On 31 January 2025, ACER received a proposal from the Nominated Electricity Market Operators (NEMOs) for the Market Coupling Operation (MCO) integration plan.

What is the MCO integration plan?

The MCO integration plan aims to integrate NEMOs from Energy Community countries into the EU’s electricity day-ahead and intraday market coupling system. To achieve this, the plan should include:

• a detailed explanation of how the integration will work;
• a proposed timeline for implementation; and
• an assessment of how the integration may impact MCO functions.

The plan should also align with the existing MCO framework, which defines how EU NEMOs collaborate to establish and perform MCO functions (e.g. market coupling operations, algorithm management, capacity data processing), needed to ensure that electricity markets across countries operate efficiently.

Why is a decision needed?

The Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management Regulation, as adapted and adopted for the Energy Community, requires all NEMOs to submit a proposal for the MCO integration plan to ACER, regulatory authorities and the Energy Community Regulatory Board.

ACER is responsible for reviewing and approving the plan, ensuring it aligns with the EU electricity market framework.

What are the next steps?

ACER expects to decide on the MCO integration plan by July 2025.

Contact information 

Interested parties may contact ACER on this matter at ACER-ELE-2025-001@acer.europa.eu by 31 March 2025 at the latest.

Relevant documents

All NEMOs' proposal for the MCO integration plan.

Explanatory note.

Today, ACER releases its report on the Swedish gas transmission tariff directed at the Swedish National Regulatory Authority (NRA), Energimarknadsinspektionen (Ei), and Transmission System Operator, Swedegas.

The report assesses whether the proposed Reference Price Methodology (RPM) complies with the requirements of the Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff structures (NC TAR). 

What are the key findings? 

After analysing the consultation document, ACER concludes that:

• Most of the required information is provided, however, the forecasted contracted capacity, tariff comparison between periods, and detailed information on some non-transmission services are missing. 

• The input parameters of the proposed RPM do not fulfil the transparency requirements of the NC TAR. As a result, ACER concludes that the proposed RPM is not fully compliant with the transparency principle.

• While the choice of the postage stamp methodology is well justified, limitations identified in the allowed revenue estimation and revenue reconciliation raise concerns about the cost reflectivity of the proposed tariff. Consequently, ACER cannot conclude that the proposed RPM complies with the cost-reflectivity principle. 

• The proposed RPM achieves a reasonable level of cross-subsidisation compared to the alternative capacity-weighted distance methodology while complying with the principles of non-discrimination, volume risk, and the prevention of distortions in cross-border trade. 

• The information provided on the three non-transmission services (fees for extra area consumption, capacity allocation for summer and winter periods, and capacity allocation for daily capacity products) is insufficient to assess the compliance with the NC TAR principles.

What does ACER recommend? 

ACER recommends that the NRA, when adopting its decision:

• Includes the missing elements and clarifies inconsistencies in the calculation of input parameters for the tariff-setting process, ensuring stakeholders fully understand the methodology. 

• Specifies the start of the regulatory period for the proposed RPM and the applicability of the consulted tariff.

• Provides the missing information on the three additional non-transmission services. 

ACER welcomes the steps taken by the NRA to realign the allowed revenue with Article 17 of Renewable Gas, Natural Gas and Hydrogen Regulation, ensuring it reflects the TSO’s actual costs, as long as they correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator. 

Additionally, ACER appreciates that the TSO and NRA followed its recommendation in the 2024 tariff report and conducted another consultation on the applied methodology. 

See all ACER reports on the national tariff consultation documents.

Today, ACER releases its Opinion on the National Resource Adequacy Assessment of Poland. This is the second ACER Opinion on a National Resource Adequacy Assessment (NRAA).

What is a resource adequacy assessment?

The European Resource Adequacy Assessment (ERAA) evaluates electricity resource adequacy across the EU and provides an objective framework to assess the need for additional national measures to ensure security of supply. ERAA is carried out annually by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and reviewed by ACER.

Member States can complement the European analysis with their own national assessments (NRAAs). While the latter follow the ERAA methodology, they may capture new developments or national specificities that have not been reflected in the latest ERAA.

When a national assessment identifies new adequacy concerns, and the Member State informs ACER, ACER must issue an Opinion on the differences between the national and European assessments.

What are ACER’s findings?

In its Opinion, ACER identified three main differences between the Polish NRAA and ERAA.

