherence with other instruments: Congestion Management (2/2)

### Narrow interpretation: Art. 16.6 1<sup>st</sup> para point b

- > Investments explicitly financed by congestion revenues
- > Inclusion in scope of ITC infrastr. fund would constitute double compensation

### Wide interpretation: Art. 16.6 1<sup>st</sup> para point b + 2<sup>nd</sup> para

- > Congestion revenues used for lowering tariffs: Also financing infrastructure?
- > Consequent application would require ITC to be based on national tariff bases  
→ incompatible with LRAIC; dependence on various national specifics
- > Tariffs finance more than infrastructure → how to determine share (per country)?
- > Implicit definition of congestion income sharing key by Reg. 838 (through fixed method for compensations and contributions) → appropriate?

### Direct set off of congestion revenues against ITC infrastructure fund

- > Not an option provided for by Regulation 838/2010
- > Would be inconsistent with current fund size being static

> We consider narrow interpr. applicable, but also quantify wide interpr.

## Review of policy context and requirements

Coherence with other instruments: Energy Infrastructure Package

### Background on proposed Energy Infrastructure Package (EIP)

- > aims at promoting the timely development of trans-European energy networks in order to achieve relevant EU policy objectives
- > defines so-called Projects of Common Interest (PCI) that shall mainly be financed via the network access charges of those countries that benefit from the respective investment
  - » Distinct mechanism for financing PCI → exclusion of PCI from ITC?
  - » Regulation 838/2010 only allows for excluding infrastructure not financed by network access charges

### Implications for this study

- > Valid reasons for considering amendment to Reg. 838/2010 when EIP comes into force
- > However, future role and design of ITC in parallel to EIP is out of scope of study
- > Purpose of this study is assessment on basis of currently valid legal framework

> EIP not considered in the study

# Review of policy context and requirements

## Scope and costing methodology

### Scope of ITC infrastructure fund

- > Geographical scope: 34 countries for the time being (based on Art. 5.3 of Annex A of Regulation 838/2010)
- > New and existing infrastructure (Art. 13.6 of Reg. 714/2009)
- > “costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows” (Art. 13.6 of Reg. 714)
  - filter (i.e. only the respective share of new and existing infrastructure to be included in ITC infrastructure fund)

### Costing methodology

- > Legal provisions clearly demand forward-looking long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC) as the basis of assessment of ITC infrastructure fund
  - » Prescribed in Reg. 714, picked up in Reg. 838
- > In addition, Reg. 838 asks ACER for an opinion on suitability of LRAIC

In this study,

- > methods and numerical results are based on LRAIC
- > separate considerations are provided on the suitability of LRAIC

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# Methodology options

## Principles

### Structure of analysis

- > Decoupling of
  - » scope - definition how the cost of some given infrastructure shall be determined for ITC purposes
  - » and costing methodology - determination of some “key” that defines which share of total infrastructure shall be considered in the ITC infrastructure fund
- > Established approach: Determine scope in terms of asset amounts for a set of asset classes and weight these with unit cost according to costing methodology

### High-level principles implied by legal framework

- > Proportionate, i.e. reasonably simple, method is appropriate
  - » Reg. 838 leaves fund size as single degree of freedom e.g. WWT, AP, MP
  - » Complex methods based on assessment of compensations and/or contributions per ITC party would lead to inconsistency:
    - > Would yield fund size as by-product
    - > But individual contributions would have to be ignored (fixed by Regulation 838/2010)
  - » Key for defining scope should be global, not composed country-by-country
- > Combination of current fund size (100 m€/a) and methods for contributions/compensations are a consistent interpretation of Reg. 714/2009

## Methodology options

### LRAIC

Taking account of  
previous studies

#### Interpretation of LRAIC

- > Long run: no exclusion of short-run invariable cost, such as investment cost
- > Average:
  1. annuities
  2. pro-rata share of cost between cross-border and other functions
- > Incremental: current, efficient technology (but actual structure and topology)
- > Forward-looking: replacement cost

#### Joint and common cost: “Thin” definition recommendable

National access charges  
to reflect ITC anyway

- > Consistency and objectivity here more relevant than precise cost recovery
- > Direct cost of investment (annuity) plus incremental annual operating cost

#### Options: Country-specific vs. standardised figures

- > Relevance in given context lower than in the past (affects only global fund size)
- > Standardisation could be done such that total cost are unchanged
- > Standardisation of depreciation period towards asset life times c’ld be beneficial

