The SO Regulation provides the rules and standards to ensure the required level of operational security, frequency, quality and efficient use of the interconnected system and resources. The SO Regulation entered into force on 14 September 2017. ​

Click here for information on the incident on the power system separation of Iberia from Continental Europe on 24 July 2021.

Click here for in​​​​​formation on the continental Europe electricity system separation (​8th January 2021) incident.​​

Click here for information on the incident in the Polish power system on 17 May 2021.

The SO Regulation applies to significant grid users that are further characterised as (new or existing):

• power generating modules classified as type B, C and D

• transmission connected demand facilities

• transmission connected closed distribution systems     

• demand facilities, closed distribution systems and third parties in case they provide demand response directly to the TSO

• high-voltage direct current (HVDC) systems, as well as,

• providers of redispatching of power generating modules or demand facilities by means of aggregation and providers of active power reserve.

The network code provides a minimum degree of harmonisation and leaves certain details to further implementation p​rocedures at regional level. This also applies to terms and conditions, as well as to methodologies, in connection to:

• key organisational requirements, roles and responsibilities related to data exchange and operational security

• methodology for building the common grid models

• methodology for coordinating operational security analysis.​​

The SO Regulation defines obligations for TSOs, regulatory authorities and ACER on the development and approval of terms and conditions and methodologies, as well as describing their adoption process. These rules contribute to ensuring security, facilitating the establishment and functioning of the Union's internal electricity market and the integration of renewable energy sources, as well as allowing a more efficient usage of the network and increasing competition for the benefit of consumers.

Terms and conditions and methodologies can be subject to the approval of:

• All regulatory authorities

• Regulatory authorities of a specific region

• Individually at the Member states' level

The TSOs' proposal should be consulted upon and submitted to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval. The proposal should contain a timescale for implementation and expected impact on the Regulation's objectives.

The NRAs involved should take decisions within six months after receiving the proposal. In case of disagreement, the regulatory authorities can request an amendment, allowing TSOs two more months for adjustments and additional two months for the regulatory authorities to approve the revised proposal. If the NRAs do not reach a unanimous agreement, or if they jointly request so, ACER can adopt a decision within six months from the referral.

Once the terms and conditions or methodologies are adopted, they can be amended after the request of the relevant TSO or NRA. In this case, the proposals for adjustments should be submitted for consultation and undergo a new approval procedure.

The implementation tabl​e​ provides more details on the latest updates.

Methodology for Coordinating Operational Security Analysis (CSAM)

The Coordinating Operational Security Analysis Methodology (CSAM) guarantees the safe execution of operational activities within the European Union's power system by outlining provisions and requirements for all Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and Regional Coordination Centres (RCCs) to:

• Facilitate effective coordination of system operation and operational planning.
• Ensure transparency and reliability of information regarding transmission system operation.
• Promote efficient operation of the electricity transmission system across the Union.

Approved CSAM

First ACER Decision​

On 19 June 2019 ACER adopted the first Decision No 07/2019 on CSAM. This Decision took into consideration inputs received in an ACER public consultation (which ran from 25 January until 18 February 2019).

This Decision allowed 18 months (i.e. until 18 December 2020) for TSOs to develop detailed rules to:

• Include remedial actions in individual grid models (Article 21).
• Coordinate cross-border relevant network elements (XNEs) and remedial actions (XRAs) in overlapping zones (Article 27).
• Share costs for XNEs and XRAs in overlapping zones (Inter-CCR) (Article 27).

In January 2023, ACER published a Corrigendum to correct a typographical error in Annex I of Decision No 07/2019.

Amendments to CSAM

First amendment: Following a public consultation (in summer 2020) organised by ENTSO-E (on behalf of all TSOs), ENTSO-E submitted a proposal to ACER to amend the CSAM in December 2020. In June 2021, with its Decision  No 07/2021, ACER amended the CSAM.

Second amendment: In early summer 2023, ENTSO-E (on behalf of all TSOs) ran a public consultation to consult on new amendments to CSAM. In November 2023, ENTSO-E submitted to ACER its proposal to amend the methodology.

ACER amended the CSAM on 13 May 2024 with its Decision No 07/2024.

Methodology for assessing the relevance of assets for outage coordination​

All TSOs must develop a proposal for a methodology at least per synchronous area, evaluating the relevance of outage coordination's assets (RAOCM) and submit it to all the regulatory authorities for approval and to ACER for information.

Action 1: In September 2018, all TSOs submitted the proposal for RAOCM to all the regulatory authorities and to ACER.

Action 2: In December 2018, all regulatory authorities requested ACER to adopt a decision on the Proposal.

Action 3: From 25 January to 18 February 2019 ACER conducted a formal public consultation in order to obtain a wider view from stakeholders.

