WHEN TRUST MATTERS



#### **Future Regulation on Natural Gas Networks**

– Key Results of the Study conducted by DNV

ACER – DNV Workshop

10 November 2022





- Meeting will be recorded and posted on the event page together with the slides
- Participants are muted, except speakers
- Should you have any questions, please:
  - 1. Post your question in the **MS Teams chat**
  - 2. Include your **name** and **affiliation** in the question
  - 3. Questions will be answered in the Q&A sessions









09:00 – 09:15	<ul> <li>Introduction</li> <li>ACER – Csilla Bartok, Miguel Martinez Rodriguez</li> <li>EC – Benedikt Klauser, Markus Backes</li> </ul>
09:15 – 10:00	<ul> <li>Repurposing</li> <li>DNV – Daniel Grote</li> <li>ACM – Wietse Van Den Bos</li> <li>Q&amp;A</li> </ul>
10:00 – 10:40	<ul> <li>Decommissioning</li> <li>DNV – Waisum Steinborn-Cheng</li> <li>ENTSOG – Claude Mangin</li> <li>Q&amp;A</li> </ul>
10:40 – 11.20	<ul> <li>Reinvestments</li> <li>DNV – Rosaria Nunes</li> <li>ARERA – Caterina Miriello</li> <li>Q&amp;A</li> </ul>
11:20 – 11:25	<ul> <li>Closing remarks</li> <li>ACER – Csilla Bartok</li> </ul>



## **TSO** assets in the context of decarbonisation

Methane supply to EU27. Source: ENTSOG and ENTSOE, TYNDP 2022, Scenario Report.



HU 80 EE Dk 70 EL **European Green Deal** LUX 60 FI  $\rightarrow$  climate neutrality in EU by 2050 SI SE 50 RO PT 40 LV LT 30 **Forecast based** HF IE only on projected 20% of 2022 aggregated RAB by AT 20 depreciation. PL 2050 **Does not include** BG 10 future investments CZ BB 0 ES 2041 2043 2045 2061 2063 2065 2025 2027 2037 2039 2049 2051 2053 2055 2057 2059 2023 2029 2035 2047 067 2017 2019 2021 2031 2033 SK NL FR

Evolution and forecast of TSO regulatory asset bases per MS 2017-2070 (€ bn)

- Setting the scene
  - Policy targets imply a decrease in natural gas demand
  - Asset removals from the TSO networks resulting from decommissioning & repurposing
  - Investments shift from new capacity to asset replacements
- Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package foresees:
  - Repurposing of natural gas pipelines
  - Forecast of potential increases in natural gas transmission tariffs
  - TSO cost benchmarking
  - Transparency on TSO costs

#### How to manage assets / networks in the future?

- Repurposing
- Decommissioning
- Reinvestments

#### Objectives of the DNV study

- Expand discussion on the decarbonisation of natural gas
- Assess current regulatory practices
- Instruments addressing present and future challenges
- Early implementation of the Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package
- Transparency on TSO costs
- Outside scope: Demand scenarios 2030-2050



#### ACER Workshop on "DNV report Repurposing, Decommissioning, Reinvestments"



10th November 2022

#### Hydrogen and gas markets decarbonisation package: 5 policy aims

- I. Facilitate access of **renewable and low-carbon gases** to existing gas network
- II. Enabling development of **dedicated hydrogen** infrastructure and market
- III. Fostering **network planning** electricity, gas and hydrogen
- IV. Promote consumer protection and engagement in renewable and low-carbon gas markets
- V. Improve resilience and security of supply



## Facilitating access of renewable and low-carbon gases into the existing natural gas network

- Allowing and promoting renewable and low-carbon gases full market access including: wholesale market access physical flexibility - reverse flows.
- Measures to facilitate gas storages and LNG terminals to receive renewable and low-carbon gases
- Removing cross-border tariffs for renewable and low-carbon gases. Similarly, in the future for dedicated hydrogen network.



- More transparency and better use of free capacities at LNG terminals and gas storages allowing more flexible gas trade and use of the terminals and storages.
- 75% tariff discount for the injection and connection of renewable and low-carbon gases.
- ✓ Introducing a 5% cap for hydrogen blends at interconnection points between Member States to avoid cross-border flow restrictions due to differences in blending, which network operators must accept. No blending obligation; voluntary agreements for higher blends possible.
- Ban for Long-Term Contracts for unabated fossil gas by the end of 2049. Short term supply, with contracts below one year, important for security of supply and market liquidity reasons will still be allowed.



