The EU is vulnerable to energy shocks. To date the 2026 energy crisis is not at the same level of magnitude as the 2022-2023 crisis.

• The Middle East conflict crisis could cut 20% of global LNG exports: EU sourced 7% of its LNG from Qatar during winter 2025/2026, equivalent to 4% of its natural gas imports over the same period. If Qatari production remains offline until December 2026, a global LNG supply shortfall of 26 bcm could arise and EU spot LNG demand could rise to around 56 bcm. Europe’s exposure to further price increases will depend on the duration of the conflict.
• Title Transfer Facility (TTF) gas prices peaked above 60 EUR/MWh after attacks on energy facilities: At the beginning of the conflict, day-ahead prices rose above 50 EUR/MWh and exceeded 60 EUR/MWh after energy infrastructure was damaged. By mid-April, prices returned close to January peak levels, which were primarily driven by colder-than-average temperatures. Price volatility is expected to remain high amid continued uncertainty.
• Competition with Asia for flexible LNG cargoes could push prices up: After the outbreak of the conflict, Asian gas price premiums reached an all-time high (over 20 EUR/MWh), due to the region's higher exposure to potential supply disruptions via the Strait of Hormuz. This dynamic could make Europe's summer storage filling more challenging, as heightened competition for flexible LNG cargoes threatens to push prices up further.
• EU underground gas storage ended winter below 30%, significantly lower than recent years’ average, leaving EU gas stocks near a 9-year low. This resulted from lower starting inventories and sustained withdrawals during the season. Although withdrawals were lower than in the previous winter, a colder-than-average season increased overall consumption, particularly for gas-fired power generation.
• Storage targets for the next winter, in accordance with the EU Gas Storage Regulation, may put upward pressure on prices this summer. Europe could achieve 80% storage levels at current LNG import rates (~11 bcm/month): If demand follows 2025 trends, the EU could achieve 80% storage capacity ahead of winter, although likely at higher costs due to tight global supply and increased competition. Reaching the 90% target would be difficult without additional supply sources.  
• EU gas demand rose slightly year-on-year to around 2400 TWh: This increase was mainly driven by higher gas use in power generation and gas use for heating, due to a colder-than-average winter. 
• Europe’s reliance on US LNG grew amid the phase-out of Russian gas imports. LNG drove supply changes and helped ease markets before the conflict. EU LNG imports increased by 20% year-on-year, largely due to a 45% rise in US LNG deliveries. US LNG now accounts for 30% of EU gas imports and about two-thirds of its LNG imports. Russian gas flows continued to decline, falling close to 240 TWh (but still around 14% of total EU gas imports).
• In Europe, gas flows continued to shift away from eastern pipeline supply and to LNG entry points: This resulted in higher west–east cross border flows, particularly along the Belgium–Germany, Germany–Austria and Germany–Czech Republic corridors. This shift was also reflected in wholesale market signals, with price spreads in Central Europe widening to over 2 EUR/MWh above the TTF benchmark. Notably, cold spells led the Baltic markets to decouple from the rest of Europe, with price premiums reaching up to 20 EUR/MWh.