

Stakeholder Workshop on the ACER Assessment on Electricity Market Design

Thursday, 10 February 2022 09:00 – 13:00





Workshop is divided into 3 Sessions:

- Session 1: Investments (09:15 -10:30)
 - Case studies 10'
 - Panel discussion 30'
 - Participants discussion 35'
- Session 2: Electricity volatility as a driver for flexibility (10:40 11:40)
 - Panel discussion 30'
 - Participants discussion 30'
- Session 3: Electricity volatility, suppliers and consumers (11:40 12:50)
 - Case studies 10'
 - Panel discussion 30'
 - Participants discussion 30'



For an interactive workshop


To ask questions and to participate in the polls

- Use Slido
- Either S within MS Teams, or <u>www.slido.com</u> with #MarketDesign2022
- Q&A, polls and word clouds
- Do <u>not</u> use chat to pose a question



- Max. 1 intervention per organisation and per session
- Raise hand to ask for the floor (plus feel free to signal to the moderator your topic in Slido Q&A)
- Come in when invited to (max. 2 min)
- Lower hand after intervention







Connecting to Slido via MS Teams


Open Slido in MS Teams

Q&A

- To ask a question, use Q&A
- "Like" other questions
- Reply to/comment on others' question

Polls

- To vote on the Opinion Polls, use Polls
- You must vote to see the poll results!





Connecting to Slido via web browser

- Through www.slido.com with #MarketDesign2022
- Use direct link: https://app.sli.do/event/8n68cRcT5VWqLfi1ips1Uw/live/questions
- Or scan the QR code with your mobile phone





Session 1: Investments

09:15 - 10:30

Rafael Muruais-Garcia, ACER



Session 1 - Introduction

- Session 1: Investments (09:15 -10:30)
 - Case studies 10'
 - Panel discussion 30'
 - Participants discussion 35'

To ask questions to the panellists and to participate in the polls → **Use Slido**

To intervene during the Open Participants Discussion → Raise your hand (plus signal to the moderator your topic in Slido Q&A)



Session 1 - Case studies

Should the EU consider additional elements to increase revenue-certainty in the EU electricity sector?

- a) No need for further elements, let the market work and evolve on its own.
- b) Need for additional elements to support the rollout of renewable energy sources.
- c) Need for additional elements to support other technologies to back-up and complement renewables.
- d) Both b (additional way to support RES) and c (additional ways to support other technologies).

Vote via Slido in MS Teams, by scanning the QR code or via the link below.

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Opinion Poll 1




The role of electricity markets in the energy transition

Preparting Market designs for net zero objectives- Case study for Korea

Alejandro Hernandez – Head of Unit Renewable Integration and Secure Electricity

The current wholesale market price signals need to evolve to attract and keep the right type of new assets





*Comparison of energy rents to fixed O&M and annualised capital cost; WACC = 7%; Notes: Using system reference marginal price (SRMC) with no carbon price.


With the current market design, only coal plants can recover their investment cost- making the market forces to work against the policy objectives - security of supply and a fast decarbonisation

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Decarbonisation will drastically change how different system needs are served








No technology is a silver bullet- Power system services will be provided by an increasingly diverse range of assets, Market design will need to rewarded and incentivise their contributions to stability, flexibility and capacity.

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How to bring the right mix of technologies? Is not only about security of supply, nor only about decarbonisation- and can't be addressed separately







- 2035 energy rents
- 2035 energy rents with scarcity
- 2035 energy rents with scarcity and CO2 price 145
- Annualized cost of new entry (Korea)
- Annualized cost of new entry (global average)

In this case, adding BOTH carbon pricing and adequacy payments can restore incentives to bring the right mix.

Low carbon dispatchable sources are specially penalized in markets lacking instruments

to achieve decarbonisation and adequacy objectives.

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^{*}Comparison of energy rents to fixed O&M and annualised capital cost; WACC = 7%; Notes: Using system reference marginal price (SRMC) with no carbon price and \$145 per ton carbon price.



Session 1 - Case studies

Which of the following additional elements, if any, should the EU consider to increase revenue certainty in the electricity sector?

- a) Centralised procurement.
- b) Standardising existing mechanisms (e.g. capacity remuneration mechanisms).
- c) Facilitating or supporting competitive markets (e.g. market for PPAs).
- d) Other measures.
- e) No intervention at all.