#### **Fostering integrated network planning**

#### Articles 51-53 of the Directive



EU Ten-Year-Network-Development-Plans





National Network Development Plans

	EU-level	National level (current)	National level (proposed)
Scenarios	Joint scenarios (gas, electricity, poss. hydrogen)	Separate scenarios	Joint scenarios (gas, electricity, poss. hydrogen)
	Alignment with climate objectives		Alignment with climate objectives
	Involvement of relevant stakeholders		Involvement of relevant stakeholders (DSOs & others)
Network plans	Separate plans (gas, electricity, hydrogen)	Separate plans (gas, electricity, hydrogen)	Separate plans (gas, electricity, hydrogen)
	New Projects of Common Interest only for hydrogen	Investment in gas and possibly hydrogen infrastructure	Investment & decommissioning of gas infrastructure
			Location of power to gas assets
	All TSOs	Only ISO and ITO	All TSOs
	Every two years	Every year	Every two years

## Facilitating hydrogen infrastructure development

- Grandfathering of national **permits and land-use rights for repurposed natural gas pipelines** (Article 7, paras 7 & 8 Directive proposal)
- Rules on cross-financing between gas/electricity grids and hydrogen networks (Article 4 Regulation proposal)
  - Default rule: separation of regulatory assets bases
  - Limited cross-financing possibility subject to approval by regulatory authority
  - Conditions: Collection via temporary, dedicated charge on domestic exit points



WHEN TRUST MATTERS



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# Background and Approach





Repurposing

Decommissioning

#### **Decarbonisation and Energy Transition**

#### European and national decarbonisation targets point to permanent decline of natural gas demand



Source: ENTSOG and ENTSOE, TYNDP 2022, Scenario Report, Version April 2022



Source: ENTSOG and ENTSOE, TYNDP 2022, Scenario Report, Version April 2022

Decline of natural gas demand



Shift and decline of natural gas volumes transported via TSO grid

Reinvestment

#### **Renewable Gases and Substitution**

Partial replacement of natural gas by renewable gases (biomethane and green hydrogen) and partial substitution by electrification and energy efficiency



Source: Carbon Limits and DNV (2021), Re-Stream – Study on the reuse of oil and gas infrastructure for hydrogen and CCS in Europe



Uncertainty on when and how much each case becomes relevant

Regulation to address all three cases

#### **Asset Value at Stake**

#### Potential risk of stranding for assets withdrawn from operation before end of regulatory asset life



Potential risk of asset stranding for an individual natural gas TSO depends on

- average asset age
- regulatory asset lives
- future role of hydrogen (and biomethane)
- speed of decarbonization

Source: ACER based on natural gas TSO data received from NRAs as part of study. Forecast based only on projected depreciation. Does not include future investments.

#### Asset Value at Stake (II)

#### For some countries: Significant share of current RAB will be depreciated after 2050

Evolution of aggregated Regulatory Asset Base per country (without future investments) – anonymized



Natural gas transmission increasingly characterised by decisions on

- replacement and extended use
- repurposing
- decommissioning



#### **Objective and Approach**

ObjectiveAnalyse regulatory challenges and possible regulatory solutions of<br/>repurposing, decommissioning and reinvestments of natural gas transmission assets<br/>in the context of decarbonisation (decline of natural gas demand)



# Regulatory Decisions on Repurposing



#### **Regulatory Questions of Repurposing**

Repurposing = Conversion of individual natural gas network asset for transport of hydrogen and transfer of asset to hydrogen network operator



#### When to Repurpose and How to Assess It (I)?

Natural gas network assets should be repurposed when operationally possibly, if need for hydrogen transport and technical feasibility is given



Provision of information on repurposing projects and timeline within NDP foreseen in proposed Directive on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen (Article 51).