Action 4: In Spring 2019, ACER engaged with TSOs and NRAs and informed them about the decision.

Action 5: In June 2019, ACER adopted a decision on the proposal for RAOCM.

The RAOCM is expected to be implemented within three months after ACER's decision.

Related documents

Approved proposal for coordinating operational security analysis​

Methodology for regional operational security coordination - CORE Region​

All CORE TSOs must develop a proposal for a methodology for regional operational security coordination (ROSC) and submit it to all CORE regulatory authorities for approval. The methodology should aim at the regional standardisation of operational security analysis for Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (the CORE region).

Action 1: In December 2019, all CORE TSOs submitted the proposal for the ROSC to all regulatory authorities.

Action 2: In June 2020, all CORE regulatory authorities requested ACER to adopt a decision on the proposal.

Action 3: In September 2020, ACER conducted a formal public consultation in order to obtain a wider view from stakeholders.

Action 4: From July to October 2020, ACER engaged with TSOs and NRAs and informed them about the decision.

Action 5: In December 2020, ACER adopted a decision on the Methodology for Regional Operational Security Coordination for the Core Capacity Calculation Region.

The ROSC is expected to be implemented in two steps. Find more details on these steps within the approved methodology.

Related documents

Approved Core ROSC

CORE TSOs' proposal

Explanatory document

RAs letter for referral ​​

Core ROSC​ Non-Paper​​

Methodology for regional operational security coordination - SEE Region

All SEE TSOs must develop a proposal for a methodology for regional operational security coordination (ROSC) and submit it to all SEE regulatory authorities for approval. The methodology should aim at the regional standardisation of operational security analysis for Bulgaria, Greece and Romania (the SEE region).

Action 1: In December 2019, all SEE TSOs submitted the proposal for the ROSC to all regulatory authorities.

Action 2: In October 2020, all SEE regulatory authorities requested ACER to adopt a decision on the proposal.

Action 3: In October 2020, ACER engaged with TSOs and NRAs and informed them about the decision.

Action 4: In December 2020, ACER adopted a decision on the Methodology for Regional Operational Security Coordination for the SEE Capacity Calculation Region.

The ROSC is expected to be implemented in two steps. Find more details on these steps within the approved methodology.

Related documents 

Approved SEE ROSC

SEE TSOs' proposal

RAs letter for referral

RAs Non​- Paper

With the adoption of its Greening Action Plan 2021-2022, ACER pledges to reduce its own carbon footprint as an organisation.

ACER’s desire to become greener and more digital as an organisation is not surprising for an EU Agency that plays such a pivotal role in the delivery of Europe’s ambition to be climate neutral by 2050.

Decarbonising the energy sector is a core pillar of the European Green Deal. Europe’s decarbonisation goals relies on integrated European energy markets. This lies at the heart of ACER’s work. Safe and sustainable energy is in turn a key enabler of a competitive and climate-neutral EU economy.

What’s in the ACER Greening Action Plan 2021-2022?

ACER has adopted its first Greening Action Plan identifying 17 concrete actions that aim to reduce the Agency’s carbon footprint in the course of 2021 and 2022, with a strong cross-departmental effort.

This commitment shows ACER’s readiness to implement concrete greening actions, and to support the efforts of its staff and members embracing innovation and sustainable ways of working.

ACER actions fall into six thematic action domains, inspired by the European Commission’s Feasibility and Scoping Study for the Commission to Become Climate Neutral by 2030:

• Design sustainable buildings and working space;
• Optimise energy consumption and systems for buildings;
• Reconsider air travel and promote sustainable travel modes;
• Reduce commuting emissions for transport and mobility;
• Reduce GreenHouse Gas (GHG) emissions from purchase and consumption;
• Manage and communicate for other sources of emissions.

The Agency was invited by its Administrative Board to prepare its first Greening Action Plan for 2021-2022.

ACER’s Greening Action Plan details the current state of play as well as the planned actions of the Agency factoring in the available resources.

Read more on the ACER Greening Action Plan (2021-2022).

​​​In the “Bridge to 2025”, regulators set out their thinking on the key challenges and the possible responses to secure the appropriate regulatory framework for the coming decade. The present document renews and updates the Gas Target Model (GTM) developed in 2011. The core principles that underpin our vision for European gas markets will remain the same today as when the GTM was first published. This vision is of a competitive European gas market, comprising entry-exit zones with liquid virtual trading points, where market integration is served by appropriate levels of infrastructure, which is utilised efficiently and enables gas to move freely between market areas to the locations where it is most highly valued by gas market participants. However, the European gas market and the uncertainties and challenges it faces have changed fundamentally, and this requires a new mind set in order to adopt the correct regulatory approach when looking forward to the next decade. You can have a look at the latest GTM here.  

