The Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) has imposed a €1 million fine on Enérgya VM Gestión de Energía, S.L.U. for manipulating the Spanish gas market.

This penalty comes under the REMIT Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, which prohibits market manipulation and seeks to protect the integrity and transparency of the EU’s wholesale energy markets.

In its decision, CNMC found that Enérgya VM Gestión de Energía had breached Article 5 of REMIT, specifically Article 2.2.a.ii, in artificially setting the price by marking the reference ‘precio último diario’ (last daily price) for the Mibgas Spanish product D+1 across 32 trading sessions from 1 September to 31 December 2022.

The investigation revealed that Enérgya VM Gestión de Energía placed purchase orders without the intention of executing them, with bids entered between 0 and 7 seconds before the trading session’s closing. This behaviour minimised the risk of the Enérgya VM Gestión de Energía bids being matched by other market participants.

As a result of Enérgya VM Gestión de Energía’s actions, in the 32 trading sessions reported the closing bid-ask spread was reduced, impacting the calculation method of the last daily price that resulted artificially inflated.

ACER welcomes this decision by CNMC, which seeks to promote the transparency and integrity of the Spanish natural gas market.

Access the Decision and CNMC’s press release (both in Spanish).

See the latest table of REMIT breach sanction decisions adopted by national regulatory authorities.

Check the ACER REMIT Guidance (6th edition) for more information on the types of trading practices which could constitute market manipulation under REMIT.

Interested in further information on enforcement decisions under REMIT? Check out ACER’s REMIT Quarterly reports.

On 30 August 2024, future hydrogen transmission network operators submitted their draft statutory documents to the European Commission and ACER to formally establish the European Network of Network Operators for Hydrogen (ENNOH) as an association under the Belgian law. These include the draft statutes, a list of members and draft rules of procedure (including the rules of procedure on the consultation of stakeholders).

Following the receipt of these documents, ACER has four months to review them and provide an opinion to the Commission.

What is ENNOH?

In December 2021, the European Commission proposed the Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market package, updating the common rules on the internal market in natural gas and introducing a new regulatory framework for the hydrogen market. The new package (adopted in June 2024 through Directive 2024/1788 and Regulation 2024/1789) requires the establishment of ENNOH as an independent body to facilitate the cooperation of the EU’s hydrogen transmission network operators.

What are the next steps?

To inform its opinion, ACER will conduct a public consultation to gather inputs from stakeholders.

The public consultation will run from 23 September to 21 October 2024.

ACER has until 30 December 2024 to provide its opinion to the European Commission. As a final step, the Commission will issue its own opinion to the future hydrogen network operators, taking into account ACER’s opinion.

The Capacity Allocation Mechanisms Network Code (CAM NC) harmonises how Transmission System Operators (TSOs) offer and allocate available gas transmission pipeline capacity to network users. With Europe’s decarbonisation goals and the evolving gas market, the network code, last amended in 2017, now needs to be updated.

To address this, ACER initiated the revision process earlier this year. In autumn, ACER will hold a final public consultation to collect stakeholders’ feedback on its draft proposals.

The revision process

The revision process is informed by new regulatory elements from the hydrogen and gas decarbonisation package, ACER’s initial analysis of the network code's achievements and areas for improvement, alongside continuous dialogue with stakeholders:

• ACER conducted a preliminary analysis (from October 2023 to January 2024) to identify main achievements and potential improvements to the CAM NC (see the scoping consultation and the workshop).
• These findings were shared with the European Commission, which prompted ACER to initiate the revision process.  
• In spring 2024, ACER developed a policy paper proposing potential improvements to the CAM NC, and sought feedback through a public consultation.
• A technical workshop was held in July 2024 to further discuss the proposed revisions with the consultation respondents.

What are the next steps?

ACER will hold a final public consultation from 26 September to 25 October 2024 to ensure the proposed amendments effectively address market needs and deliver the expected improvements.  

The CAM NC revision process will conclude with ACER’s recommendations to the Commission (expected by December 2024), which is responsible for revising the text of the network code.

On 31 July 2024, ACER received a proposal from Transmission System Operators (TSOs) to amend the harmonised methodology for cross-zonal capacity allocation for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves.

What is the methodology about?

This methodology provides a harmonised approach for effective allocation of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves. Having an optimised allocation of cross-zonal capacity is important to:

• Foster the integration of balancing capacity markets.
• Lower the costs of procuring balancing capacity (hence the costs for tariff payers).
• Ensure the security of electricity supply.

The methodology harmonises the processes (i.e. market-based and co-optimisation) that compare the market value of cross-zonal capacity between balancing capacity and day-ahead electricity markets. These processes then allocate the available cross-zonal capacity to each market in a way that maximises overall welfare.

Why amend the methodology?

The current methodology was approved by ACER in July 2023.

Amending the methodology is necessary to clarify the governance of the market-based process, covering both its implementation and operation. This aims to ensure the process runs efficiently and encourage more TSOs to apply it.

Additionally, TSOs proposed to:

• Establish a process and governance framework to set different maximum limits for exchanging balancing capacity or sharing reserves.
• Amend the provisions to distribute congestion income among TSOs.
• Allow the possibility of delaying the implementation of the harmonised market-based process beyond 31 July 2026.

What are the next steps?

ACER expects to:

• Run a public consultation from 16 September to 14 October 2024 to collect views from stakeholders and inform its decision-making process.
• Reach a decision by 31 January 2025.

Update as of 30 January 2025: with its Decision 01-2025, ACER adopted the amended methodology.

Today, ACER publishes its report on the Danish non-transmission tariffs proposed by Energinet, Denmark’s Transmission System Operator (TSO). These tariffs cover the costs of Denmark’s emergency supply services, such as filling gas storage and providing emergency gas supply to non-protected consumers.

The proposed methodology includes:

• An ex-ante tariff, calculated using a postage stamp reference price methodology (RPM), which distributes emergency service costs equally among all non-protected consumers.
• An ex-post compensation, which adjusts cost allocation after gas is delivered based on the actual gas volumes received by each non-protected consumer during an emergency.

What are the key findings?

ACER evaluated the compliance of the proposed methodology with the requirements of the Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures (NC TAR) and notes:

• The ex-ante postage stamp tariff does not consider the varying risks of supply interruption among different non-protected customers.
• Non-protected consumers receive equal protection for the first 72 hours after emergency measures begin. After this period, the risk of gas supply interruptions may depend on the remaining gas volumes.
• Designing a cost-reflective ex-ante tariff is highly challenging due to information confidentiality and the uncertainty of supply emergencies.
• In the event of a supply emergency, the ex-post compensation increases cost reflectivity by adjusting the initial tariff to reflect the actual level of interruption for each non-protected customer.
• The consultation document lacks sufficient information on the functioning of the ex-post compensation mechanism.

ACER concludes that the proposed non-transmission tariffs comply with the NC TAR and recommends the Danish regulatory authority to ensure greater transparency by providing more detailed information on the ex-post compensation mechanism in their next decision.

Access all ACER reports on national tariff consultation documents.