#### When to Repurpose and How to Assess It (II)?

#### Natural gas network assets may also be repurposed, when associated with economic net benefits





#### **Repurposing Costs of Natural Gas TSO**

Efficient and necessary costs of natural gas TSO related to repurposing of assets should be considered in allowed revenues and asset transfer value



#### **Determination of Asset Transfer Value**

Asset transfer value should be determined based on regulatory guidelines, whereas residual asset value of natural gas RAB serves as a reference value

#### **Determination of asset transfer value**

Adopt clear regulatory rules on determination

Apply same asset valuation methodology as for determination of natural gas RAB

Apply residual asset value of natural gas RAB as reference value

Consider additional repurposing costs of natural gas TSO in value

Natural gas and hydrogen network operator may, based on reference value, potentially agree on a higher or lower asset transfer value

Consider application of average asset value as alternative

Determination by natural gas TSO based on regulatory guidelines

## Allocation of revenues and costs of an asset transfer

Adopt Sharing mechanism for asset transfer values deviating from residual asset value

Asset transfer value will have to be set at residual asset value if proposed Regulation on internal markets for gas and hydrogen is adopted (Article 4).

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Determination of general guiding principles for the determination of the asset transfer value within a dedicated Network Code set on European level are foreseen within proposed Regulation on internal markets for gas and hydrogen (Article 54.2.f).



Autoriteit Consument & Markt



# Hydrogen backbone

From a regulator's perspective

Markten goed laten werken voor mensen en bedrijven

## **Opportunities**

### **Dense & large methane network**



### **Projected gasflow**



## Future hydrogen network



## **Role ACM**

- Subsidy & regulation by ministry until +/- 2030
- Asset-transfer from natural gas TSO to hydrogen TSO
- Informal advice on transfer value

## Vision ACM

- Based on consultations
- Price based on remaining RAB is desirable
- Average price not first choice, but acceptable
- Result to be seen

# Discussion



# Regulatory Decisions on Decommissioning



Repurposing

#### **Regulatory Challenges for Decommissioning**



Repurposing

Reinvestment

#### **Definitions of Decommissioning**



Reinvestment

#### When to Decommission and Identification of Individual Assets?

Natural gas TSO best placed to perform analysis to identify assets expected to be stranded and decommissioned



**Other factors** (asset may not be used under normal conditions)

Demand & supply seasonality

Security and reliability of supply ("insurance value")

Future utilization of individual network assets

Role of pipelines in enabling / fostering competition

How to assess

Dedicated analysis as part of natural gas Network Development Plan

#### **Regulatory approval process**

Decommissioning defined in regulatory framework; approval as part of Network Development Plan

#### Identification of Stranded Costs and Recovery

Stranded assets valued at residual asset value, removed from RAB and consider options to recover within regulatory framework

Stranded Cost based on	
Residual Asset Base (best indicator)	Past RAB re-valuations recognized by NRA and factored in current RAB

Treatment of Stranded Asset		
Removed from the RAB		No longer earn a regulatory rate of return and no longer receive a depreciation allowance
One-off Adjustment e.g. Depreciation / Opex		depends on the age of the asset - impact will be smaller compared to a "newer/younger" asset

#### Allocation of Stranded Costs / Recovery – Who Pays?

Natural gas TSO / asset owner?

Natural gas network users?

Both, via sharing



Additional analysis needed to explore these options further within respective regulatory regimes

Reinvestment

#### **Treatment of Physical Decommissioning and Dismantling Costs**

Additional costs related to the physical decommissioning or dismantling of these assets, (even when the assets are left in the ground).

## Separate NRA cost assessment and approval of <u>efficient</u> decommissioning and dismantling costs

Not part of general efficiency assessment (if applied)

Natural gas TSO to list and submit associated costs for each activity related to decommissioning

Natural gas TSO may be required to conduct a public tender or get competing offers for decommissioning work

#### Who Pays?

Natural gas TSO / asset owner?

Natural gas network users?





Reinvestment

#### **Explore Mitigation of Stranded Assets within Regulatory Framework**

Changing / adapting parameters within regulatory framework to ensure recovery of past investments



#### **Depreciation Policy Options:**

- Both options increase certainty in cost recovery for natural gas TSO in shortto medium-term: recovery shifted forward
  - Assumes current natural gas network users will use network more heavily than future natural gas users.
  - More natural gas users to distribute costs to than in the future
- Targeted Depreciation (e.g. 2045, 2050, 2070)
- **RAB Re-valuation:** 
  - Limited precedent in context to mitigate asset stranding
- Non-indexation of the RAB / Nominal WACC
  - Compensation for inflation is directly reflected via capital costs in respective year and charges to users of natural gas network in that year
- WACC Premium:
  - beta up-lift or an individual risk premium to cost of equity, may already be reflected in risk premiums above risk-free rate



09/11/2022 MAR0139-22



#### ACER workshop on future regulatory decisions on natural gas networks

#### **ENTSOG presentation, 10 November 2022**

Claude Mangin

Market Director



**Definition by DNV:** 'Stranded assets are assets withdrawn from operation before the end of their regulatory asset lifetime as a result of permanently declining natural gas demand, changes in technology, policy decisions (decarbonisation) or other factors.'