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Opinion Poll 2












Reforming power markets for the energy transition

Stakeholder Workshop on the ACER Assessment on Electricity Market Design

Fabien Roques, Université Paris Dauphine CEEM, Florence School of Regulation, and Compass Lexecon

10 February 2022

STEPPING UP AND SECURING INVESTMENTS IN THE EU POWER SYSTEM IS KEY FOR THE EU DECARBONISATION



- Historically most EU investments in the power sector were made under regulation or supported by long term contracts
- The Green Deal requires a step up in power sector investments
- A framework to boost private investment is needed to support the economic recovery and energy sector decarbonisation

A MARKET FIT FOR NET ZERO NEEDS TO BUILD ON EXISTING SHORT TERM MARKETS TO DELIVER OPERATION EFFICIENCY AND OVERLAY AN INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK

Investment (years ahead)

Operations (days /hours ahead)

Planning of system needs

- Comprehensive and transparent approach to identify the evolving system needs
- Main dimensions: firm, flexible, variable energy, and interface with networks
- Ensure that the contribution of all resources to the system needs is adequately rewarded

Competition "for" the market

- Tendering of long-term contracts
- Can be technology neutral or specific
- Puts competitive pressure where it matters: CAPEX
- Can be used to stimulate development of competitive market
- Ensures coordinated system development

Competition "in" the market

- Well integrated and liquid forward, day ahead and intraday markets
- Optimises short term dispatch and minimises costs for consumers
- Real time price signals and removal of barriers to participation
- Supports retail competition and development of demand response

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THREE MISSING ELEMENTS FOR AN EFFICIENT INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK: PLANNING, CONTRACTING AND EFFICIENT MARKET INTERFACE

Investment framework stages

Key features of an efficient hybrid market investment framework

Planning & definition of system needs

- Efficient coordination and holistic planning of the different system needs (clean tech and for flexible/firm capacity), across sectors (power/gas/heat/mobility) and Member States
- Neutrality of the planning agenc(ies), supported by sound regulatory and governance framework

Contracting & hedging mechanisms

- Long term contractual commitments to hedge some of the policy, regulatory and market risks and facilitate investment
- Increased coordination and consistency of the procurement mechanism with the planning process, to make it more efficient and predictable

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Efficient market interaction

- Efficient interface with wholesale and retail markets
- Careful choice and design of products to avoid distortions of short term market signals

If you have any question about this presentation, please contact



Fabien Roques

Executive Vice President +33 (0) 1 53 06 35 29

FRoques@compasslexecon.com

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Session 1 - Panel discussion

- Does the EU need to consider further instruments to increase revenue certainty (e.g. longer-term contracts, contracts-for-difference, Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) or capacity remuneration mechanisms)?
- Which ones, what would be their main benefits and drawbacks?



Session 1 - Participants discussion

Which topic on investments would you like to discuss next? (2 words maximum)

 Reply via Slido in MS Teams, by scanning the QR code or via the link below: https://app.sli.do/event/8n68cRcT5VWqLfi1ips1Uw/live/questions

Raise your hand (plus signal to the moderator your topic in Slido Q&A)

Opinion Poll 3 20





Session 2: Electricity volatility as a driver for flexibility

10:40 - 11:40

Clara Poletti, ARERA



Session 2 - Introduction

- Session 2: Electricity volatility as a driver for flexibility (10:40 11:40)
 - Panel discussion 30'
 - Participants discussion 30'

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Session 2 - Introduction

Is the short term price signal enough to trigger the needed level of flexibility?

- a) Maybe. Some technologies do receive the right incentive but other technologies don't.
- b) No. The short term price signal alone will not be enough. Some flexibility options will need more (external) support to get to the desired level.
- c) Yes. The short term price signal is enough.

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Opinion Poll 4



Session 2 - Panel discussion

- Price volatility (including the current price 'shock' situation) seems to indicate that the system has limited flexibility. How to best incentivise increased flexibility?
- How best to create a level-playing among all technologies (including storage, generation, demand side etc.) that provide flexibility?
- Do we need more hedging products for flexibility-related revenue (e.g. products on price volatility or on low wind)?



Session 2 - Panel discussion

Looking at 2030 needs, most contribution to flexibility can be expected from:

- a) Fossil fuel power plants.
- b) Large-scale storage.
- c) Small-scale electricity storage.
- d) Smart electric vehicles and vehicle-to-grid.
- e) Demand response from industry.
- f) Demand response from households.
- g) Power-to-gas: hydrogen.
- h) Increased interconnection capacity.

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Opinion Poll 5



Session 2 - Participants discussion

Which topic on electricity volatility as a driver for flexibility would you like to discuss next?