The Network Codes will bring Europe closer to this vision. Implementing them in full and on schedule is the right priority and the focus for regulators and other stakeholders today. However, the Network Codes alone are unlikely to deliver a “well-functioning transparent gas wholesale … market” that benefits consumers across Europe, as required by Regulation (EC) No 715/2009. Consequently, this revised GTM not only guides the coherent development and implementation of the Network Codes, but also specifies the steps required to realise liquid and dynamic gas markets thereby enabling all European consumers to benefit from secure gas supplies and effective retail competition.    

Increasing uncertainty in supply and demand     

An important factor in revising the GTM has been changing gas market dynamics. The supply and demand picture has become increasingly uncertain in recent years. For a long period, gas demand had been rising relentlessly. A combination of factors has changed that. In particular, the shale gas revolution in America has put gas-intensive European industrial enterprises at a competitive disadvantage. At the same time, the coal displaced from the American generation mix has lowered coal prices in Europe such that coal-fired generation is now far more profitable than running gas-fired power stations. The low emission allowance price has also exacerbated this phenomenon. On the supply side, European Union (EU) production, which is located largely in the UK and the Netherlands, is declining. Whilst unconventional gas production will be a positive development as far as domestic output is concerned, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on gas supplies, even in the most optimistic scenarios, until well into the 2020s.    

Competitive markets ensure Security of Supply    ​

Security of Supply and competition work in concert; the more pluralistic upstream supply is in Europe, the less we will depend on any one source of supply that may be subject to either physical restrictions or political interference. Our research shows that thirteen Member States do not meet the original GTM target of a Residual Supply Index (RSI) of over 110% of demand, whilst most Eastern European countries cannot currently hit this target.     

The GTM strongly affirms that well-functioning gas markets remain essential providers of supply security. Building on the original GTM, we recommend further enhancements to market-based measures, such as ensuring that imbalance prices remain dynamic throughout an emergency, with no cap on prices (up to the value of lost load, or VoLL), in order to strengthen incentives for market participants (including storage users) to deliver supply security. In addition, we propose full unbundling of storage products and setting appropriate network tariffs for storage users. We note that it can be difficult to give Transmission System Operators (TSOs) incentives to work together to build large, complex projects from relatively distant regions (and such projects are often unable to access capital markets). Relevant public bodies should give priority status to such infrastructure investments and be able to promote them as projects of common interest (PCIs).    
 

Wholesale market functioning    ​

The GTM interprets the Gas Regulation requirement of “facilitating the emergence of a well-functioning and transparent wholesale market” as implying a liquid spot market and, crucially, a liquid wholesale forward and/or futures market, so that cost-effective wholesale market risk management is possible. For example, this means that a new entrant can sell a fixed-price contract to a consumer for delivery of gas in a year’s time, and in turn purchase the required gas at a fixed price in the wholesale gas market. Research we have undertaken shows that forward trading is highly limited across the EU. This point is of critical importance.     

Interconnections have a key role to play in achieving a functioning EU market. The Capacity Allocation (CAM) Network Code and the Congestion Management Procedures (CMP) Guidelines represent a fundamental step forward, but are not sufficient in many cases. The updated GTM therefore includes an assessment of the functioning of wholesale markets at national level, developing a revised series of metrics to assess whether a wholesale market is ‘well-functioning’. These metrics are based on the analysis of data and information not available when the first GTM was drafted and can be grouped into two key characteristics of markets:    

1. They meet market participants’ needs: products and liquidity are available that enable effective management of wholesale market risk; and,   

2. They have “market health”: the wholesale market is demonstrably competitive, resilient and has a high degree of Security of Supply.    

The self-evaluation process    ​

We propose that all Member States assess whether they are likely to meet, or continue to meet, these revised GTM metrics by 2017 (and every three years thereafter) in order to determine whether their market will be well functioning. If it will not, the GTM suggests considering structural market reforms. Three market integration tools have been identified (this list is not exhaustive):    

1. Full market merger: full merger of two or more adjacent markets by merging their virtual trading points and balancing zones;     

2. Trading region: partial merger of two or more adjacent markets at the wholesale level by merging their virtual trading points and establishing a cross-border trading balancing zone; and,    

3. Satellite market: substantial linking (via pipeline capacity) of a non-functioning gas market to a directly neighbouring, well-functioning wholesale gas market.    

Additional tools, including market coupling, can have a beneficial effect by facilitating coordinated, simultaneous access to capacity and spot gas markets.    

Any reforms undertaken by Member States should be based on an appropriate cost-benefit analysis to ensure their economic viability.   