- More than 20 years of liberalization of gas market have led to investments in the European gas network to increase competition and security of supply.
- What might look like stranded assets at one point may be in fact useful later (e.g., post-Fukushima/low LNG share versus war in Ukraine/high LNG share; SoS drivers linked to climatic or political conditions; physical and commercial flexibility; potential for RES integration). The potential future utilisation of the assets must be assessed adopting precautionary criteria.
- The short and long-term effects of the war in Ukraine on gas consumption and flows in the EU are difficult to evaluate yet (e.g., pre-war consumption scenarios are under revision, need in new infrastructures - LNG terminal and pipes - for fostering the gas flows from West to East / across Europe, RePowerEU Communication has set huge hydrogen target).
- However, gas infrastructure shall be expected to play a key role also in the future: gaseous fuels share expected to stay constant (EC Impact Assessment Gas&H2 Package). Thus, stranded assets risk should not be perceived as relevant since low-carbon/renewable molecules will progressively increase.
- ENTSOG supports going for repurposing gas infrastructure to transport hydrogen as the most efficient solution for the overall energy system.

## Decommissioning in the DNV report



#### **ENTSOG** agrees with several points from DNV like:

- Gas TSOs are better placed than NRAs to define assets to decommission (NRA scrutiny by the way not opposed).
- Residual value of asset (i.e., RAB) should be the reference.
- Dismantling, removal, and land restoration to be assessed comparing costs and benefits.
- However, ENTSOG would like to clearly state that TSOs should be protected against retroactive decisions and should recoup full investment costs, including potential decommissioning and dismantling costs for stranded assets, as regulated infrastructure operators do not have a remuneration including stranded assets risk.
- Adjusting depreciation policy (accelerated, shorter regulatory lives) is an approach we can discuss but any capital shortfall (full or even partial write-off by changes in the RAB valuation methodology and/or adaptations of the WACC) is a no-go, as it retrospectively modifies the regulatory framework.



## Thank you for your attention

Claude Mangin Market Director

Location: Online

Date: 10.11.22

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# Discussion



# Regulatory Decisions on Reinvestments and Extended Use of Assets



#### **Regulatory Questions for Reinvestment and Extended Use of Assets**

Choice between replacing existing assets (reinvestments) or keeping the assets in operation after the end of the regulatory asset life (when technically feasible and safe)



#### **Replacement Needs**

## Increasing role of asset replacement as part of TSO investments. This trend will likely increase soon because of assets becoming fully depreciated



#### Source: NRAs (ACER)\*

\* Disclaimer: the data figures were put together by ACER based on the information received from the NRAs. The underlying data was only reviewed by ACER (and not DNV, only aggregated / anonymised data was in general made available to DNV).

#### Adaptation of Regulatory Asset Lifetimes (Regulatory Depreciation)

The regulatory depreciation should reflect the costs of investments and be related to the use of natural gas transmission asset

- Depreciation allowance based as close as possible to technical life
- Existing assets: changing to a new (longer) depreciation lives is possible but not recommended (regulatory certainty and predictability + increased risk asset stranding)
- New assets (used and useful for the whole of its technical life): regulatory depreciation = expected technical life → current regulatory asset lives could be adjusted (if deemed appropriate by NRAs)
- New assets (operational for longer than it will be used and useful): further consideration whether to purchase / replace this asset
   → alternative ways of supplying respective natural gas transmission users



#### **Changes to Regulatory Assessment and Remuneration of Reinvestments**

Additional regulatory scrutiny may be applied by NRAs for reinvestments, possibly only be allowed to be included in RAB, if natural gas TSO can provide convincing evidence on their need

- In some EU countries this requires a change to the national legislation to give NRAs more powers for the approval of investment plans
- Large reinvestments: NRAs can request comprehensive CBA to compare a set of options (replacement vs. keeping the asset in operation at the end of the regulatory life) + detailed explanations of the need for a replacement
- Smaller reinvestments: NRAs should consider developing a simplified CBA process
  - Exact format and details of a simplified CBA for smaller investments would need to be developed in future work