(2 words maximum)

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- Raise your hand (plus signal to the moderator your topic in Slido Q&A)



Opinion Poll 6 27



Session 3: Electricity volatility, suppliers and consumers

11:40 - 12:50

Csilla Bartok, ACER



Session 3 - Introduction

- Session 3: Electricity volatility, suppliers and consumers (11:40 12:50)
 - Case studies 10'
 - Panel discussion 30'
 - Participants discussion 30'

To ask questions to the panellists and to participate in the polls → **Use Slido**

To intervene during the participants open discussion → Raise your hand (plus signal to the moderator your topic in Slido Q&A)



Session 3 - Case studies

Which measures might better protect consumers from volatility whilst not being too burdensome on suppliers?

- a) Stronger hedging requirements.
- b) Stronger licensing with enhanced risk assessment.
- c) Increased guarantees/collaterals.
- d) All of the above.
- e) None of the above.

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






Supplier failure is not all about poor hedging, its about a need for massive working capital


- The energy crisis has pushed supplier margins deep into the red (even more if price caps)
- Hedges reduce the impact of wholesale but need to be renewed and during a crisis, commodity vendors protect themselves by demanding upfront payments.
- The amount of this depends on the strength of the supplier's balance sheet. Smaller and weaker suppliers pay more or receive no hedge at all.
- But other costs also increase: other guarantees, defaults; balancing costs; system price based hedging in markets with big zonal price differences...
- And as smaller suppliers are forced to stand still, they bleed customers to those with the balance sheets (or natural hedges) to keep going.
- While poorly run challengers have failed, so too have many innovative suppliers with excellent service.





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*4.2m between August 2021 and Jan 2022


Impact for consumers beyond price increases


- Fixed price and capped contract prices have been increased / caps removed
- Reduced offers means few alternatives for customers on a bad deal
- In desperation, customers are locking into high fixed long-term contracts
- Many high-satisfaction, innovative suppliers have left the market
- A fixed price market mean higher prices and less flexibility

Possible solutions

- Market-wide shared insurance instrument
- Decarbonised / Integrated homes and heating









Session 3 - Case studies

What is required to engage consumers to respond to and shield against price volatility and/or partake in demand side flexibility?

- a) Price transparency including the possibility of flexible contracts for consumers.
- b) Availability of aggregators.
- c) Enhance investments for solar PV and battery storage capabilities.

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Opinion Poll 8



- Adviser to customers
 - Provider of risk mitigation services
 - Provider of new and innovative products & services
 - Enabler of customers' access to the markets

















Case Study: Suppliers 10 FEB 2022

Antonio Colino EER President

Founded in 2017:

ACIE: Asociación de Comercializadores Independientes de Energía / Association of Independent Retailers – SPAIN
AFIEG: Association Française Indépendente de l'Electricité et du Gaz / French independent association for electricity and gas – France
AIGET: Associazione Italiana di Grossisti di Energia e Trader / Italian Association of Energy Traders & Suppliers - ITALY
BNE: Bundesverband Neue Energiewirtschaft e.V. / Association of Energy Market Innovators – GERMANY
ESPEN: Ελληνικό Σύνδεσμο Προμηθευτών Ενέργειας / Hellenic Association of Energy Suppliers - GREECE
Oberoende Elhandlare / Independent Electricity Retailers – SWEDEN



Volatility: The Real Challenge for Retailers




High market volatility **impedes a sustainable P&L visibility** for retailers and, therefore, implies **big price premiums for consumers** or, alternatively, direct pass-trough of this volatility to final consumers.



Well-designed marginal price markets can be efficient but because of the volatility they should also be marginal in volume.

How much do I hedge?





Volatility: The Real Challenge for Retailers



Retailers, and market participants in general, must support **very high guarantees** to operate. The total amount of guarantees required **covers the system** for the default of **all participants at the exact same time**.

At this price level and with this level of volatility, **guarantees** intended to demonstrate solvency end up making companies **non-solvent**.

In addition, in organized markets no collateral is accepted. Only cash.



A cash and collateral individual model should be substituted by a global **CREDIT INSURANCE** model where each participant pays a part of the assurance premium based on market share.



Session 3 - Panel discussion

- Which requirements should apply to suppliers, regarding promotion of hedging, collateral, and what information consumers should have to better protect them from price volatility? Should such requirements be harmonised at EU level, or defined locally?
- Which market-based instruments could help shield consumers from volatility (especially vulnerable consumers) in such a way that it does not affect overall market efficiency?
- In what way will the evolution of the retail market and its regulation have implications for the design of wholesale markets and how to ensure this is accommodated in the improvements to wholesale market design?



Session 3 - Participants discussion

Which topic on electricity volatility, suppliers and consumers would you like to discuss next?

(2 words maximum)

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- Raise your hand (plus signal to the moderator your topic in Slido Q&A)



Opinion Poll 9

Thank you. Any questions?

The contents of this document do not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the Agency.