ACER finds that Poland’s assessment:

• Updates assumptions on capacity resources, for example, by using revised estimates for nuclear and renewable energy capacity.
• Introduces additional modelling elements, e.g. thoroughly assessing the economics of capacity resources by analysing their revenues and costs. However, it does not fully account for the development of demand response and battery storage in the Polish market.
• Does not adequately consider the interconnected nature of Europe’s electricity market, as:
  • the country’s maximum import capacity indicated in the NRAA is more constrained than in practice (as shown in the figure below); and
  • exports are not considered.

This simplification does not highlight the benefits of cross-border electricity exchanges, which help reduce overall system costs and improve adequacy.

The figure compares the import (1.8 GW) and export (0 GW) limits in the Polish NRAA (yellow) with Poland's actual net import in 2023 (blue, where a positive value indicates net import).

ACER also notes that some issues (and their potential effects) identified in Poland’s NRAA were already observed in other monitoring activities:

• The Polish Transmission System Operator (TSO) applies “allocation constraints” (i.e. temporary measures foreseen by the regulation). In its report on cross-zonal capacities (July 2024), ACER found that these constraints occasionally limit electricity exports from Poland, even when its neighbours are in need. This has a stronger impact during Dunkelflaute events, i.e. when renewable energy production is reduced due to weather conditions. As a result, Poland’s electricity prices do not reflect regional shortages effectively, limiting earnings for local generators and demand response providers (see figure below).
• In its report on barriers to demand-side flexibility (December 2023), ACER found several barriers to demand response and other distributed resources in Poland. Addressing these barriers would facilitate the uptake of these resources, helping to alleviate concerns that might otherwise justify extending the existing capacity mechanism.

During a dunkelflaute event on 12 December 2024 at 16:00-17:00, the electricity price in Poland (165 euros/MWh) was several times lower than in its neighbouring countries. Source: ACER based on ENTSO-E Transparency Platform.

What are the next steps?

ACER recommends that the Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Polish TSO take these findings into account and, if necessary, revise the NRAA.

This would improve the robustness of the Polish assessment and provide a more accurate picture of the country’s electricity adequacy. 

On 16 August 2024, the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) of the Netherlands asked ACER to decide on how to address insufficient risk hedging opportunities at the bidding zone border between the Netherlands and Norway (NL-NO2).

After consulting with stakeholders in autumn 2024 and assessing the potential impact of long-term transmission rights (LTTRs) on the NL-NO2 bidding zone border, ACER has now issued its Decision 02-2025.

Why was a decision needed?

The assessments performed by the Dutch and Norwegian NRAs found insufficient opportunities to hedge electricity prices in their respective bidding zones. Sufficient long-term hedging opportunities are important for market participants to hedge against price volatility and to mitigate uncertainty on future investment returns.

To address this issue, national regulators can request their Transmission System Operators (TSOs) to:

• Issue long-term transmission rights (LTTRs); or
• Ensure the availability of other long-term cross-zonal hedging products that can support the functioning of the wholesale electricity market.

Since the Dutch and Norwegian regulators could not reach an agreement, the decision was referred to ACER and the EFTA Surveillance Authority.

What are long-term transmission rights?

Long-term transmission rights are cross-border hedging tools provided by TSOs, enabling market players to manage price differences between bidding zones and reduce financial risks.

What did ACER decide?

ACER decided against the introduction of long-term transmission rights on the NL-NO2 bidding zone border. ACER’s assessment showed that:

• LTTRs would offer limited improvements to hedging opportunities in the Dutch and NO2 bidding zones;
• Financial LTTRs on this border would likely be undervalued, resulting in higher costs for consumers.

For this reason, ACER has asked the Dutch TSO to explore alternative measures to address insufficient hedging opportunities in these bidding zones.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority will issue a decision for Norway, following the procedure outlined in the EEA Agreement.

What are the next steps?

The Dutch TSO has six months to submit an alternative proposal to its NRA, outlining arrangements to improve hedging opportunities in these bidding zones.

On 20 January 2025, the Dispute Settlement and Sanctions Committee (CoRDiS) of the French energy regulatory authority (CRE) imposed an €8 million fine on Danske Commodities A/S and a €4 million fine on Equinor ASA for manipulating annual capacity auctions at the virtual interconnection point between France and Spain (PIR Pirineos) in 2019 and 2020.

These penalties come under the REMIT Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, which prohibits market manipulation and seeks to protect the integrity and transparency of the EU’s wholesale energy markets.

In its decision, CoRDiS found that Danske Commodities A/S, in collusion with Equinor ASA, had booked higher volumes of transmission capacity than those offered in the first round of PRISMA annual gas capacity auctions for PIR Pirineos in July 2019 and July 2020. This was done without the intention of acquiring such capacity, sending false or misleading signals regarding the demand for annual gas transmission capacity from France to Spain via the PIR Pirineos interconnection point.