#### **Changes to Regulatory Treatment of Assets Whose Use is Extended**

## NRAs could apply explicit financial incentives for keeping fully depreciated assets in operation (when totex approach is not feasible)

Provide an opex allowance (only) for keeping fully depreciated assets in operation

- If asset is kept in operation after the end of the regulatory lifetime, it would still require operating and maintenance costs
- Solutions associated with higher opex seem unattractive compared to more capex intensive solutions
- Natural gas TSO might decide to replace asset and could justify decision with risks and potential failures of network

#### Provide an explicit financial incentive for maintaining fully depreciated assets in operation (in addition to opex allowance)

- CBA could be a pre-requisite to make sure the best decision has been taken
- Amount of financial incentive: could consist of a premium on opex value (i.e., increased opex allowance) or part of the capital costs
- Should be re-assessed over time (e.g., at the end of each regulatory period) and its application should be limited in time
- NRAs should consult on details of design of financial incentive

#### **Changes to Regulatory Models**

## When feasible, NRAs may apply a totex approach to mitigate asymmetric information between natural gas TSO and NRAs

- Information asymmetries: it may be difficult for NRA to not approve a replacement investment when a risk on security of supply and reliability is involved
- One option for NRA would be to adopt some form of totex approach, instead of dealing separately with capital and operational expenditure
- Conducting economic benchmarking on total cost (including capital cost) is difficult due to data limitations, different accounting conventions in the treatment of capital costs, etc.
- Adoption of a totex approach would represent a change from current regulatory practice and would require further work from NRAs



#### **Regulatory Tools**

Application of regulatory tools to facilitate efficient choice between reinvestments and extended use of assets

#### 1. Forecast of Natural Gas Demand and Network Planning

- Accurate forecasting is a pre-requisite to determine future (re)investment requirements
- Decarbonisation policies and respective timings shall be clearly defined at a national level
- More integrated network planning and operation of entire EU energy system, across multiple energy carriers, infrastructures and consumption sectors

#### 2. Asset Maintenance

- One way to defer capital replacement and reinvestment expenditures is to improve maintenance
- Natural gas TSOs could prepare and publish an asset management plan
- When feasible, condition-based assessments could be adopted rather than age-based replacement programmes
- Natural gas TSOs could also apply monetised risk assessments

## 3. Transparency Requirements

- Important to define and publish indicators to monitor evolution of reinvestments and assets fully depreciated (in operation)
- Information requirements could be either included at EU level or at a national level defined by NRAs





# ARERA: measures for asset substitution vs reinvestment

ACER TAR TF 10 November 2022

> **Caterina Miriello** Gas Infrastructure Officer (ARERA)

#### Main themes on asset replacement vs reinvestment

- In Italy: regulatory asset life for pipelines is 50 years; several pipelines are (almost) fully depreciated although still fit to be maintained in operation
- ➤ <u>TSO perspective</u>: maintaining fully depreciated assets into operation is not economically profitable (increased OPEX but price cap, no CAPEX allowance) → *but* substituting a large part of the network might prove critical
- ► <u>NRA perspective</u>: avoiding inefficiencies, by inducing TSO to keep in exercise fully depreciated assets when technically feasible, and postponing/avoiding their substitution → *but* in the context of decarbonisation, how to deal with the risk of assets no longer being needed before the end of their technical life?

Arera's findings: in general, postponing the substitution brings a benefit to the system, even in the case of substitution of assets no longer needed before the end of their technical life

#### Arera's regulatory measures

- 1. Increased **oversight** on TSO investments:
  - inclusion of substitution investments in NDPs
  - introduction of an Asset Health Methodology to evaluate the need for substitution or the possibility of reinvestment
- 2. Introducing an **incentive to postpone** a substitution investment based on the benefit for the system of avoided remuneration:
  - 1% of re-evaluated investment cost (*still under consultation*), computed as a share of the estimated benefit for the system of avoided remuneration, under different decarbonisation scenarios
  - the benefit is computed as a function of years of postponement, amount of remuneration, discount factor
- 3. Possibility to capitalise extraordinary maintenance expenses (up to a certain threshold) with a **regulatory life shorter** than pipelines (15/20 years) *still under consultation*



#### THANKS

#### Caterina Miriello Gas Infrastructure Officer (ARERA) cmiriello@arera.it



# Discussion





# Closing remarks

Csilla Bartok

 $\mathsf{DN}$ 

#### Our vision A trusted voice to tackle global transformations

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