# Methodology options

## Incremental approach

### Principle of incremental approach

Entry-into-force of  
Regulation 838/2010

- > 100 m€/a = appropriate proportion of existing infrastructure in 2011
- > Development after 2011 requires incremental adjustments

### Proposed implementation (including simplifications for practicability)

D = standardised  
depreciation period

- > Existing infrastructure: Decreasing over time
  - » Decommissioning: Starting value (100 m€/a) reduced by  $1/D$  each year
  - » Scale with ratio of current and 2011 unit cost to reflect LRAIC development
- > New infrastructure: Increasing over time
  - » Every investment after 2011 may lead to increase of fund, with following restrictions
    - > Deduct investment (shares) financed by other sources than network access charges
    - > Only the share of the investment related to hosting cross-border flows may be counted
      - Multiplication with “Global Transit Share”, see next slide

## Methodology options

Global Transit Share GTS (element of incremental and absolute approaches)

### Purpose and principle

- > Determine the share of new investment related to hosting cross-border flows
- > Key should be global and simple to determine
- > Desirable: Similarity to methods for determining contributions and compensations
  - » Formulae for determining the compensations reflect cross-border flows by means of “transit” (defined in Art.1.6 of Annex A of Regulation 838)
  - » Distinction between cross-border and “other” purposes: other = domestic load (defined in Art. 1.8 of Annex A of Regulation 838)

### Proposed implementation

- > Ratio of
  - » Total transit of all participants and
  - » Total transit plus load of all participants
- > Remarks/properties:
  - » Based on data required anyway for implementing ITC
  - » Definition contributes to requirement to account for benefits (transits based on netted flows)



## Methodology options

Absolute and restricted absolute approaches

### Principle of absolute approach

- > No distinction between existing and new infrastructure
- > Both the relevant share of new infrastructure and the “appropriate proportion” of existing infrastructure should be consistently determined by applying the GTS

### Proposed implementation (including simplifications for practicability)

- > Start with entirety of transmission assets
- > Deduct (shares of) assets financed by other sources than network charges
- > Multiply with GTS

### Variant: Restricted absolute approach

- > Expectation: Absolute approach yields fund size  $\gg 100$  m€/a
- > Restricted absolute approach may help avoiding abrupt large changes
  - » Consider only share of infrastructure commissioned after “reference year”
  - » Pragmatic implementation: Proportional shares based on standard depreciation period, assuming homogeneous age structure

e.g. 1996 (1<sup>st</sup> electricity market directive), but no unambiguously correct year

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# Numerical assessment

## Data base (1/2)

### Introductory remark: Assessment limited by data availability

- > Allows for comparison of options, but not to determine “definite” figures

### Considered years

- > 2011 is base year (latest completed year)
- > Original request: Assessment for 2011, 2012, 2013
  - » 2012 and 2013 not feasible for data availability reasons
- > Instead, the following temporal effects are considered:
  - » Short-term volatility of flow patterns – comparison of flow data 2010 vs. 2011
  - » Impact of prospective network expansion – forecasted asset amounts of 2022

### Asset volumes


- > 6 asset classes (AC lines, DC lines, transformers), 4 actually used here
- > Data source: ENTSO-E
  - » Data gaps replaced by data from older years, back to 2007
- > Estimation of development until 2022 based on TYNDP (projects of pan-European significance)

# Numerical assessment


Data base (2/2)

23 usable responses,  
gaps replaced by volume  
weighted averages

## LRAIC: Based on questionnaires sent to NRAs



- > Large relative variation of LRAIC unit cost across countries
- > Variation unaffected by standardisation of rate of return (RoR) and depreciation periods
- > Variation mostly caused by differences between the capital outlay figures



- > Total LRAIC based annual cost of transmission grid: ca. 17 bn€/a

# Numerical assessment

## Preparatory calculations

### Global Transit Share (GTS)

> Based on historic data from actual ITC implementation provided by ENTSO-E

Year	GTS
2010	6.65 %
2011	7.53 %

### Infrastructure financed by sources other than network charges

> Based on congestion revenue data (divided by usage destinations) provided by ENTSO-E

> Results for 2011 and country-specific LRAIC:

» “Narrow” interpretation: 1.2% of total LRAIC based network cost


» “Wide” interpretation: 5% of total LRAIC based network cost

> Shares assumed to also apply to 2022

# Numerical assessment

ITC infrastructure fund size: Base case

## Comparison of fund sizes between methodology options



- > Base case=
  - » Country-specific LRAIC
  - » GTS = 7,53% (2011)
  - » Reference year for restricted absolute (abs\_r): 1996