The role of gas in complementing renewable energy source generation  

We believe that more can, and should, be done to ensure that regulatory and market arrangements allow for more efficient use of gas-fired power plants. We predict that significant gas-fired generating capacity is likely to be needed to provide flexible back up to renewable energy sources (RES) whilst also running at a far lower load factor than was previously the case. To optimise the joint working of the electricity and gas sectors, we propose that gas and electricity TSOs should be legally obliged to cooperate with one another. This could include: (i) improved information flows so that system operators and market participants benefit from more timely information, allowing all parties to make more optimised operational decisions; and, (ii) a cooperative review of gas and electricity industry timelines, among other things.    

New developments in the gas supply chain 

We have also considered new developments in the use of gas. These include: (i) the intensification of gas use in the transportation sector (in both liquefied (LNG) and compressed natural gas (CNG) forms); (ii) small-scale applications of LNG and CNG, including alternative means of distribution such as virtual pipelines; and, (iii) pioneering technologies that facilitate the storage of electricity in the form of hydrogen or synthetic gas (“power to gas” or P2G).    

As regulators, it is important that we facilitate the emergence of these new uses of gas through appropriate and limited interventions only. The areas we have considered in our review include:    

Clarification as to which of these activities require regulatory intervention (in particular loading/bunkering activities at LNG storage facilities);    

Ensuring that LNG and CNG filling stations are not considered as suppliers of gas, and consequently should not be subject to third party access (TPA) or licensing procedures;    

Facilitating a level-playing field between piped and non-piped supplies, so that gas-to-gas competition is possible if the market demands it; and,    

Particularly in the case of P2G, the technical provisions for injecting hydrogen and synthetic gas in the gas system, the pricing regime, the role of the P2G operators, the balancing aspect and integration in the electricity system.   ​

Conclusion    

​Our 2014 Market Monitoring Report estimated that insufficient interconnection of wholesale gas markets led to a gross-welfare loss of approximately EUR 7 billion in 2013. The implication is that functioning European gas markets which meet the needs of EU gas consumers are the exception rather than the rule in 2014, when the internal energy market was due to be completed. Security of gas supplies is again the focus for policymakers across the EU and the costs of dependence on a single supplier have again been made clear. This revised GTM identifies how Europe can realise its potential and reap the vast benefits of a secure, fully implemented internal gas market for all its citizens.   

The Agency has been informed by the European Commission that the proposed changes to the Articles of Association and other statutory documents of ENTSO-E would still need to be further adapted, inter alia in light of the obligations stemming from the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the UK, and which would therefore require a resubmission of the afore-mentioned ENTSO-E documents.

For reasons of procedural efficiency, the Agency has therefore decided to halt its proceedings on the proposed changes to ENTSO-E's Articles of Association and other statutory documents.

Any comments which the Agency has meanwhile received in the course of the current proceedings will be taken into account when the Agency will examine the finalised proposal of statutory documents, once the above-mentioned further implementing measures have been taken, and to the extent that they will remain relevant in light of the possible additional changes made to the documents submitted. In case relevant changes would be made to any of the statutory documents consulted, the Agency will allow for a new consultation, so as to enable additional comments to the Agency.

Original consultation of 25 March

ACER consults on amended statutory documents of ENTSO-E,  in accordance with Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity. 

This consultation is addressed to the organisations representing all stakeholders, in particular system users, including consumers.

Replies to this consultation should be submitted to ACER by 12 April 2021, 09:00 hrs (CET).

​

For any questions, please contact us on:  ENTSO-E-statutes-amendments(at)acer.europa.eu

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Early in 2021, the National Regulatory Authorities for energy from the Hansa, Core and Baltic regions asked the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to decide on the respective market-based cross-border capacity allocation process for the exchange of balancing capacity in their region.

This request follows the Article 41 of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2195 establishing a Guideline on Electricity Balancing (EB Regulation).

Additionally, regulators from the Core region asked ACER to decide on the regional cross-border capacity allocation process for the exchange of balancing capacity to be based on economic efficiency in accordance with Article 42 of the EB Regulation.

ACER is now collecting comments from stakeholders in order to take an informed decision.

All interested parties are invited to submit their inputs by 2 May 2021, 23:59 hrs (CET).​

Would you like to find out more on the topic? Join the ACER Public Workshop on 20 April (10 am - ​12 pm)​.​

Background information

The cross-border capacity allocation methodologies ensure efficient, transparent, and non-discriminatory capacity allocation for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves.

The market-based process applies in case the allocation takes place not more than a week in advance of the provision of balancing capacity, while the process based on economic efficiency applies in case the allocation takes place more than one week in advance of the provision of balancing capacity.​

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