The investigation revealed that the objective of this behaviour was to create market congestion and prevent the application of multipliers to the prices of gas transmission capacities on the infra-annual market, which are meant to incentivise the booking of annual transmission capacities. By placing non-genuine offers in the first round of auctions for annual gas transmission capacity and creating congestion, Danske Commodities A/S and Equinor ASA prevented the application of multipliers, reducing the price of gas transmission capacities on the infra-annual market and setting the market price at an artificial level.

CoRDiS considers this behaviour a violation of REMIT Article 5, which prohibits actions that give or are likely to give false or misleading signals about the supply, demand, or price of wholesale energy products, or which secure or are likely to secure the price at an artificial level.

ACER welcomes this first REMIT decision of 2025 and appreciates CRE’s continued efforts to strengthen market integrity.

Access the CoRDiS decision, CoRDiS' press release and CRE's press release (all in French).

See the latest table of REMIT breach sanction decisions adopted by national regulatory authorities.

Check the ACER REMIT Guidance (6.1st edition) for more information on the types of trading practices which could constitute market manipulation under REMIT.

Interested in further information on enforcement decisions under REMIT? Check out ACER’s REMIT Quarterly reports.

Today, ACER releases its report on the Romanian gas transmission tariffs directed at the Autoritatea Naţională de Reglementare în domeniul Energiei (ANRE), the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) of Romania.

The report assesses whether the proposed reference price methodology (RPM) complies with the requirements of the Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff structures (NC TAR). 

What are the key findings?

After analysing the NRA’s consultation document, ACER finds that, while most of the required information is available, the absence of important elements prevents a complete assessment of the proposed methodology’s compliance with the Network Code requirements. In particular:

• ANRE did not provide sufficient justification for choosing the proposed postage stamp methodology, making it difficult for stakeholders to evaluate its suitability.
• While the postage stamp methodology may be appropriate, ACER cannot determine its compliance with the NC TAR principles (e.g. cost-reflectivity, preventing cross-subsidisation, and avoiding cross-border trade distortions) without further clarification.
• While the transparency and volume risk criteria of the NC TAR are not directly addressed in the consultation document, ACER could still conclude that the proposed methodology meets these requirements. Additionally, ACER did not identify any discriminatory elements in the proposed RPM.
• Although the criteria for setting non-transmission charges are met, the non-transmission revenue is not included in the allowed revenue, contrary to Network Code requirements.
• Finally, the criteria for setting commodity charges align with NC TAR requirements.

What does ACER recommend?

ACER recommends that the NRA, when adopting its decision, further justify the choice of the proposed RPM by including the following elements:

• Further considerations on the system’s technical characteristics and flow dynamics, focusing on distance as a potential cost driver.
• The conclusions drawn from the comparison of the proposed RPM with the Capacity Weighted Distance (CWD) methodology.
• A detailed assessment of the proposed RPM against all requirements outlined in Article 7 of the NC TAR.

ACER also invites ANRE to clarify how costs associated with the inclusion of the “transit” pipeline (part of the Trans-Balkan pipeline infrastructure) in the national transmission system have been taken into account.

Access all ACER reports on national tariff consultation documents.

The EU’s Hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package (2024) aims to support the development of a competitive hydrogen market and the integration of renewable gases into Europe’s energy system. To achieve this, the package extends the role of ACER to include new hydrogen-related tasks.

One of these tasks, set out in the Regulation on hydrogen and decarbonised gas market, requires ACER to issue a recommendation on the methodologies for setting the inter-temporal cost allocation by 5 August 2025 and update it at least every two years. 

To inform the drafting of this recommendation, ACER will seek stakeholder input through a public consultation from 10 to 31 March 2025.

What is inter-temporal cost allocation?

Developing a European hydrogen market will require significant infrastructure investment to transport hydrogen from supply sites to end users. However, funding this infrastructure through traditional regulated tariffs (fees paid by network users) could result in extremely high fees for early users, making hydrogen less affordable and potentially discouraging further demand.

To address this issue, the Regulation on hydrogen and decarbonised gas market grants Member States the authority to allow hydrogen network operators to recover infrastructure costs over time through inter-temporal cost allocation mechanisms. These aim to ensure a fair distribution of costs between early and future hydrogen consumers, ensuring that the former are not disproportionately burdened.

ACER’s recommendation will provide guidance to Transmission System Operators (TSOs), Distribution System Operators (DSOs), hydrogen network operators, and National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) on how to develop and implement these mechanisms effectively.