> Large differences between the 3 options

> Absolute sizes increasing, relative difference decreasing over time

# Numerical assessment

ITC infrastructure fund size: Sensitivity analysis

## Sensitivity with respect to Global Transit Share (GTS)




- > Effect of GTS variation is much smaller than base case differences
- > Effect on inc smaller than on abs and abs\_r

# Numerical assessment

ITC infrastructure fund size: Sensitivity analysis

## Sensitivity with respect to treatment of congestion revenues




> Small impact with given data, because congestion revenues are small compared to LRAIC based total annual network cost



# Numerical assessment

ITC infrastructure fund size: Sensitivity analysis

## Sensitivity with respect to LRAIC parameters




- > Fund size varies by +25% / - 15% when altering RoR by 2%
- > Damped effect on incremental approach

# Numerical assessment

ITC infrastructure fund size: Sensitivity analysis

## Sensitivity for restricted abs. approach w/ respect to the reference year



- > Strong impact (intended flexibility – difficult to reach agreement?)
- > Relative impact decreases over time

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## Preliminary conclusions

Appraisal of methodology options for determining ITC infrastructure fund size

### General observations

- > Fund sizes differ considerably between the methods, but converge over time
- > Relative order not changed by considered parameter variations
- > Reservations concerning LRAIC bandwidth

Exception: Reference year for restricted absolute approach

### Method-specific findings

- > Absolute approach yields highest fund sizes
  - » Outside usually discussed bandwidth
  - » Abrupt change consistent with current fund size being in line with Reg. 714?
- > Restricted absolute approach and incremental approach yield lower results
  - » Advantage of incremental approach:  
Ensures consistency with current fund size
  - » Advantage of restricted absolute approach:  
Avoids explicit tie to fixed setting of current fund size

Subject to reservations concerning LRAIC

## Preliminary conclusions


### Suitability of LRAIC

#### General considerations

- > Alternative would require altering Reg. 714 → only if clearly better than LRAIC
- > Motivation for LRAIC: High consistency across countries
- > However, appears difficult to achieve in practice
  - » Could be due to lack of practical relevance of LRAIC for national tariffing
- > Improvement appears possible
  - » External validation/auditing easier than for regulated cost (standardisation)
  - » Difficulties faced in this study do not speak against LRAIC as such

#### Most suitable costing method could depend on approach for fund size

- > Forward looking perspective of LRAIC consistent with incremental approach
- > Regulated (historic) cost more appropriate for absolute approach
  - » Considers entire asset base
  - » In line with ITC purpose to compensate for costs actually incurred
- > Restricted absolute approach: Practicability of obtaining reasonably sound cost figures could be the decisive criterion to decide between costing methods



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
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Annex

## Mathematical specification of methodology options

### Incremental approach

$$F_{inc,t} = 100Mio \left(1 - \frac{t-2011}{D}\right) \frac{UC_{global,t}}{UC_{global,2011}} + GTS_t \cdot \sum_{i=1}^k (Q_i (1 - q_{other,i}) \cdot UC_{i,t})$$

with	$t$	year under assessment
	$D$	standard depreciation period
	$k$	number of new investment projects (2011 or later)
	$Q_i$	quantity (in km or MVA) of new investment $i$
	$q_{other,i}$	relative share of investment $i$ financed by sources other than national network access charges
	$GTS_t$	Global Transit Share of year $t$
	$UC_{global,t}$	global unit cost in year $t$
	$UC_{i,t}$	unit cost of asset class of investment $i$ in year $t$



## Mathematical specification of methodology options

### Global Transit Share

$$GTS = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N T_i}{\sum_{i=1}^N (T_i + L_i)}$$

with  $N$  number of ITC participants

$T_i$  transit of participant  $i$

$L_i$  load of participant  $i$

## Mathematical specification of methodology options

### Absolute approach and restricted absolute approach

$$F_{abs,t} = GTS_t \cdot \sum_{i=1}^k (A_i \cdot UC_{i,t})$$

with	$t$	year under assessment
	$GTS_t$	Global Transit Share of year $t$
	$A_i$	Quantity (in km or MVA) of asset class $i$ , after “appropriate adjustment” for financing by other sources than network access charges
	$k$	number of asset classes
	$UC_{i,t}$	unit cost of asset class $i$ in year $t$

$$F_{abs,restricted,t} = F_{abs,t} \cdot \frac{t-t_{ref}}{D}$$

with	$D$	standard depreciation period
	$t$	year under assessment
	$t_{ref}$	reference year